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Preface
When we reason about what to do we try to include everything that we think
might affect the outcome of our decision. When choosing between different
career options, for instance, we may take into account things such as the
earnings potential, work hours, prestige and social benefit of the career
options. But often we fail to include something in our deliberation, even
though it could affect the outcome of our decision in an important way.
It is this limited appreciation of the full scope of relevant possibilities—
dubbed limited awareness—that is the topic of this book. Navigating limited
awareness is a pervasive aspect of our reasoning, and yet it has hitherto
been relatively little studied.
The most dramatic cases of limited awareness are when we simply
lack the conceptual resources to entertain the possibilities in question. For
instance, there may be features of our solar system—not captured by our
best scientific theories—that bear on whether or not to pursue a career as
an astronaut, that even the most educated person could not entertain. To
give a historical example, when early industrialists reasoned about their
actions, they failed to account for the possibility of a “greenhouse effect” at
the global level; this was well beyond their scientific comprehension of the
world at the time. (In this historical case, the awareness gap was eventually
filled, but there may be some awareness gaps that humanity will never fill.)
Other cases of limited awareness are more mundane. Sometimes we fail
to account for relevant possibilities in our decision-making due to a mo-
mentary lack of perspective—a failure to consider some otherwise familiar
contingency that bears on the decision at hand. For instance, we might
reason impeccably about career choices on the basis of a select set of career
characteristics, but overlook other characteristics, say concerning health,
that for some reason happen to be inaccessible to us at the time.
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Given that it covers both of the above types of cases, the category of
“limited awareness”, as used in this book, is broad. That is, it covers both
dramatic and more mundane sorts of conceptual inaccessibility. This may
not be the only way to conceive of an agent’s awareness and the limitations
thereof; but it is one that suits the context of decision making, which is
the focus of this book. (Arguably, any study of an agent’s belief state and
associated awareness must make reference to some function or role that the
beliefs play, whether in decision making or otherwise.)
To be more precise, according to our use of “awareness”, an agent counts
as being aware of a possibility in a decision situation just in case she could
in that situation, without either further evidence gathering or reflection,
factor the possibility into the decision. The reasons why an agent cannot
factor a possibility into a decision in a particular situation can therefore be
anything from limited conceptual resources to mere absent-mindedness (as
one might call it). Indeed, the line between these, as far as decision making
is concerned, is far from sharp.
The main aim of this book is to introduce the topic of limited awareness,
and changes in awareness, to those interested in the philosophy of decision-
making and uncertain reasoning. While it has long been of interest to
economists and computer scientists, this topic has only recently been subject
to philosophical investigation. Indeed, at first sight limited awareness
seems to evade any systematic treatment: it is beyond the uncertainty that
can be managed. On the one hand, an agent has no control over what
contingencies she is and is not aware of at a given time, and any awareness
growth takes her by surprise, at least in the sense that she can never predict
what she might become aware of. On the other hand, agents apparently
learn to identify the situations in which they are more and less likely to
experience limited awareness and subsequent awareness growth. In other
words, agents can predict that they will become more aware. How can these
two sides be reconciled? That is the puzzle we confront in this book.
We propose a way of conceiving limited awareness that does justice to
its elusive character. While we build on earlier work of others, our analysis
departs from this previous work in various ways. We accept that awareness
growth can have radical and unpredictable effects on an agent’s beliefs.
But we argue that this does not preclude anticipating awareness growth.
Moreover, we argue that unlike the effects of experiencing “unexpected”
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awareness growth, the effects of anticipating awareness growth are both
quite predictable and can be captured without too radical a departure from
the standard (Bayesian) model of rational preference and belief.
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1.1 Roadmaps to the unknown
This book is about our plight as reasoning agents in the world. That is, our
plight as agents who seek to understand the world and how we can change
it to best align with our ends. This requires some ingenuity because our
perspective on the world is inherently limited. Think of it this way: our
experience is confined to a more or less tiny patch of the world’s history, so
we can be certain of relatively little. The best we can do is try to account
for all the contingencies, that is, all the ways the world might be, in at least
as much detail as is relevant for our purposes. In this way we can build
ourselves a roadmap, so to speak, for navigating the unknown.
Consider, for instance, the reasoning of a single-minded conservationist
who cares only about eradicating weeds and pests. At a particular juncture,
our conservationist deems that she has a limited set of options: she can
release a moth that will hopefully eat the non-native cactus plant known
as “prickly pear”, or she can continue with the status quo, whereby all
resources are devoted to manually uprooting the pear. Our conservationist
judges that which of the two options will best realise her ends depends on
whether or not the world is such that the moth will eat (and kill) the prickly
pear if released, and this she is unsure about. That is, these are the two
possible states of the world that the conservationist deems relevant to her
decision.
The conservationist’s problem is summarised in table 1.1, where the
columns represent the states of the world and the rows represent the avail-
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able options; the interior cells of the table depict the outcomes in each state
of choosing each option. So, depending on how the world turns out, or
the true state of the world, the options yield different outcomes. In this
case, there are trade-offs between the options across the states: releasing
the moth is better if the first state is true while the status quo is better if the
second state is true.
moth eats pear if released moth fails to eat pear if released
Release moth pear eradicated pear thriving, wasted resources
Status quo pear thriving pear thriving
Table 1.1: A simple roadmap for navigating the unknown, a.k.a. a decision
model.
The prickly pear decision is a highly stylised one, but it exemplifies the
general predicament we reasoning agents face, day in and day out. We
are condemned to live as gamblers. By our own lights, our choices are
nearly always risky ventures—we are not assured that the world will turn
out one way or another, and thus whether our ends will be served more
or less well by any given choice of option. Not only are we limited by our
practical circumstances—the options we have to change the world—but
we are limited also by our epistemic circumstances—the ability we have to
discern what is true of the world and thus which of our options serve us
best, and even what are our options.
To say that we live as gamblers in fact understates the precariousness of
our position in the world as reasoners. For one thing, the gambles we face
in the pursuit of our ends are not like games of roulette or dice for which
the probability of the outcomes is typically thought to be objective and easy
to calculate. (We’ll briefly return to this point a little latter; it has been much
studied elsewhere.) The other thing—the main topic of this book—is that
we typically do not have a good grasp of what are all the possible outcomes
or contingencies that are relevant to the decision at hand. That is, it is not
just that we confront the world not knowing which of the possible states
of the world is actual, but we do not even know what are the pertinent
possibilities to begin with. Throughout the book we refer to this latter
predicament as limited awareness. Another form of limited awareness that
will occasionally come up in this book concerns the options available to an
agent. In addition to not knowing which amongst the options she considers
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will best serve her ends, an agent may often not even know what are the
options available to her.
The twenty-first-century reader may indeed have been struck by the
limited awareness of our conservationist introduced above. This stylised
example is in fact inspired by a historical episode in environmental man-
agement in Australia. (The prickly pear episode in Australia in the 1920s
had a happy ending, as the moth that was released did in fact eradicate the
highly invasive cactus. But there were other prominent cases of introduced
biological pest controls in Australia that did not end so well.) With the
benefit of hindsight, we can see that the conservationist failed to appreciate
the complexity of decisions to introduce a biological pest control; she failed
to consider other contingencies that were relevant to her decision, such as
that the introduced moth might itself become a pest, eating native plant
species instead of the target cactus plant. In addition, modern conserva-
tionists may see that our simple-minded conservationist failed to consider
other viable options, say a targeted chemical pest control or an alternative
biological pest control, which might have served her ends at a lower risk to
the ecosystem.
Let us give another stylised historical example that also highlights, and
perhaps even more clearly, limited awareness due to the body of scientific
knowledge available to the relevant decision-makers at the time. Although
the possibility that human activity could change the climate through the
“greenhouse effect” had been discovered during the 19th century, it was
only in the 1970s that it became relatively widely known that greenhouse
gas emissions were wreaking havoc on our planet. Thus, when the first
hydropower plant was built in Iceland in 1904, the country’s contribution
to climate change did not figure in the reasoning of the country’s decision-
makers. At the time, coal was the most common energy source in Europe,
and importing coal instead seemed to some to be a viable alternative to
building hydropower plants. Today, about 55% of Iceland’s energy con-
sumption comes from hydropower and only about 2% comes from coal,
compared to a global average of 6% from hydropower and 25% from coal.
So, given the pressing need to tackle the climate crisis—and since the cli-
mate impact of hydropower is generally much lower than that of burning
coal—the decision to invest in hydropower was arguably right. Neverthe-
less, today we see that the decision was not based on all the best reasons;
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after all, the decision-makers in question were unaware of one of the best
reasons for choosing hydropower over coal. In addition, these decision-
makers were, we can safely assume, unaware of some of the options for
generating significant amounts of energy that we are aware of today, such
as those harnessing wind and solar power.
Examples from history allow us to witness limited awareness, and sub-
sequent growth in awareness. But fast forward now to the present. A little
reflection suggests that limited awareness is not something that we reason-
ers have overcome. We continue to face novel scenarios and have our own
forms of limited awareness. An example we focus on (in chapter 6) is solar
radiation management. This is a technique that could reduce (and perhaps
even revert) climate change. But even its proponents admit that predicting
the consequences of adopting solar radiation management on a global scale
goes beyond today’s scientific knowledge. Or consider carbon capture and
storage. This is a relatively new technology, which consists in capturing
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and typically storing it underground, and
which could be critical in combating the climate crisis. However, important
uncertainties remain, for instance, about the impact of long-term under-
ground storage of the captured carbon. Again, since this is a rather new
and radical technology, the history of technological innovation would seem
to suggest that it could result in consequences of which we are currently
unaware.
It is these types of trying epistemic circumstances—the unavoidably
parochial view of the world held by agents ranging from private citizens
to individual public servants to the global community—that is the topic
of this book. The examples we will appeal to include dramatic cases of
limited awareness and subsequent growth that involve novel combinations
of concepts (e.g., a “greenhouse effect” at the global level prior to the 20th
century) or even novel concepts simpliciter (e.g., an “electron” prior to the
late 19th century). But we will also appeal to more mundane cases of limited
awareness and subsequent growth due to temporary shifts in attention or
imaginative ability. The plight of the conservationist, an example we will
pursue in this introductory chapter, arguably lies somewhere in the middle
of the spectrum.
There are two things to say about our liberal stance on what counts as
limited awareness, that may help orient the reader from the outset as to the
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target of our inquiry and our approach. The first is that, as the reader may
well discern, we examine limited awareness in a practical decision-making
context (and as such we will be appealing to and extending the tools of
“Bayesian decision theory”). While we focus on decision making, we have
little to say about an agent’s basic values or ends; we simply take them as
given. (That is, we leave the analysis of values or ends for others to address.)
Nonetheless these ends have an important bearing on our epistemological
project. It is not just that we are ultimately interested in how an agent
reasons about what to do to further her ends. Our very understanding of
her epistemic state and associated (limited) awareness is intimately tied to
the pursuit of her ends.
Moreover, we doubt whether an agent’s epistemic state and its limita-
tions can even be well understood in the absence of some functional role
that the epistemic state plays. The functional role that we are interested in
is decision making, but we allow that others may have different projects in
mind and may thus understand an agent’s epistemic state and her limited
awareness in different ways that are moreover less liberal about what is
genuine limited awareness and what is a mere mistake. That is, although
we think that limited awareness is an important phenomenon that may be
explored in a range of guises, by appeal to a variety of models, our particu-
lar interest is limited awareness in the context of decision making. As such,
we deem limited awareness to be concerned with whatever is the agent’s
decision frame at the time. In particular, we take an agent to be aware
of a possibility, in a given decision situation, just in case she could in that
situation—without either further evidence gathering or, say, overcoming
any defects in imagination—factor the possibility into her decision. Her
awareness may in this sense be limited and subject to growth.
Our conservationist, for instance, may well have many (at least implicit)
ideas about the way the world is, including the weather, her family and
friends, and so on. But these ideas are in a sense idle, at least in the context
of her current options and ends, which concern the eradication of pests.
Generally speaking, there may or may not be a richer story to tell about an
agent’s epistemic life. This book, however, aims only to capture a part of
this story. When we talk of an agent’s epistemic perspective, we mean her
current views about the possible contingencies, or ways the world might be,
in so far as those contingencies play a role in her reasoning about what to do
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now to further her ends. In other words, an agent’s epistemic perspective is
relative to a decision problem, on this picture.
The second thing to note is that, while we thus seem to engage with
rather hapless agents—including agents that may seem quite far from any
ideal state of awareness, even accounting for the limitations of the best
science of the day—our project remains normative. We will examine how
an agent should, rationally speaking, navigate her limited awareness and
awareness growth. In particular, we take as our starting point agents’
differing degrees of awareness—and, as we shall later see, the different
extent to which agents are aware of their unawareness—and we ask what
principles of rationality such agents should satisfy, for instance, when their
awareness grows, or when they simply predict awareness growth. So, the
book seeks to answer normative questions about agents who are less than
epistemically ideal, in that they lack full awareness.
Now, any normative project of this kind will inevitably to some extent
be prescriptive. That is, the principles of rationality we discuss are useful
not just for assessing the rationality of agents, but also for guiding their
deliberations. But our primary aim is the former rather than the latter;
we do not set out to offer principles that it would necessarily be wise
(or even possible) to apply whenever one finds one self in, say, a state of
growing awareness, or anticipated awareness growth. Still, we hope that
by, for instance, learning about what principles one should ideally satisfy
in situations of limited unawareness—and, moreover, by thinking more
about the nature of (un)awareness and the situations where people have
previously been demonstrably unaware—our book can help the reader
make better decisions and reach more justified conclusions, when she finds
herself in such situations.
1.2 Internal consistency and its limits
Since we will investigate limited awareness in the context of an agent’s
decision making, we will appeal to standard (Bayesian) decision theory as
our starting point. In the remainder of this introductory chapter we will
explain how we will build upon standard decision theory—why it does
not accommodate limited awareness and what we will seek to fill in, in the
book.
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The standard decision-theoretic account of our reasoning goes beyond
simple roadmaps such as those we described above. The roadmaps that the
theory offers do not only account for the supposed possible contingencies
or ways the world might be, but also, typically, their relative plausibility.
To be rational, i.e., to reason well, one’s judgements of relative plausibility
must be internally consistent. Another requirement of rationality is that
one’s judgements of relative desirability be internally consistent. Indeed,
decision theory can be understood as a theory of internal consistency. It
tells how our epistemic and evaluative judgements or attitudes must “hang
together” so as to yield clear choices of action that are not self-defeating
with respect to our ends.
This book is about the limits of internal consistency, in particular due
to an agent’s (limited) awareness, or what she perceives to be the possible
contingencies or ways the world might be. But we need an understanding
of the guidance that internal consistency can provide in order to see what are
the shortcomings of this guidance. In what follows, we start by articulating
the guidance (1.2.1), before looking more closely at how arguments from
internal consistency work (1.2.2) and what are their inherent limitations
(1.2.3). One way to understand the point of this book, is that we want to
go beyond the uncertainty that decision theory typically deals with, that
is, beyond the type of uncertainty that can be treated normatively in terms
of internal consistency. However, we acknowledge that we are only taking
one step beyond this uncertainty, and that further steps may have to be
taken.
1.2.1 Introducing probabilities
We said that agents consider the relative plausibility of the possible ways the
world might be. Put differently, agents have varying degrees of confidence—
also known as degrees of belief, or as credences, which is the term we shall
mostly use—in ways the world might be. It is as if they weigh the competing
possibilities on a set of scales with multiple arms. The common wisdom
is that, as an arm gets more weight, the others should collectively get less
weight. To be more precise: credences are rational only if they can be
represented as probabilities. This norm is often referred to as probabilism.
For instance, if our conservationist assigns much weight, or has relatively
high credence, say, of 0.9, in the moth eating the pear if released, then on
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pain of inconsistency she must assign little weight, or have relatively low
credence, here 0.1, in the moth not eating the pear if released.
Let us more thoroughly describe our conservationist’s credences, as
pertinent to the choice problem depicted in table 1.1. As noted, what
matters for determining how well her options realise her ends is whether the
released moth will eat the prickly pear or not—that is, which of these states
of the world is actual—which we can denote M and¬M respectively. Strictly
speaking, our conservationist is also unsure about what she will do, whether
she will release the moth or not, denoted R and ¬R respectively. This yields
four relevant possibilities for how the world might be: R&M, R&¬M,¬R&M
and ¬R&¬M. We assume that our conservationist has credences in each of
these fine-grained possibilities or sure outcomes that are each non-negative
and together sum to one. Her credences in all other propositions can be
derived in conformity with the probability calculus. Moreover, presumably
our conservationist’s credences in M versus ¬M do not depend on her
credences in R versus ¬R. That is, P(M|R) = P(M|¬R), where P represents
the agent’s credences, and P(M|R) denotes her conditional credence in M
given R. That is, in this case we have act-state probabilistic independence, but
this need not always be so.1
Table 1.1 is the most economical depiction of our conservationist’s choice
problem. But note that the view of the world she brings to bear on this
choice problem, and her associated credences, may be somewhat more
complicated. Perhaps she entertains other potential properties of the world
in an effort to form judgments about the relevant states of the world. For
instance, perhaps our conservationist recognises that there may or may not
be a drought during the year following the potential release of the moth,
denoted D and ¬D respectively. She does not care about droughts. Our
assumption is that she cares only about the eradication of weeds and pests.
So in a sense whether or not there is a drought does not matter to her.
Nonetheless, the consideration of whether there will be a drought may
assist our conservationist in forming her credences in M and ¬M. After
all, by the law of total probability, P(M) = P(M&D) + P(M&¬D). Plausibly,
our conservationist arrives at a settled credence in M by considering her
“component” credences in P(M&D) and P(M&¬D). This is to say that our
1The knowledgeable reader may discern that our presentation of the agent’s decision
model follows that of Jeffrey (1965), as opposed to Savage (1954).
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conservationist’s roadmap may look more like table 1.2 (which, along with
table 1.3, is produced at the very end of this introduction).
In general, there is a space of propositions describing ways the world could be
about which the agent has an opinion that bears on her practical reasoning at
some given time. This space of propositions about which she has an opinion
is assumed to have a certain completeness in structure. In technical terms,
it forms an algebra F with the following characteristics (which means that
it is what is called a Boolean algebra):
• F contains a contradictory proposition (⊥).
• F contains a tautologous proposition (>).
• F is closed under disjunction, conjunction, and negation. That is, if
A and B are in F , then A ∨ B, A&B and ¬A and ¬B are also in F .
The rational agent has credences in the propositions in F that can be rep-
resented by a probability function P. That is, P(A) ∈ [0, 1] for all A in F ;
P(⊥) = 0; P(>) = 1; P(A ∨ B) = P(A) + P(B) for all mutually exclusive A and
B in F .
1.2.2 Rationality as internal consistency
Why think that rational credences are probabilities? There are various
arguments for this position. A relatively straightforward one is known
as the “Dutch book argument”.2 It turns on the claim that an agent’s
credences are effectively her “betting odds” or the proportion of the stakes
she’d be willing to pay for a bet that yields the stakes if the proposition in
question turns out true but yields nothing otherwise. It is shown that if
and only if her betting odds over the space of propositions conform to the
probability calculus, the agent is not vulnerable to accepting a set of bets that
would guarantee her a sure loss (measured in monetary terms). Positioning
oneself for a sure loss is considered a marker of inconsistency, albeit of a
pragmatic kind. So one’s credences had better be probabilities. Note that
other arguments for credences being probabilities turn on inconsistencies
of a non-pragmatic kind. For instance, credences that do not conform to the
probability calculus are shown to be accuracy dominated in the sense that
2The first suggestion of the Dutch book argument is due to Ramsey (1926).
14 1. INTRODUCTION
some alternative probabilistic credence function would be more accurate
(roughly, closer to the truth) no matter how the world turns out.3
We have been emphasising the role of rational credences in deliberating
about what to do. Indeed, the standard wisdom is that probabilistic cre-
dences, together with a cardinal value or utility function over sure outcomes
(in our example: the cell entries in table 1.1)—which represents how much
the agent in question values the sure outcomes—determine the expected
utility of risky options, which is the basis for their relative desirability and
thus choice-worthiness. The expected utility of an option (or indeed any
prospect or claim about the world represented by a proposition) is the sum
of the probability of each possible way in which the option or prospect may
be true multiplied by the utility of that way it may be true. The higher the
expected utility, the better, according to expected utility theory.
To make the above more concrete, recall the choice problem of our con-
servationist, as represented by table 1.1. The conservationist is considering
two options: release the moth (R), and don’t release the moth (¬R). There
are only two states of the world that she considers relevant to the outcome of
her options: the moth eats the pear if released (M) or it does not (¬M). Now
let U be the conservationist’s utility function over sure outcomes. Then the
expected utility (EU) of the conservationist’s options, according to her, are
given by:
EU(R) = U(R&M)P(M | R) + U(R&¬M)P(¬M | R)
EU(¬R) = U(¬R&M)P(M | ¬R) + U(¬R&¬M)P(¬M | ¬R)
By the aforementioned assumption that act-state probabilistic indepen-
dence holds in this case, the above equations reduce to:
EU(R) = U(R&M)P(M) + U(R&¬M)P(¬M)
EU(¬R) = U(¬R&M)P(M) + U(¬R&¬M)P(¬M)
There are again various arguments for why one ought to evaluate and
rank risky options according to their expected utility.4 (Call this the expected
utility principle.) One kind of argument appeals to the infinite long run:
expected utility matches what one would be more or less sure to gain
3See, e.g., Joyce (1998).
4For overviews of these arguments, see Briggs (2017) and Steele and Stefánsson (2015).
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were the choice repeated over and over (provided certain independence
conditions hold between the individual decisions). The more prominent
kind of argument is known as the expected utility representation theorem,
which is all-encompassing in that it supposedly justifies rational credences
being probabilities together with the expected utility principle, all in one hit.
There are several different versions of this theorem, but they have a similar
form. They appeal to consistency in the ranking of options comprising a
specially engineered rich set of options. (Note that the “ranking” of options
here means how they are ordered in terms of the agent’s judgement of their
relative desirability or “choice-worthiness”.) One consistency requirement,
for instance, is transitivity, which requires that if an agent ranks option
A over B and B over C, then she ranks A over C. In short, the expected
utility theorem is the result that if and only if an agent’s ranking of the
relevant options satisfies a number of consistency constraints including
transitivity, she can be represented as having credences measured by a
probability function and judgments of relative desirability measured by a
cardinal function that conforms with the expected-utility principle.5
What we have just presented is the orthodox position in decision theory.
Indeed, the arguments for rational credences being probabilities and for ra-
tional evaluations of options satisfying the expected utility principle are core
results in decision theory. This is not to say, however, that these arguments
have not been challenged. Different (generally weaker) constraints on what
counts as rational credence have been fruitfully explored, where “rational”
is still understood in terms of internal consistency.6 And different (again,
generally weaker) constraints on rational evaluations of options have also
been fruitfully explored, where, again, “rational” is understood as internal
consistency.7 We do not pursue these debates in this book, however. Rather,
we stick with the orthodoxy, at least to the extent that it is applicable. But
this should not be interpreted as strong endorsement of expected utility
theory. We build on the orthodox theory for reasons of simplicity. The
issues raised in this book concern the limits of internal consistency, and
5For some classical representation theorems, see Ramsey (1926), Savage (1954), and
Bolker (1967).
6In particular, that rational credences need not be precise is a popular view. For an
overview, see Bradley (2019).
7Lara Buchak (2013) has developed an influential theory with weaker constraints on the
evaluation of options than those in orthodox decision theory. Stefánsson and Bradley (2019)
criticise Buchak’s theory and defend an alternative view.
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as such, are orthogonal to the debate between expected utility theory and
alternative formalisations of internal consistency.
1.2.3 Beyond internal consistency
So internal consistency provides standards for our roadmaps. But one
might have further concerns about whether an exemplary roadmap, in this
respect, will really be a good guide to the world. What if the roadmap is not
very faithful to the world, despite being internally consistent? There are
two issues that might come to mind. The first is that the agent’s credences
may not be very sensible. After all, we would not take very seriously an
agent who is extremely confident that the moon is made of green cheese,
even if the agent’s credence function overall conformed to the probability
calculus.
The other issue is that the agent may have limited awareness of the various
contingencies, or possible ways the world might be, such that her perception
of her own decision problem, and what matters, is rather narrow. For in-
stance, perhaps our conservationist simply does not take account of whether
or not there is a drought, and so her credences lack the sophistication that
would come from accounting for this contingency (as per table 1.2 rather
than table 1.1). Worse still perhaps, she might not recognise contingencies
that have a more obvious bearing on her evaluation of outcomes. For in-
stance, our conservationist might not realise that the released moth could
possibly eat native plant species, thereby itself becoming a pest. Table 1.3
includes this contingency in addition to the drought contingency that was
already introduced in table 1.2.8 In addition, and as previously discussed,
our conservationist might not be aware of all the options that are available
to her.
This book is concerned with the problem of limited awareness. We
do not try to address the problem of nonsensical credences. For what it’s
worth, we do not think the two issues are entirely unrelated, since the more
possible ways in which the world might be that an agent is aware of, the
more checks and balances there are on her credences. For instance, if one is
8Table 1.3 is what we later call a refinement of the agent’s possibility space described
in table 1.1. Alternatively, our conservationist might have implicitly assumed that the
moth would not be a pest, and failed to realise that this is not exhaustive of the ways the
world could be (in which case the awareness growth would be what we later refer to as an
expansion).
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to maintain high credence in the moon being made of green cheese, without
there being a conflict within one’s overall credal state, then one needs to
also maintain some other odd credences, like that telescopes are generally
misleading, at least when it comes to the composition of the moon. And
so on. There may be no substantial norms governing the credences that an
agent has at any particular point in time, beyond the probability calculus.
But we leave that as an open question.
1.3 Limited awareness in perspective
So our focus is on how an agent’s roadmap to the unknown may fail to cap-
ture all the important contingencies or ways the world might be. Standard
decision theory is silent on how to respond to this failure. The primary
reason for this is that standard decision theory does not acknowledge the
failure! That is, the theory, as it is standardly used, simply assumes that
a roadmap, at least in outline, is given to a decision-maker, and is only
applicable once the decision-maker has such a roadmap. Another way to
put this is that it is standardly assumed that the framing of a decision prob-
lem, including the relevant space of possibilities, is not part of the theory;
the theory can only be applied given some framing. But a general account
of reasoning should not, we think, overlook issues of framing. Instead,
it should acknowledge that an agent’s roadmap or framing of a decision
problem is integral to her reasoning. And it should say something about
whether a rational agent perceives gaps in her roadmap and how she fills in
those gaps over time. In other words, it should say something about how
to rationally respond to a lack of awareness and growing awareness.
To see that the move to modelling limited awareness is an important
one, let us situate it in a series of developments towards a more thoroughly
subjective decision theory. We are then in a better position to determine
whether this is an important next move.
1.3.1 Towards a truly subjective expected utility theory
Let us return to the development of the standard model. The history of
standard expected utility theory can be understood in terms of social sci-
entists’ efforts to provide operational definitions of key reasoning attitudes
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like credence and desire in more and more realistic settings. We want to
position our inclusion of growing awareness as the natural next step in the
trajectory towards a fully general model of reasoning. To see roughly how
this goes, we will describe an earlier, somewhat analogous move along the
trajectory: the move from the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) model to
that of, say, Savage (1954) or Jeffrey (1965).
Start with the expected utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern
(vNM). The theory establishes the conditions under which an agent ranks
risky options in accordance with their expected utility. But the model vNM
introduce effectively has only one free variable or subjective dimension:
the extent the agent desires or values various outcomes. Other aspects of
the options are fixed since these are assumed to be an objective part of the
decision problem that is not specific to the agent in question. In particu-
lar, the nature of the final outcomes is assumed to be an objective matter,
and moreover transparent to all, as well as the probabilities by which the
various options may yield these outcomes (and, by implication, the options
themselves). The theory establishes that if and only if the agent’s ranking of
these options satisfies some proposed internal consistency constraints, then
the agent’s strength of desire can be measured by a cardinal utility function
(unique up to positive linear transformation) such that she evaluates op-
tions according to their expected utility. (Recall our earlier remarks about
the expected utility theorems.)
The vNM model offers significant insights about the structure of reason-
ing; in particular, it provides a powerful way to measure and thus concep-
tualise strength of desire. The problem is that the model is only applicable
when its assumptions hold. And they rarely do hold (Hansson 2009). In
most choice settings, the probabilities with which the available options yield
the different outcomes are not objective parts of the decision problem, but
are rather something that the decision-maker brings to the decision prob-
lem. Hence the development of expected utility theories that allow for more
subjectivity in the characterisation of the options. The theories of Savage
and Jeffrey, for instance, accommodate desires that are specific to the agent,
as vNM do, but in addition allow for probabilistic credences that are specific
to the agent (subjective desire and credence). The ingenuity of these theories
is that they still allow a way of measuring and thus conceptualising these
attitudes in terms of the agent’s ranking of options (insofar as this ranking
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is internally consistent or rational).
The subjective expected utility theories of Savage and Jeffrey are more
generally applicable than that of vNM. They propose a way of measuring
and thus making sense of subjective desire and credence. But note that
there remains an important “objectivity” assumption: the options that are
ranked are still in large part given to the decision-maker (in the sense of
being an objective part of the decision problem) rather than being specific
to her. In Savage’s model, for instance, the options are functions from states
of the world to outcomes. It is not that the probabilities for the states of
the world are objectively given (as in the vNM model). That is where the
agent’s own credences come in. But the states of the world themselves and
the nature of the outcomes are assumed to be objectively given or external
to the agent’s reasoning.
So while Savage’s and Jeffrey’s theories make an advance on that of von
Neumann and Morgenstern, these theories too have limited applicability.
In particular, they are not applicable when the very states of the world
and outcomes (or more generally, the ways the world might be) cannot
be assumed to be external to the agent but are rather specific to her own
perspective, in particular, her specific level of awareness. That is the kind
of scenario we will focus on in this book.
1.3.2 A limit to what can be modelled?
Now one might think there is nevertheless good reason for not trying to
model limited awareness. To begin with, this arguably makes for one too
many free variables in our model of an agent’s reasoning that cannot, even
in principle, be empirically settled. We lose sight of what our concepts
mean in an operational (or functional) sense, and providing this meaning
was one of the great advances of decision theory. The ingenuity of Savage’s
expected utility theory, for example, is that it offers a way to understand
credence and desire in terms of choice behaviour. But there might seem to
be no conceivable choice scenario that could reveal an agent’s attitude to
an outcome of which she is unaware without thereby making her aware of
the outcome.
Secondly, one might think it is in any case pointless to model limited
awareness in a normative decision model. Lack of awareness is typically
not something that an agent can correct (by herself). Compare this to, say,
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non-transitive preferences. An agent can check for herself whether her
preferences are transitive or not; and if they are not, she can try to make
them transitive. By contrast, an agent normally cannot check whether she is
in fact unaware of something; and even if she suspects that she is unaware of
something, she cannot simply correct for this lack of awareness by becoming
more aware.
These are two important challenges for the project of modelling limited
awareness. We will not, however, respond to either of them directly in a
satisfying way. We rather acknowledge, here at the outset, reasonable scep-
ticism about the project we embark upon. Our hope is that the scepticism
is mitigated by our treatment of limited awareness in the remainder of the
book.
Moreover, we are not alone in the quest to understand limited aware-
ness and how it affects an agent’s reasoning. A small but strong cohort of
economists, computer scientists, and philosophers have already made im-
portant progress towards this goal, and we are indebted to the foundations
they have laid. The very notion of limited awareness—or unawareness,
as they typically call it9—is due to early work by economists and com-
puter scientists. An extensive review of this work can be found in Schipper
(2014). Philosophers too have explored the challenge that growing aware-
ness poses for the traditional probabilist models, typically under the guise
of “the problem of new theories” (Earman 1992; the problem was origi-
nally raised by Glymour 1980 as the counterpart to “the problem of old
evidence”). Richard Bradley (2017) has recently turned philosophical at-
tention to the general problem that (un)awareness poses for rationality; his
own work draws on a series of recent papers by the economists Karni and
Vierø (2013, 2015, 2017).
We will expand on these earlier contributions in relevant places through-
out the book. For now, let us simply give a taste of how the challenges raised
above have been at least partially met by others. For instance, on the first:
Piermont (2017) illustrates how we can, by observing a person’s choices
9Since awareness is typically a matter of degree—in the sense that an agent can be
more or less aware (as in, aware of more or fewer possibilities)—we find the term “limited
awareness” to be more apt, in most cases, than “unawareness”. And indeed that is the
terminology we shall typically use. However, since “unawareness” has come to be widely
used, in particular by economists, for what we think should be called “limited” awareness,
we will occasionally use the term “unawareness” for limited awareness, for instance, when
discussing the works of these economists.
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between what he calls “contingent plans” (that is, conditional options of
the form: if state s obtains, then choose c), tell whether or not a person
anticipates her awareness to grow. In short, the idea is that a person an-
ticipates awareness growth just in case she is willing to take on some cost
to postpone a choice between contingent plans, even when all such plans
that she can conceive of are available. Moreover, Karni and Vierø (2017)
show that even if a person anticipates awareness growth, as long as her
preferences satisfy certain consistency constraints, then she can be repre-
sented as maximizing expected utility. The representation even allows us to
infer how (un)desirable the decision-maker predicts a currently unknown
outcome to be.
Turning to the second challenge: Although it is true that one cannot
determine whether or not one is unaware of something, nor immediately
become aware of that something in case one is unaware, one can take steps to
increase one’s level of awareness if one suspects that there is something one
is unaware of. That is, one can conduct (formal or informal) experiments
that can be expected to reveal contingencies that one is unaware of, if
there are such contingencies. Moreover, one can make plans for how one
will adjust one’s attitudes, and what choices one will make, if one does
become more aware. In fact, it would seem that one should in certain choice
situations suspect that there is something that one is unaware of; hence,
one arguably should, in some situations, make plans for how to respond to
growing awareness.
The issues just raised—concerning how one should respond to aware-
ness growth and the extent to which one can and should plan for such
growth—will be explored in a systematic fashion throughout the book
(more on how we will proceed shortly). For the moment, the idea is just to
get a feel for how (un)awareness, as amorphous as it may sound, nonethe-
less admits of structured treatment according to usual decision theoretic
principles. That said, we are sympathetic to the general worry that there
is only so much that can be said or done about limited awareness. It is
just that, notwithstanding the significant and pioneering contributions to
date, not enough has yet been said. Limited awareness and its perils is
an interesting aspect of our epistemic predicament, and it has not yet been
addressed in a fully general and comprehensive way. This book is intended
as a step towards remedying that situation.
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1.4 How we will proceed
As noted, we will approach the problem of limited awareness in an incre-
mental fashion. Even if it turns out that there is little to say about one’s
limited awareness at a time, there is plausibly a lot to say about changes in
awareness, specifically awareness growth, over time. After all, our roadmaps
for navigating the unknown are not finished deeds but rather works in
progress. They are subject to feedback from the world itself, as events
unfold and the agent comes to new realisations. That is, in any case, the
starting insight for the approach taken in this book. We will approach the
issue of limited awareness—what it is and whether there is anything to be
done about it—by considering first changes in awareness.
In fact we begin in chapter 2 at an even more preliminary point. We
consider, in qualitative terms, the kinds of feedback that the world may pro-
vide on our reasoning roadmaps. As said, these roadmaps are not finished
deeds. Consider our conservationist. Subsequent to her deliberations, let’s
say she releases the moth. The story does not end there of course. Presum-
ably, after some time, it will be apparent to her whether or not the prickly
pear has been eradicated, and thus which state of the world is actual. A
more thorough roadmap than those we have considered thus far would in
fact seek to anticipate such learning events. That is, in addition to other sorts
of properties of the world, such as whether a moth population will eradi-
cate a prickly pear population, it may be important to also anticipate one’s
interactions with the world, in particular, what one will learn and when,
and what options one may choose between and when. The popular format
for these more thorough roadmaps is the sequential-decision model. Chap-
ter 2 proposes a way to read such models. But no matter how thorough,
a roadmap that attempts to account for all relevant future contingencies
comes up against the world as time unfolds. Actual events will either be
consistent with the roadmap or not.
In chapter 3 we elaborate on the kind of feedback from the world that
is the focus of this book—the realisation of unfamiliar contingencies, or in
other words, the realisation of limited awareness. We articulate the different
types of awareness growth that such a realisation may herald, and go on to
consider how such growth is best modelled. We finally reflect on how our
approach to awareness growth borrows insights from the work of others
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across different disciplines.
Chapters 4 and 5 go on to consider the impact of awareness growth on
rational credences. While others who have investigated this question have
a rather sanguine view of the impact of awareness growth on credences,
we argue that awareness growth may have highly disruptive, far-reaching
impacts, at least in some cases. We proceed to offer a characterisation of
the better behaved cases: when awareness growth has a more conservative
impact on one’s credences.
We then turn, in chapters 6 and 7, to the question of whether there
is anything to be done in advance to stave off radical changes in one’s
credences due to awareness growth. We argue that there is a sense in which
one can and indeed should plan ahead for awareness growth, even if, at
the end of the day, there are no assurances that awareness will not change
in unforeseen ways. Encouraging decision-makers to plan for awareness
growth, as well as providing them with the tools for such planning, is
arguably decision theory’s most important contribution to the problem of
limited awareness.


























































































































and the test of time
2.1 Introduction
As we explained in the introductory chapter, one can view the introduc-
tion of limited awareness into decision models as the natural next stage in
decision theory’s historical trajectory, from the “objective” expected utility
theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) to the “subjective” ex-
pected utility theories of Savage (1954) and Jeffrey (1965). In this chapter
we begin the task of articulating what a more thoroughly subjective decision
model that can accommodate changes in awareness looks like.
The starting point for our investigation is the experience of failure. In
the course of time, it often becomes apparent that one’s roadmap or decision
model has failed to account for all contingencies. The recognition of failure,
we suggest, is the first step to i) acknowledging limited awareness and
subsequent growth in awareness and ii) reflecting on when such growth
might happen again. These are the major themes to be developed later in
this book.
There are in fact several kinds of feedback that the world may provide on
one’s roadmap. The failure to account for all contingencies is just one kind
of feedback. This chapter will consider the other kinds of feedback as well,
by way of putting limited awareness in perspective. First, however, we need
to introduce a more detailed kind of roadmap, known as a sequential-decision
model. Such a model makes explicit an important kind of future contingency:
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the agent’s own interactions with the world—not only when and what she
will be able to choose but also when and what she will learn about the world.
An important aspect of the feedback that the world provides is whether an
agent learns the things about the world that she expects to learn.
This chapter thus proceeds, in section 2.2, to lay out sequential-decision
models. We can then identify, in section 2.3, four major kinds of feedback
the world may provide on such models. Once we have limited awareness
in perspective, we can elaborate on the particular forms it may take and
how it is best modelled. But that task must wait until the next chapter.
2.2 Situating oneself in the stream of events
Return to the plight of our single-minded conservationist. Assume, for
starters, that the contingencies she is tracking (apart from her own choice
of action) concern whether or not the moth eats the pear if released, and
whether or not there is a drought. That is, her roadmap, or personal decision
model, is as per the second decision problem in the introductory chapter,
reproduced below in abbreviated form.
eats; drought eats; no drought no eats; drought no eats; no drought
Release moth eradicated eradicated thriving, waste thriving, waste
Status quo thriving thriving thriving thriving
Table 2.1: Conservationist’s roadmap
Let us now add some further detail to our conservationist’s roadmap,
concerning her other interactions with the world. As noted above, such
interactions may include i) when she receives information from the world,
which we may refer to as “learning events”, and ii) when she makes a
choice that impacts on the world, which we may refer to as “choice events”.1
Besides her choice of whether or not to release the moth, let us assume that
our conservationist predicts only one relevant interaction with the world:
she predicts that she will learn, prior to making her choice about whether to
1In game theory, the terms “nature’s moves” versus “agents’ moves” are used. This is
along the lines of the distinction we are drawing here, but does not quite coincide, since
“nature’s moves” may or may not be learnt by the agent.
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release the moth, whether or not there will indeed be a forthcoming drought.
To keep things simple, imagine that she predicts she will somehow learn
this with certainty, even though that is rather implausible—forthcoming
weather is not ordinarily the sort of thing one can learn with certainty.
Our conservationist’s sequential-decision model is shown in figure 2.1.
As per convention, the circle nodes represent learning events, when the
world presents new evidence, the possibilities for which are represented by
the branches emanating from the node; the square nodes represent choice
events, when the agent will have the opportunity to choose amongst op-
tions, normally also represented as branches emanating from the node.
Here we abbreviate the model slightly by inserting the relevant decision
table at the choice nodes. (Recall that M denotes that the moth eats the pear
if released, while D denotes that there is a drought.)
Figure 2.1: A roadmap as per table 2.1 with predicted learning
As per their static (or single-decision) counterparts, sequential-decision
models are not typically interpreted in a fully subjective way. The space of
contingencies, including the agent’s own interactions with the world, are
taken to be given to the decision-maker—that is, they are assumed to be an
objective part of the decision problem—rather than being specific to her. For
instance, with respect to figure 2.1, it is typically taken to be an objective part
of the decision problem that the agent will learn whether or not there will be
a drought (effectively assigning it probability one), and will subsequently
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choose whether or not to release the moth. But we pursue a more thoroughly
subjective interpretation of sequential-decision models. It is not merely that
the agent assigns her own subjective probabilities to whether or not there
will be a drought, but it is moreover her own fallible prediction that she
will learn this information at a given time and then will subsequently be
presented with a choice as to whether or not to release the moth. Of course,
the finer details of “subjectivising” the space of contingencies in this way
will need to be ironed out. For now we ask that the reader simply go along
with our reading of sequential-decision models such as that depicted in
figure 2.1, and our “subjectivising” project more generally.
We make one further point before continuing: If learning and choice
events are a matter of the agent’s own predictions, then strictly speaking,
these should feature in the space of contingencies. That is, the relevant
propositions should feature in the algebra F over which the agent has
opinions. For instance, as well as entertaining the contingencies of drought,
D, and no drought, ¬D, figure 2.1 shows that our agent also entertains
learning, prior to acting, of drought, or else of no drought, which we might
denote LD and L¬D respectively.
Similarly, the agent’s predictions about her future credences and desires
should also feature in the algebra over which she has opinions. And so too
her predictions about the future choices she may encounter. But including
all this in the agent’s algebra would make it rather complicated. So the con-
vention is not to include these propositions, unless for some special purpose
(such as arises in chapter 7). One can think of a sequential-decision model
as a relatively simple way to represent all these extra predictions about
how the agent will interact with the world, without expanding the agent’s
algebra (instead using circle and square nodes in a tree-like structure).
This abbreviated way of representing the agent’s predictions about her
future attitudes and interactions with the world is only accurate, however,
under some important assumptions regarding how an agents sees her future
self in relation to the external world. We will take these assumptions for
granted throughout this book as they are crucial for the type of methodical
examination of learning and anticipated learning that we will be carrying
out in this book. Roughly speaking, it is assumed that the agent does not
predict her future self to be a skittish and irrational character by her current
lights. Rather, she predicts her future self to be an exemplary reasoner who
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moreover has credences and desires that are stable, or continuous with those
she currently holds. Moreover, she predicts her future self to be properly
responsive to the evidence, such that she will learn some proposition only
if it is really true. This means, for instance, that our conservationist regards
LD as entailing D and L¬D as entailing ¬D.2 It is moreover implicit in
the sequential-decision model that the agent predicts she will update her
credences (and desires) upon learning in a way that accords with her rational
plans.
It is generally accepted that the rational plan for updating or changing
one’s credences in response to learning that some proposition (in which one
had positive credence) is certain, as befalls our conservationist in figure 2.1,
is to conditionalise on what one has learnt. The new credence in any propo-
sition is just the old credence, conditional on what is learnt.3 Accordingly,
our conservationist predicts that her credence in the moth eating the pear,
M, in the case that she learns of a drought at the circle node, LD (or equiv-
alently, D), will be P(M|LD) (that is, P(M|D)). Likewise, she predicts that
her credence in M, in the case that she learns that a drought will not occur,
L¬D (or equivalently, ¬D), will be P(M|L¬D) (that is, P(M|¬D)). Note that for
the remainder of this chapter we will suppress the propositions describing
the agent’s own learning, since we are assuming that the agent treats these
propositions (for instance, LD) as equivalent to those describing what is
learnt (in this case, D).
It follows from the above that our conservationist’s current credence in
M equals a weighted average of what she predicts her credence in M to be
in the future, where the weighing is determined by her current credence in
D vs. ¬D. (In other words, the agent satisfies a principle called Reflection,
which we discuss in detail in chapter 7.) To see this, note that by the law of
2To be clear, the assumptions concern the relationship between an agent’s predictions
about the external world and her predictions about her future self. They do not concern
what is really true of the external world and nor do they concern what is really true about
the agent’s future self or selves.
3 The rule of conditionalisation is sometimes referred to as Bayesian learning. Indeed, the
term Bayesianism incorporates the norm that credences should be probabilities (probabilism)
as well as the norm that credences should be revised in accordance with conditionalisation
(or generalisations thereof). Hence why subjective expected utility theory, as described in
chapter 1, is sometimes referred to as Bayesian decision theory. In later chapters there will be
reason to use the Bayesian terminology.
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total probability, for any M and D:
P(M) = P(M | D)P(D) + P(M | ¬D)P(¬D)
Therefore, by our assumption that, first, our conservationist predicts that
she will learn either D or ¬D, and, second, she predicts that her credence
in M, in the case that she learns of D, will be equivalent to P(M|D), and
similarly for ¬D, it follows that her current credence in M equals what she
expects (i.e., her weighted prediction) her credence in M to be in the future.
To take a concrete numerical example, let’s say that our conservationist’s
credences are such that P(M|D) = 0.6 and P(M|¬D) = 0.9. Then, since
P(D) = 0.5 = P(¬D), it follows from the above that P(M) = 0.75, and this,
moreover, is her expected future credence in M.
Now it may well be that the learning of the drought is irrelevant for our
conservationist’s choice, because whether her credence in P(M) increases
from 0.75 to 0.9, or else decreases to 0.6, her preferred option is still to
release the moth. (This will be so if eradicating the pear is sufficiently better
than the status quo relative to how much worse the wasted resources are
compared to the status quo.) Or it may be that she predicts the learning to
be relevant in the sense that it will affect her choice. Either way, that is not
our focus here. The point is rather to show how an agent’s roadmap may
be rather sophisticated in keeping track of the possible ways the world may
be, including when information or choice opportunities will arrive. These
ways in which the agent interacts with the world are typically represented
in sequential-decision format. Strictly speaking, they should be included in
the algebra of propositions of which the agent is aware.
Finally, we note that the sequential-decision format has brought to light
some controversies amongst decision theorists concerning how a rational
agent should identify and evaluate options.4 But we can put these contro-
versies aside for the time being, at least, since we are thus far concerned
with orthodox agents who maximise expected utility, plan to learn in accor-
dance with the rule of conditionalisation, and moreover expect their plans
to be carried through. Under these assumptions, the various approaches to
choosing in the sequential-decision context coincide. If and when debates
about sequential choice become relevant, we will expound on the details.
4For a summary of the controversies, see Steele (2018).
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2.3 Feedback from the world
As time progresses, the world provides feedback on an agent’s roadmap
or (sequential-)decision model. Think of this feedback as a learning event
that was either planned for or not planned for. In addition, the substance
or content of the feedback—the contingency in question—may be either
familiar and so yielding an ordinary case of learning (which a rational
person responds to by conditionalisation), or else unfamiliar and so yielding
awareness growth. So, when the substance of the feedback is unfamiliar, it
is a contingency that was inaccessible to the agent before she received the
feedback.5
We should note however a contingency may be inaccessible—and thus
unfamiliar if learned—only with respect to the specific decision problem, in
which case it is not what we will call “radically unfamiliar” (and to which
we return in a moment). For instance, recall that we assumed that the
possibility that the released moth would eat a native plant species was not
accessible to our conservationist when reasoning about releasing the moth.
So, in that decision problem, the possibility in question was unfamiliar
to her. However, this does not mean that the possibility in question was
beyond the conservationist’s conceptual repertoire; it simply did not occur
to her when making this decision.
The observation that learning can be either planned or unplanned, and
that the learnt content can be familiar or unfamiliar, suggests that we need to
distinguish between four major kinds of feedback from the world, of which
Table 2.2 provides a summary. The more obvious are the two extreme
kinds of feedback. The happy case (top left) is where the world effectively
vindicates one’s model. All learning was planned, and since it concerns
familiar contingencies the agent can respond by conditionalising on what
was learnt. The less happy case (bottom right) involves learning that was
unplanned and moreover concerns unfamiliar contingencies. This is the
paradigmatic case of limited awareness and subsequent awareness growth.
Finally, there is the middle ground (top right and bottom left).
5We mentioned earlier that, strictly speaking, predicted learning events should feature
in an agent’s proposition space or algebra. It follows that learning events too can be
inaccessible to an agent and thus unfamiliar when they arise, as per unplanned learning.
In what follows, however, we do not draw attention to awareness growth with respect to
the very experience of learning; we simply contrast “planned and unplanned” learning and
refer only to awareness growth with respect to what is learnt.
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familiar content unfamiliar content
planned planned conditionalisation planned awareness growth
unplanned unplanned conditionalisation unplanned awareness growth
Table 2.2: feedback on our reasoning roadmaps
We will expand on table 2.2 in what follows. The point to note from
the outset is that awareness growth amounts to gaining recognition of un-
familiar contingencies. While this kind of learning about the world is often
unplanned, table 2.2 floats the possibility that this need not be so. We can
plan for awareness growth. (And as such there may be a case for repre-
senting such plans in a sequential-decision model by way of some further
symbol, say a diamond.) This issue will be taken up later in the book.
2.3.1 The two extremes
Sometimes the world affirms one’s roadmap or model, in the sense that
one expects to receive some kind of input from the world, that is, to learn
something, and does indeed receive this input. We referred to this as the
happy case. Consider our conservationist as described in figure 2.1. It may
well be that she learns about the drought—whether it is surely happening
or surely not happening (and nothing more)—prior to making her choice,
just as she predicted. So she learns as planned and the content is familiar.
Of course, part of the reason that she does not perceive other events
that her roadmap did not account for may be that she is not looking for
these events. Her observations of the world are no doubt “theory-laden”
or rather “roadmap-laden”. We are not suggesting that, when an agent
perceives that the world affirms her roadmap, it has passed some objective
test and is shown to be faithful to reality. It is purely the agent’s own
perspective that we are considering here. What we draw attention to is just
that sometimes an agent’s roadmap appears to serve her well. The feedback
from the world does not call for a restructuring of her roadmap, but rather
affirms it. That need not always be the case, as we will explore now.
What does the less happy case look like? Assume that our conserva-
tionist reasons as before, as described by figure 2.1. But the feedback she
receives from the world is rather different. She learns about the drought,
as before, but then a little later, she realises there are further contingencies
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that are pertinent to her choice problem. Some interaction with the world,
perhaps simply the sight of a moth landing on a native plant, prompts the
realisation that the moth may or may not itself become a pest, eating and
destroying native plants.
So in this latter case our conservationist’s roadmap turns out not to
serve her very well. She has an unplanned learning experience, namely,
the realisation sparked by the moth landing on the leaf of a native plant.
Moreover, this realisation or learning event concerns potential properties of
the world that are unfamiliar, in the sense of not being already articulated
by her roadmap. It prompts a restructuring of her roadmap, presumably
such that her impending decision problem now has the complexity of the
third decision problem of the introductory chapter, reproduced below in
abbreviated form.
eats; drought; pest eats; drought; no pest eats; no drought; pest . . .
Release moth eradicated, pest eradicated, no pest eradicated, pest . . .
Status quo thriving thriving thriving . . .
Table 2.3: Conservationist’s roadmap after awareness of pest contingencies
We suggest that this sort of roadmap failure and subsequent restruc-
turing is the natural way to think about limited awareness and subsequent
awareness growth. That is, it is natural to think that awareness growth
is unplanned (although it need not always be, as we shall soon see). As
previously mentioned, in the case we described, the newly realised poten-
tial properties of the world are in a sense unfamiliar because they are not
accounted for in her roadmap, but they are not radically unfamiliar. It is not
as if our conservationist lacks the concept of either moths or pest species.
After all, we stipulated that she cares single-mindedly about eradicating
weeds and pests and is contemplating whether to release a moth. More-
over, it is presumably not a giant conceptual leap to imagine moths being
pest species, in addition to prickly pears being weeds. Our conservationist
simply had not considered, in the context of the choice problem at hand,
whether the moth might itself become a pest. Perhaps for very mundane
reasons, this simply did not cross her mind, and so was not part of her
reasoning, or roadmap, at the time in question.
Later in chapter 4 we will introduce more explicitly cases of limited
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awareness and subsequent growth that do in fact involve radically unfa-
miliar properties of the world. The examples concern unusually radical
shifts in scientific world view, for instance, the shift in the early 1900s to ac-
commodate Einstein’s theories concerning the relationship between space
and time, amongst other things. These more dramatic examples are useful
for highlighting that, at the earlier time, the contingencies in question are
truly beyond the agent’s grasp of the ways the world might be. We can
all appreciate that someone in the early 1900s simply does not have access
to the notion that space may be curved, or that someone in the 1970s does
not have access to the notion of data sharing over the internet. These are
very obvious limitations in awareness. What we draw attention to is that
the more ordinary limitations in awareness, like that experienced by our
conservationist, may be similarly unavoidable. For whatever reason, some-
times quite ordinary properties of the world are simply inaccessible to an
agent at a given point of decision, either due to something as mundane as
inattention or lack of imagination, or due to more radical limitations in how
things are conceptualised.
Since we classify both the ordinary and the more radical unfamiliarity
as unawareness, we think that a formal model of unawareness and changes
in awareness should accommodate both types. And, indeed, the model we
develop in chapter 3 is meant to accommodate both types of (changes to)
unawareness for a given decision situation.
2.3.2 The middle ground
We suggested above that there are yet two further kinds of feedback that the
world may present to an agent, as regards her reasoning roadmap (refer back
to table 2.2). Our contention is that whether or not the learning experience
is planned is orthogonal to whether or not the content of this learning
experience is unfamiliar. One can have a planned learning experience of
unfamiliar content, giving rise to planned awareness growth. Before we get
to this case, however, let us warm up with the other middle-ground case:
when the agent learns something familiar, but the learning experience was
unplanned. This case should strike the reader as very common, even if it is
not explicitly acknowledged or discussed in the literature.6
6Learning is often discussed in the literature in a way that abstracts from whether or
not the learning experience was planned. Sequential-decision models do include learning
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To illustrate unplanned learning of the familiar, let us again appeal to the
plight of our conservationist. Assume this time that she does not expect to
learn anything relevant before making her choice. Her roadmap is simply
table 1.2, or figure 2.1 without the circle node representing the learning
experience regarding the drought. Now, it may turn out that she does
not learn anything; the world affirms her roadmap. Another possibility,
however—the one we draw attention to now—is that she unexpectedly
learns about the drought, that is, she either learns D or ¬D. These are
familiar contingencies in that they are represented in her roadmap; for
instance, the roadmap in table 1.2 includes the contingencies D and¬D. But
the learning experience was unplanned, so in this sense, her roadmap let
her down; for instance, the roadmap in table 1.2 doesn’t include the learning
experience about D and¬D. Presumably, it is easy for her to adapt, however,
to her unplanned circumstances. For starters, she can simply proceed to
update her credences in the rational way, by adopting her “old” credences
conditional on what she now knows to be true, whether D or ¬D. So,
the idea is that when it comes to unexpected learning of the familiar, the
agent does have credences conditional on what she learns (even though
the learning was unplanned) which of course implies that what the agent
learns was all along in her algebra. But since the learning was unplanned,
she had not anticipated that she would revise her beliefs in line with these
conditional credences in the roadmap she had been using for the decision
at hand.
We turn now to the case of planned awareness change: when an agent
predicts or plans that she will come to recognise unfamiliar contingencies.
We suggest that such occurrences can be represented in a suitably em-
bellished sequential-decision model, even if the contingencies in question
cannot be articulated in advance. For instance, our conservationist might
anticipate that she will (or at least may) learn something pertinent to her
choice problem, in addition to whether or not there is a drought. But she
cannot put her finger on what this might be. Her characterisation of the con-
tingency may be more or less abstract. We will not say too much more about
this sort of case for now, as the focus of chapters 6 and 7 is what an agent can
experiences, but, as noted above, these models are often treated as objective representations
of a temporally-extended choice problem, rather than a subjective representation that may
or may not turn out to be correct.
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anticipate and how it affects her current credences. The answers to these
questions are not obvious. The “hard” position is that limited awareness
cannot be well understood by the agent and it is incoherent to regard her
as anticipating awareness growth. As mentioned, we will argue for the
“soft” position that awareness growth can in some sense be anticipated and
planned for. But the details matter.
2.4 Concluding remarks on chapter 2
So far we have introduced (un)awareness and changes in awareness in
general terms, with reference to the experience of unfamiliar contingencies.
We have moreover situated changes in awareness within a general picture of
how one’s (sequential-)decision model, or roadmap, may be vindicated or
else undermined by the feedback one receives from the world. We have not,
however, yet said much about how to formally represent limited awareness





We turn now to a closer examination of the forms that limited awareness
and changes in awareness might take. We initially, in section 3.2, introduce a
new example which we use to illustrate two intuitively quite different ways
in which awareness might grow. Subsequently, in section 3.3, we again use
this example to describe two approaches to modelling limited awareness
and growing awareness; first a model that may seem natural but which
we nevertheless reject, next our own preferred model. Section 3.4 reflects
on how our discussion has been informed by others; we briefly survey the
diverse treatments of awareness growth in the literature.
3.2 Rent or buy?: Types of awareness change
Suppose that you are contemplating buying an apartment and moving out
of your rental apartment. The reason is that you have heard that the rent
might go up, and you are primarily concerned with whether you will be
able to make ends meet. So, you are trying to figure out whether you will
be more likely to make ends meet in your current rental apartment or in
an apartment that you own. Your decision problem can be represented by
table 3.1.
Now you realise that an additional important possibility, that you should
factor into your decision, is that the owner of the apartment you currently
rent decides to sell; in which case you will, let us assume, find yourself
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Rent same or lower
Table 3.1: Rent or buy?
suddenly homeless as the apartment will no longer be available to rent.
This transforms your decision problem1 into one that can be represented by
table 3.2.
Before you make your choice, you hear speculations about the central
bank planning to raise interests rates. As you realise that this would affect
whether you are able to make ends meet after having bought an apartment,
you want to factor this possibility into your deliberation too. To simplify
the table, let us assume that the interest rate only affects you if you decide to
buy. Then the decision problem you are now faced with can be represented
by table 3.3.
Note that in the shift from the epistemic state represented by Table
3.1 to the one represented by Table 3.2, you have expanded or extended the
possibilities you entertain to include the possibility that the apartment is
sold. By contrast, in the shift from the epistemic state represented by
Table 3.2 to the one represented by Table 3.3, you have refined some of
the possibilities you entertain to accommodate the possibility of a changed
interest rate. In this case, your old possibilities are effectively split into more
fine-grained ones, allowing for new partitions of the possibility space.
The examples above are special cases of awareness growth: what we
might dub pure expansion and pure refinement respectively. Throughout
the book we will appeal to these sorts of cases. But it is also possible for
awareness growth to be a mixture of expansion and refinement. For example,
one may recognise that the apartment might be sold at the same time as
recognising that the interest rate might change (a transition from table 3.1
directly to table 3.3). Moreover, there may be cases of awareness growth
that are even more complicated; for instance, they may involve deleting or
retracting possibilities that one had entertained, in addition to expanding
1In keeping with our subjectivist approach, we take an agent’s decision problem to be (at
least) partly defined by the agent’s own epistemic state, in particular, what she takes to be
her options and the relevant states of the world.
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and/or refining one’s possibilities. We do not explicitly consider any such
more complicated cases in this book. As will be seen, even the simple cases
of awareness growth reveal much about how awareness growth can affect
a rational agent’s credences and desires.
Finally, there are cases of limited awareness and awareness growth that
would be more naturally characterised as being about (un)awareness of
options, rather than being about (un)awareness of states and/or outcomes
which has been the focus in this chapter. We already mentioned such ex-
amples in the introductory chapter. For instance, when discussing the con-
servationist example we mentioned that from a modern point of view we
recognise that the conservationist was unaware of some targeted chemical
pest controls. Although unawareness and growing awareness of options is
both theoretically interesting and practically important, we will not in what
follows discuss whether this phenomenon calls for special treatment and
special norms. As will become apparent, (un)awareness of states and out-
comes generates more than enough philosophical problems to occupy us in
this book. And it is plausible, at least, that our model is sufficiently gen-
eral to accommodate all kinds of limited awareness and awareness growth,
whether of states, outcomes or options.
3.3 Modelling awareness growth
The tables above give us a fair idea of what limited awareness and sub-
sequent awareness growth looks like. But in order to get a firm grip on
whether an evolving agent like the one described by the transition from
table 3.1 through to table 3.3 is rational, both at a time and over time, we
need to go into a little more detail. Ultimately, we need to describe and
assess the agent’s evolving credences.
In the introductory chapter it was noted that a reasoning agent may be
depicted as entertaining a set of propositions at the time in question. The set
of propositions should form what is known as a Boolean algebra, that is, a set
of propositions F , that contains both the contradiction and the tautology,
and is moreover closed under disjunction, negation and conjunction. More-
over, it is assumed that a rational agent has credences in the propositions
in F that can be represented by a probability function P (see p. 13 for the
details).
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We want to preserve this way of conceiving a rational agent’s epistemic
state at any given time, but also introduce the possibility of awareness
growth. To that end, let us refer to an agent’s state of awareness at a given
time as her awareness context. For any given awareness context, then, the
agent entertains a set of propositions—a Boolean algebra—over which she
has probabilistic credences. The question is: how does the agent’s set of
propositions change upon awareness growth? More precisely: what is the
relationship between her Boolean algebras, so to speak, from one awareness
context to the next? We respond to this question in our own way in what
follows, and then, in section 3.4, we compare our model of awareness
growth with those others have proposed.
3.3.1 First pass: the catch-all model
In the philosophical tradition, propositions are typically interpreted as sets
of (objective) possible worlds, where these worlds are understood to be max-
imally detailed descriptions of ways the world might be. For instance, the
proposition “Oswald killed Kennedy” is just the set of possible worlds for
which that particular proposition is true.2 The tautologous proposition is
thus identified with the set of all possible worlds, while the contradictory
proposition is identified with the empty set of possible worlds. Note that
it is typically not considered useful to quantify over all possible worlds;
rather, one quantifies over the possible worlds relative to F , which are specific
enough just to assign truth values to each of the propositions in F . The set
of these worlds amounts to a coarsening of the set of all possible worlds.
This way of conceiving an agent’s proposition space, however, does not
seem to leave room for awareness growth by expansion. On this model,
at any given time, the rational agent supposedly grasps the full set of
possible ways the world might be, since she assigns probability one to the
tautology—which, in this model, is equivalent to assigning probability one
to the full set of (objective) possible worlds. That does not seem to square
with transitions, e.g., the shift from table 3.1 to table 3.2 above, in which
the agent apparently comes to recognise possibilities that are inconsistent
2As the reader may recall, this is not an interpretation we committed ourselves to in
chapter 1.2.1. (For instance, we did not define the algebra F with respect to some set of
possible worlds; that is, we did not assume that a set of worlds is in any (metaphysical,
epistemological, or methodological) sense prior to the set of propositions.) But it is an
interpretation that is widespread in philosophy.
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with all those she previously entertained—that is, inconsistent with all
the propositions in F—such that there is a genuine enlargement of her
(subjective) set of possibilities beyond F . This type of transition cannot be
properly modelled as a shift in probability over the adopted set of possible
worlds, that is, a set of worlds that allows only for truth value assignments
to the propositions in F . It rather involves a revision of F .
The way to proceed, if one wants to stick with this kind of underlying
model, is to engineer the agent’s proposition space for any given awareness
context so that all instances of awareness growth can be treated, at least
formally, as refinements. The thought would be that an agent’s algebra
includes an abstract catch-all proposition signifying “Other ways the world
might be” or “None of the above”; it represents all those further possible
ways the world might be that the agent cannot (yet) articulate. In fact,
some argue that an epistemically rational agent would always be open to
the possibility that they lack full awareness, and thus assign a positive
probability to such a catch-all (see, e.g., Chloé de Canson ms). For instance,
table 3.4 is identical to table 3.1 above except that it allows for a catch-all
proposition that may include “Other ways in which the landlord affects my
living arrangement”.3










Rent same or lower Buy & ???
Table 3.4: Less aware state with “catch-all” proposition(s)
The idea is that what we earlier called awareness growth by expansion is
really a special case of refinement—it is a refinement of the catch-all. In the
case that the agent realises the landlord might sell the apartment (what was
formerly the transition from table 3.1 to table 3.2), the catch-all proposition
is effectively divided into “Rental apartment sold” and, say, “Other (yet
unarticulated) ways in which the landlord affects my living arrangement.”
3The catch-all will typically be best interpreted as a disjunction, since it must account
for all other ways that the world might be that are inconsistent with those of which one is
already aware. For instance, even for the simple proposition space depicted in table 3.4, the
catch-all should strictly speaking be “Other ways in which the landlord affects my living
arrangement or other housing options that I might choose”.
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The worry with the catch-all model is that it seems not to be apt as a
general characterisation of unawareness. Nothing that we have said thus
far suggests that any agent at all times entertains a catch-all by way of
accounting for her inevitably limited awareness. Indeed, this proposal may
not even be cogent, since, in order for an agent to make sense of a catch-all,
she would presumably need to entertain some universal set of possibilities
relative to which the catch-all can be defined as the complement of those
possibilities she can properly articulate. But it is hard to see how the agent
could have access to this universal set of possibilities (which might in fact
not even be a coherent notion), given that, by assumption, some of these
possibilities cannot be articulated. So, it is hard to see how the catch-all
could be well-defined for the agent.4
By way of response, one might resist these cogency worries. Indeed, far
from being incoherent, an agent who accounts for her limited awareness in
entertaining a catch-all may be regarded praiseworthy (cf. de Canson ms).
Alternatively, one might argue that the cogency worries are moot because
a catch-all model need not entail that the agent herself entertains such a
proposition. The inclusion of a catch-all proposition, to which the agent
implicitly assigns zero probability, may simply be the most elegant way
for the modeller to account for an agent’s limited awareness. While we
are sympathetic to these lines of argument, we do not find them sufficiently
convincing (to be elaborated shortly) to continue pursuing a catch-all model
of awareness growth.
As for the first: We admit that a certain portrayal of the cogency worry
would, as it were, prove too much. The portrayal we have in mind is one
that trades on the catch-all being too “abstract”, in that the agent has no
idea how to specify the proposition’s content. After all, the abstractness of a
proposition would seem to be a matter of degree rather than an on/off affair.
And one can surely represent an agent as having credences in propositions
of varying abstractness without thereby being committed to her being able
to precisely articulate what these propositions mean. Moreover, arguably
the wiser agents do routinely entertain propositions at the more extreme
levels of abstractness—propositions that are intended to capture a wide
range of contingencies. Indeed, this point will become important later, in
4We thank Alan Hájek for suggesting this way of putting the problem. He elaborates on
worries along these (and other) lines in his unpublished manuscript “Omega”.
44 3. MODELLING (UN)AWARENESS
chapters 6 and 7. That said, the objective catch-all, as one might refer to
it, does not simply capture a wide range of contingencies; it represents all
other ways the world might be that are inconsistent with those of which the
agent is aware. But how can an agent conceptualise all other ways the world
might be? Therein lies the real cogency problem.
Turning now to the second line of argument: The idea is that the ob-
jective catch-all is accessible only to the modeller (or perhaps to the agent
herself at a later time), not the agent in question (at that time), who is
modelled as implicitly assigning the catch-all zero probability.5 Refer back
to table 3.4: the catch-all proposition indicates that the agent has limited
awareness. She entertains only two ways in which her landlord may af-
fect her living arrangements in ways relevant to her ends. She fails to see
the other possibilities, and thus these are represented by a catch-all. The
agent implicitly assigns the catch-all zero probability. The model in a sense
captures a wiser person’s perspective and how that person interprets the
reasoning of the agent in question. But again, therein lies the problem. For
some applications, there may well be special reason to capture a wiser per-
spective on an agent’s limited awareness. But we contend that that is not
the case for our application. We are interested in the reasoning of a single
agent, who lacks full awareness but is (in other respects) an ideal reasoner,
and our aim is to investigate the principles of rationality that govern how
her perspective or awareness changes with time. For this purpose, there is
no need to keep track of how the agent’s awareness looks from some more
expansive point of view. Doing so only detracts from the simplicity of the
model.
In fact, we think a general model of how an agent should reason in light
of her limited and changing state of awareness should not even commit to
a subjective catch-all (more on which shortly). Such a model would not be
a good characterisation of agents who are unaware of their unawareness, nor
would it be useful for analysing what principles of rationality they should
satisfy. We want our general model, which we develop in this chapter,
to leave room for such agents and thus we do not presume any kind of
catch-all. As we explained in the introductory chapter, our aim is to take
as given agents’ varying degrees of awareness, and ask what principles of
rationality these agents should satisfy.
5We thank Richard Bradley for this suggestion.
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That said, agents may sometimes be aware of their unawareness and more-
over anticipate awareness growth. In fact, in chapters 6 and 7, when we
model such agents and consider what rationality principles they should
satisfy, we suggest that it is most fruitful to use propositions that may be
thought of as subjective catch-alls. These types of catch-all are not meant
to be interpreted as a metaphysically or logically universal complement to
whatever the agent is aware of. Instead, they are meant to represent the
possibilities that the agent cannot specify but thinks she might have left out
of her reasoning.
3.3.2 Our preferred model
The way forward, we suggest, is to divorce the agent’s possibilities from
objective possible worlds. While it is useful to depict an agent’s epistemic
outlook in terms of atomic possibilities that are the ultimate bearers of
probability, these atomic possibilities need not be the objective possible
worlds that many think give meaning to propositions. Indeed, a model of
an agent’s epistemic outlook need not offer an interpretation of propositions.
They can simply go uninterpreted. For instance, they can be understood
as abstract variables or placeholders that are used to define the “agent’s
possibilities”, that is, the possibilities as the agent sees them. That is the
approach we shall take. In particular, we define the agent’s possibilities as
truth functions over these uninterpreted propositions, or more accurately,
over the basic propositions. We proceed now to spell out our idea more
carefully.
We say that an agent’s awareness context is defined by a set X of basic
propositions of which she is aware (which we assume to be finite). We
take basic propositions to be primitive propositions, representing simple
facts about the world, that do not involve any logical connectives. So, for
instance, in the awareness context described by Table 3.1, “Rent” and “Rent
higher” are basic, while “Rent & Rent higher” and “¬Rent higher” are not.
(Note that, to keep the prose here and in what follows relatively simple,
we will use abbreviated expressions to describe aspects of Table 3.1. So, for
instance, “Available at higher rent” is shortened to “Rent higher”.)
The basic propositions are not themselves given an interpretation in our
model, as previously mentioned; they are simply the primitive facts that
the agent is aware of. In other words, any deeper interpretation of these
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propositions, whether in terms of objective possible worlds or some other
kind of structure, is not explicitly modelled here. We do not here take a
stance on whether propositions should be identified with sets (see footnote
6). Instead, we simply use them, as abstract and uninterpreted objects, to
define the agent’s possibilities, to which we turn next.
Let the possibilities that the agent is aware of be truth functions, ωi,
that return “true/false” for each of the basic propositions. Note that below
we will occasionally use ω1, ω2, ..., ωn to denote individual possibilities.
The putative set of possibilities are all the distinct truth functions that take
this form, that is, effectively all the different combinations of truth values
for the basic propositions. This is merely the putative or first-pass set of
possibilities, since some will be deemed inconsistent by the agent (to be
explained shortly) and thus excluded from the real set of possibilities (as
recognised by the agent). We may describe the possibilities in terms of
conjunctions of the basic propositions for which the ωi function in question
returns “true”. So, in the awareness context represented by Table 3.1, the
possibility {ωi(Rent) = true, ωi(Buy) = false, ωi(Rent higher) = true, ωi(Rent
same or lower) = false} can be described as “Rent & Rent higher”. From
now on, we will use this latter way of describing possibilities.
For the set of basic propositions X, let WX be the agent’s (real) set of
possibilities, which is a subset of the putative set of possibilities, containing
only the possibilities that the agent regards as consistent. A possibility is
consistent, by the agent’s lights, if all its conjuncts could be true, that is, if
the agent does not take the conjuncts to be mutually inconsistent. What an
agent takes to be the set of consistent possibilities will depend on what she
regards as partitions of the proposition space (corresponding to properties
or categories for which one and only one value can be assumed). For
instance, for the agent described by Table 3.1, one partition of the space is
{“Rent”, “Buy”}, these being the candidate values for what we might call the
“action property”; a necessary condition for being a consistent possibility,
then, is that the conjuncts include only one of “Rent”, “Buy”.
So an agent’s awareness context X may be just as well defined in terms
of her possibility space, WX. Any given basic proposition Xi can now be
associated with a set of possibilities in WX: the ωi ∈ WX for which the
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proposition Xi is true. For simplicity, we refer to this set as {Xi}.6,7 We can
now also generate a Boolean algebra,FX, in the usual way: ¬Xi is associated
with the set WX \{Xi}, Xi∨X j is associated with the set {Xi}∪{X j}, and Xi&X j
is associated with the set {Xi}∩{X j}. For reasons that will become apparent in
the next chapter, the same proposition can be associated with different sets
of possibilities in different awareness contexts. So, more formally, we can
think of a proposition as a function from the awareness contexts in which
the proposition plays a role to the corresponding sets of possibilities.8
The approach described above invites some degree of language rela-
tivity, for instance, since what counts as a basic proposition (for an agent)
may depend on the agent’s language. But this is at it should be, we think,
given that our starting point is an agent’s view of the world—which is of
course often shaped by the agent’s language—and how that changes as her
awareness changes.
For simplicity, we will model only growth in awareness over time; our
model will not countenance the shrinking or contraction of awareness over
time. Inclusion of the latter possibility would complicate the model and
its presentation; moreover, there is a tradition in modelling rational belief
change to consider only incremental learning (gains in information) rather
than forgetting (losses of information).9 That said, contraction of one’s
concepts—that is, contraction of the set X—may in some cases not be due
to “forgetting” but rather due to considerations that make it an important
aspect of rational learning. Such contractions may in fact be the correct way
of modelling certain kinds of rational learning or realisation, such as when
a previous believer in the influence of homeopathy discovers that it has no
(non-psychological) influence and so does not number amongst alternative
physical treatments for some condition.10 Due to lack of space, however,
6We are not here suggesting that the basic propositions are identical to, or defined in terms
of, the relevant set of possibilities. After all, the possibilities were themselves constructed
from propositions that had some prior meaning. One can retain the traditional notion of
propositions being identified with sets of objective possible worlds, as per, e.g. Stalnaker
(1984), although this is not explicitly represented in our model. The relation of “association”
that we appeal to here is intended to be weaker than “identity”.
7Strictly speaking, the set in question should be thought of as being indexed to the
relevant awareness context. If we wanted to make the index explicit, we could, for instance,
write {Xi}X. But to simplify the notation, we omit making the index explicit.
8To clarify: For awareness contexts where the proposition does not play a role, it is not
associated with any set of possibilities.
9For notable exceptions, see Titelbaum (2012) and Bradley (2017).
10We thank Sven Ove Hansson for this particular example.
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we leave further exploration of this phenomenon for future work.
Now let us address the dynamics of awareness. We say that the agent’s
awareness grows when the awareness context shifts from X to X+ = X ∪ Xj.
Note that by the assumptions we made above, when the awareness context
shifts from X to X+ there is a corresponding shift from WX to WX+ and from
FX to FX+ . Strictly speaking, WX and WX+ do not have any possibilities in
common; after all, the possibilities in each are truth functions that have a
different number of propositions in their domain. If, however, we allow that
the possibilities may be described in terms of the proposition that they are
each associated with—the conjunction of all basic propositions for which
the function in question returns “true”—then WX and WX+ may in certain
cases (as we will see shortly) have possibilities in common.
Now we can characterise the difference between awareness growth by
expansion and awareness growth by refinement. Let us measure the length
of a possibility by the number of propositions for which the function in
question returns “true”. (Recall that we assume that the set of basic propo-
sitions is finite.) We say that the awareness growth was (purely) due to
expansion if the number of possibilities in WX+ is greater than in WX, without
any possibilities becoming longer in the sense given. In contrast, we say
that the awareness growth was (purely) due to refinement if the number of
possibilities in WX+ is greater than in WX, and moreover, at least some pos-
sibilities in WX+ are longer (in the sense just described) than the possibilities
in WX. Moreover, in the case of pure expansion there are some possibilities
common to WX and WX+ , while in the case of pure refinement, there are no
possibilities common to WX and WX+ .
Return again to our rent-or-buy example, and suppose now that in the
least-aware context (Table 3.1), the only possibilities that the agent of interest
is aware of and considers consistent can be characterised as: “Rent & Rent
same or lower”, “Rent & Rent higher”, “Buy & Rent same or lower”, “Buy
& Rent higher”. In other words, she regards any possibility that involves
“Rent & Buy”, and likewise “Rent same or lower & Rent higher”, inconsis-
tent. Now, when awareness grows due to an expansion, e.g., when the agent
becomes aware of the possibility that the owner sells the apartment—which
the agent takes to be inconsistent with the owner keeping the rent the same
and also inconsistent with the owner increasing the rent—the possibilities
do not become longer. Instead, we simply add “Rent & Rental apartment
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sold”, “Buy & Rental apartment sold” to the original four possibilities. This
is represented by the shift from the awareness context represented by Table
3.1 to the one represented by Table 3.2.
In contrast, when awareness grows due to refinement of the possible
interest rate—as represented by the shift from the awareness context repre-
sented by Table 3.2 to the one represented by Table 3.3—some of the new
possibilities are longer; for instance, “Buy & Rent same or lower & Interest
higher” compared to “Buy & Rent same or lower”. The number of possi-
bilities also grows, since e.g. “Buy & Rent same or lower” becomes “Buy
& Rent same or lower & Interest higher”, “Buy & Rent same or lower &
Interest same or lower”.
3.4 Awareness growth in the literature
We noted in Chapter 1 that there is already a small but significant liter-
ature on (un)awareness and awareness growth, dating back 30 years or
so. A select group of economists and computer scientists have introduced
this phenomenon to their various abstract models of reasoning and knowl-
edge (and indeed, as noted earlier, the term (un)awareness comes from this
literature).
For the most part, at least until very recently, philosophers have tended
to consider awareness growth in relation to very specific questions in the
philosophy of science concerning theory change. In the last few years,
however, occasional philosophers have turned their attention to awareness
growth more generally. Richard Bradley’s (2017) recent work for instance
pursues the more general challenge that (un)awareness poses for decision
theory. As will become apparent in the next chapter, we criticise aspects of
Bradley’s general approach to unawareness. Others have also weighed in
on this debate, including Mahtani (2020) and de Canson (ms) (whose work
we mention in this and the next chapter). Yet others have applied Bradley’s
general framework to particular philosophical debates, for instance, Aron
Vallinder (2018) who examines the problems that changing awareness poses
for moral epistemology, and Joe Roussos (2020) who discusses the relation-
ship between expert testimony and awareness growth.
Our treatment of (un)awareness draws on various aspects of earlier
approaches. Like Bradley (2017) and economists such as Karni and Vierø
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(2013, 2015), our aim is to characterise a (single) rational agent’s reasoning
in the face of limited awareness and subsequent awareness growth. Note
that this need not be the aim: The pioneering work on (un)awareness by
Fagin and Halpern (1987), for instance, and the work of many economists
since, is more about characterising the relative state of (un)awareness of
several agents, e.g., in the context of a game.
Our approach is also similar to Bradley’s and Karni and Vierø’s in that
although we examine both practical and epistemic reasoning, we take the
decision-perspective to ground our analysis. Ultimately, our aim, just like
theirs, is to figure out how a decision-maker ought to reason in light of
her limited and changing state of awareness. In this our approach differs
from the early work of philosophers of science concerning the challenge
that growing awareness poses for the traditional probabilist model of belief
and confirmation under the guise of “the problem of new theories” (Earman
1992) or “the problem of old evidence” (Glymour 1980). (Below we mention
another difference between our model and theirs.)
As is typical of philosophers, we prefer the generality of a Jeffrey (1965)
inspired decision framework, rather than the Anscombe and Aumann
(1963) framework (based on that of Savage 1954) employed by Karni and
Vierø. In this respect, our approach is close to Bradley’s. What is distinctive
about the Jeffrey framework is that all events are treated as propositions
towards which an agent has both an epistemic and a desire attitude. That
is, no distinction is made between the objects of actions, desires, and be-
liefs.11 But our model has a further subjectivity that is more in keeping with
the the approach of some economists and computer scientists: we treat the
relevant set of possibilities as dependent on an agent’s state of awareness,
in that the set changes as awareness grows.
Philosophers have not embraced this kind of “subjective state space”
(as Schipper 2015 puts it, in an important review of economists’ and com-
puter scientists’ work on (un)awareness). For the reasons discussed in
section 3.3.1 above, the natural move when working with objective possi-
ble worlds is to introduce a catch-all proposition standing for “the other
ways the world might be”, where this catch-all need not be something the
agent herself entertains. That is the approach taken by various philosophers
11See e.g. Joyce (1999) for a discussion of how to translate between Jeffrey’s framework
and Savage’s.
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seeking to model growing awareness about new scientific theories, in the
context of the aforementioned problems of new theories and old evidence,
including Shimony (1970), Earman (1992), and recently Wenmackers and
Romeijn (2016). Bradley’s (2017) model does not appeal to a catch-all per se,
but the agent’s point of view is described in contrast to the modeller’s point
of view, such that the former can be seen as presupposing some proposition
to be true and its negation false.
While we have some sympathy with these catch-all approaches, we
question the cogency and/or the usefulness of including an (objective) catch-
all in a model of the reasoning of agents with limited awareness (recall
our arguments above in section 3.3.1). However, as previously explained,
we acknowledge that—at least to some extent—the choice between the
model we have proposed and these earlier catch-all models is like any
other modelling choice in that it should be judged relative to the purpose to
which the model is put. For some purposes, the (objective) catch-all model,
appealing to the perspective of a wiser party or modeller, is indeed very
suitable.
Other philosophers do not appeal to catch-alls in accommodating (un)awareness
and awareness growth but rather abstract propositions that stand in for
classes of contingencies whose members are yet to be better articulated.
As a result, however, these models are highly constrained in terms of the
(un)awareness and awareness growth that is permitted. For instance, Ma-
her (1995) assumes that the agent’s algebra contains variable propositions
for each of the yet-to-be-formulated theories, and he moreover assumes that
the agent assigns a (non-zero) probability to each such proposition. Hen-
derson et al. (2010) propose something similar, although with the added
sophistication that the propositions in the agent’s algebra form a hierarchy
that remains fixed throughout the investigation, that is, remains unchanged
even when the agent becomes aware of new theories that effectively fill in
this hierarchy.
It is also worth mentioning the proposal of Zabell (1992) in this context.
Zabell extends statistical inference to cases where previously unsuspected
phenomena of a given kind may occur (such as in the so-called sampling of
the species problem where an unrecognised species may be sampled). As in Hen-
derson et al., the probability function is defined over a set of hypotheses
that are sufficiently abstract to accommodate all the possible phenomena
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of the given kind, whatever they turn out to be. Moreover, by construc-
tion, the probability function does not depend on how exactly the abstract
hypotheses are instantiated.
Unlike Zabell, Maher, and Henderson et al., we do not assume that the
agents we consider always assign a positive probability to some yet-to-be
formulated theory or possibility—let alone all such theories or possibilities.
Instead, we will argue, in chapters 6 and 7, that the appeal to abstract propo-
sitions that are placeholders for yet-to-be-fully-articulated contingencies is
an apt way to model only the special case whereby an agent anticipates her
own awareness growth. Note that economists too have appealed to “catch-
alls” of this sort. For instance, Grant and Quiggin (2013a, 2013b) incorporate
what we call a subjective catch-all in their model; it is assigned a probability
based on the agent’s past experience of limited awareness. In one of their
more recent papers, Karni and Vierø (2017) introduce a subjective catch-
all consequence to allow for the agent anticipating her awareness growth,
which they also call “awareness of unawareness”. This psychological phe-
nomenon is also sometimes dubbed “conscious unawareness” (Walker and
Dietz 2011), or “introspective unawareness” (Piermont 2017). We suggest
that these models do not incorporate what is strictly speaking a catch-all,
i.e., a proposition standing for all other possibilities of which the agent is
unaware (as perceived by a wiser party or modeller), but rather appeal to
an abstract proposition standing for a broad class of contingencies that the
agent believes she may “fill in” later. The same is true of the subjective
catch-all model we introduce in chapter 6.
An agent need not always anticipate her own awareness growth, how-
ever, such that it can be treated formally as a refinement. We insist that
there can be genuine cases of awareness growth by expansion. That is
why the notion of a subjective and changing possibility space is important.
In this respect, our model draws on the work of economists Heifetz et al.
(2006, 2008). In particular, and as previously explained, we draw on the
idea that an agent’s possibility space is constructed from combinations of
the basic propositions of which she is aware, which may change over time.
Heifetz et al. (2006: 80) model progressive awareness change in terms of
“a complete lattice of disjoint spaces”. Similar to our characterisation of
propositions above, Heifetz et al. also refer to a “surjective projection” from
more aware to less aware spaces, i.e., every atomic possibility in the more
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aware state maps onto a single atomic possibility in the less aware state,
whereas some possibilities in the less aware state map onto more than one
atomic possibility in the more aware state.
The preoccupations of Heifetz et al.—and indeed the finer details of their
model—differs, however, from ours. As per Fagin and Halpern (1987),
they focus on (un)awareness in the context of interactions between mul-
tiple agents, or games.12 For them, the question of how to characterise
an agent’s growing awareness is therefore only the starting point. There
are further questions about how knowledge interacts with (un)awareness.
What they are ultimately interested in, is how rational agents’ respective
(un)awareness and their knowledge of others’ (un)awareness affects the
actions that the agents take in some interactive decision problem (i.e., in a
game).
3.5 Concluding remarks on chapter 3
The main aim of this chapter, as the reader will recall, was to develop a
model of reasoning and choice that is more subjective than even traditional
subjective expected utility theory, in that our model makes room for the
possibility that agents differ in what they are aware of and the extent to
which they are aware. Although we have now developed such a model,
and explained how it can be used to characterise intuitively different ways
in which awareness can grow, we have not yet considered how an agent
should change her credences when awareness grows. That will be the topic
of the next two chapters: 4 and 5. Moreover, while we have suggested that
agents sometimes can, and arguably should, anticipate that their awareness
will grow, we have not examined how they should factor this anticipation
into their reasoning. That will be the topic of chapters 6 and 7.
12As discussed above, this is not, however, true of all economists (and computer scientists)
(see, e.g., Grant and Quiggin, 2013a, Walker and Dietz, 2011, Karni and Vierø, 2013, 2015
Piermont, 2017).





So we have introduced awareness growth informally and formally. How
should an agent respond to such growth? That is what we turn to now. We
consider what sort of impact awareness growth has on the credences (i.e.,
degrees of belief) of a rational agent.
We know that awareness growth is different from the type of learning
that philosophers and decision theorists typically consider. The typical case
is where the agent comes to have a new credence in propositions represent-
ing familiar contingencies. (Recall our characterisations of different types
of learning in chapter 2, table 2.2.) With awareness growth we are talking
about coming to entertain propositions that represent previously unfamiliar
contingencies. This is not a learning experience that can be characterised
in the usual way: as a constraint on the agent’s probability function over a
given possibility space. It rather involves a revision of this very possibility
space.
This chapter and the next investigate the extent of the analogy between
awareness growth and traditional kinds of learning. One way to put the
question is as follows: What is the parallel between norms for belief or
credence revision under awareness growth and regular so-called Bayesian
norms for belief revision?1 (Recall from chapter 2, in particular footnote 3,
1Throughout this book, we focus on degrees of belief, rather than on outright (all-or-
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that the probabilist model of belief, together with the norm of belief revision
known as conditionalisation, is collectively referred to as the Bayesian model
of belief, or simply as Bayesianism.2)
The standard answer in the literature—at least to the extent that there can
be said to be a “standard” answer when it comes to awareness growth—is
that there is a strong resemblance between awareness growth and ordi-
nary learning, and similarly between the norm for awareness growth and
Bayesian conditionalisation. In the case of awareness growth, the norm has
become known as Reverse Bayesianism, a term coined by economists Karni
and Vierø, who have devised influential decision-theoretic arguments in
favour of the norm (2013, 2015). Informally, Reverse Bayesianism states that
when a person becomes aware of new contingencies, she should update her
credences “in such a way that likelihood [probability] ratios of events in the
original [epistemic] state space remain intact” (2013: 2801). Insofar as they
have addressed belief revision under awareness growth, philosophers too
(notably, Wenmackers and Romeijn 2016, and Bradley 2017) have endorsed
what is effectively Reverse Bayesianism.
In this chapter we investigate the Reverse Bayesianism response to the
question posed above. We initially, in sections 4.2 and 4.3, explain why Re-
verse Bayesianism has a strong resemblance to regular Bayesian belief revi-
sion. We go on, however, in section 4.4, to pose putative counterexamples to
Reverse Bayesianism. Our diagnosis of these cases leads us to conclude that
they are indeed genuine counterexamples to Reverse Bayesianism, which
thus cannot be a general requirement of rationality.
4.2 Traditional Bayesianism
Let us first lay out in detail the traditional Bayesian account of how cre-
dences should be revised in response to learning.3 We note upfront that
the finer details of Bayesian norms of belief revision are controversial. For
instance, there is disagreement about whether the norms govern the actual
transitions in an agent’s credences through time, or merely an agent’s plans,
nothing) belief. Thus, when we talk about “belief revision” we mean revision of degrees of
belief, that is, revision of one’s credences.
2Note that Bayesianism is often taken to incorporate the expected utility principle as well.
3A very brief account of Bayesian learning was given in chapter 2, specifically in sec-
tion 2.2.
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at some given time, for how to revise her credences in response to learning
new things. For many purposes, such finer interpretative questions ar-
guably do not matter. We hope that interpretative issues do not matter for
our purposes either, but that is not something we can take for granted. We
seek belief revision norms for awareness growth that are the counterpart of
norms for ordinary learning. Our response will be more compelling to the
extent that it does not depend on a specific and controversial interpretation
of these norms for ordinary learning.
4.2.1 The rule of conditionalisation
We will get to the nuances shortly. Let us first present the basics. The rule
of conditionalisation—one of the core theses of Bayesian epistemology—
states that for any proposition B, the agent’s degrees of belief or credence in
B, after learning A (and nothing stronger), should equal her (prior) condi-
tional credence in B given A, i.e., P(B | A), which, according to the standard
definition of conditional probabilities, equates to P(A&B)/P(A) whenever
P(A) > 0. (It is typically assumed that the agent would never learn some-
thing to which she had assigned zero probability.4) More formally, let PA
represent our agent’s credences after she has learned A. Then the rule of
Conditionalisation states that:
Conditionalisation. For any A,B ∈ F and according to any rational agent:
PA(B) = P(B | A) assuming that P(A) > 0
Now, just like we used PA to denote our agent’s credences after she has
learned A, we can use it to denote her conditional credences after she has
learned A. Thus, PA(B | C), for instance, denotes her conditional credence
in B given C after she has learned A. Then, given the standard definition
of conditional probabilities stated above, Conditionalisation is logically
equivalent to the conjunction of the following two principles:
Certainty. PA(A) = 1
4We leave it as an open question whether or not the relevant conditional probabilities
can otherwise be defined for cases where the proposition conditioned on is assigned zero
probability (see Hájek 2003 for discussion). In general, there is a question which we do not
address in this book of how an agent should revise her credences if she were to learn that a
proposition which she had assigned zero probability is in fact true.
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Rigidity. PA(B | A) = P(B | A) assuming that P(A) > 0
Informally, Certainty says that the agent is certain of whatever she has
learned. Rigidity, on the other hand, says that whatever proposition the
agent may learn, her degrees of belief conditional on this proposition are
rigid, or unchanged by the learning experience. These two principles thus
reflect a neat division between those beliefs directly affected by the learning
experience (described by Certainty), and those beliefs that are not affected
by the learning experience and are thus unchanged (as per Rigidity). In this
way, the rule can be described as a “conservative-change” maxim: “hold
fixed the relationships between any beliefs that are not directly affected by
the learning experience”.
It has been well noted that the Certainty condition does not encompass
all kinds of learning. For starters, it does not fit well with an intuitive notion
of learning according to which one could take oneself to have learned some-
thing without having become certain of some proposition. Fortunately, the
Bayesian framework can be straightforwardly extended to learning experi-
ences where an agent does not learn anything with certainty, without giving
up Rigidity, as Richard Jeffrey (1965) proposed.5
4.2.2 Interpreting the norm
We said that conditionalisation articulates conservative belief change. One
might defend such a rule on the basis that an agent should adjust her
credences in response to learning only to the extent that the learning is
revelatory. Any further change would be arbitrary. For instance, when an
agent learns a proposition A with certainty, the only change that this licences
is, first, a credence of 1 in A, and, second, the corresponding credence change
in other propositions brought about by conditionalising on A. All other
credences should stay the same. In particular, all conditional credences
should stay the same (as per Rigidity), and so should the credence in any
proposition B that the agent takes to be independent of A in the sense that
conditionalising on A does not change her credence in B.
One might wonder why an austere approach to learning is rationally
required, and if so, whether an austere approach amounts to conditional-
5 The maxim has also been extended to cases where the information one gains affects
one’s conditional probabilities (in the form of the rule known as Adams conditionalisation)
(Bradley 2005).
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isation. But let us put this big substantive question to the side. We focus
rather on the interpretative question introduced above: Is the relevant norm
about transition or planning? That is, are we talking about whether an agent
should actually or rather merely plan to change her credences according to
the rule of conditionalisation?6 The hope would be that it does not matter:
either interpretation of Bayesian conditionalisation will have an analogue
in the case of awareness growth.
Indeed, defenders of the Bayesian model (so-called Bayesians) have taken
different sides on questions of interpretation. The standard reading of
conditionalisation is arguably the transition reading: that it is a genuinely
diachronic norm governing the relationship between an agent’s credences
at different times, before and after learning. The planning interpretation is
more attractive, however, to those who are uncomfortable with the idea of
genuinely diachronic norms of rationality, and who doubt that such norms
can be defended.
The problem, when it comes to remaining ecumenical about the inter-
pretation of belief revision norms, is that any planning norm does not seem
to have an obvious analogue in the context of awareness growth. There
is no sense in which an agent can plan for a particular awareness growth,
as that would contradict the very nature of the phenomenon. That said,
one might suppose that an agent can plan for some generically-described
awareness growth. Indeed, we explore such plans in detail in chapters 6
and 7, under the auspices of “anticipated awareness growth”. Accordingly,
one might regard the norm we seek, the analogue of conditionalisation,
to be a constraint on one’s planned credence change in the event of some
generically-described awareness growth. While we do return to this idea
in chapter 7.4, for now it is worth noting that there are certain limitations
to the kinds of awareness growth that one can anticipate. For instance, one
cannot anticipate what is truly awareness growth by expansion. It seems
that, insofar as we are looking for a parallel norm for all kinds of awareness
growth, it is more straightforward to have in mind the actual-transition
version of Bayesian conditionalisation.
6Others have suggested that there is no direct norm governing credence change at all.
Rather, conditionalisation is a mere consequence of rational agents having credences that
fit the evidence at any given time (Hedden 2015). But this picture involves substantial
evidential constraints on credence and lies well outside the subjectivist picture we are
pursuing here.
60 4. RESPONDING TO AWARENESS GROWTH
It is however worth asking: Is there yet another way to interpret norms
of belief change in the standard setting that can also be extended to aware-
ness growth? Let us suggest one that accords with the conservative nature
of conditionalisation. The main idea is that conditionalisation is not a sub-
stantive norm at all but rather a mere description of what it means for
credences to be stable upon learning. That is, if an agent who learns some
proposition for sure changes her credences in accordance with condition-
alisation then her credences are stable throughout the experience. This is
the most deflationary account of the significance of “conservative belief
change”.
On this reading, an agent is not irrational in any sense if her actual
changes in credence do not accord with conditionalisation. It is just that
her credences are not stable, or do not change in a stable way, at the time
in question. (One might, in addition, be interested in an agent’s overall
epistemic stability. For instance, one might regard a person to be an epis-
temically stable agent even though she occasionally fails to conditionalise,
as long as she doesn’t do so too often.) Similarly, in the case of planning,
it is not irrational for an agent to predict that she will not revise her cre-
dences in accordance with conditionalisation. There may nonetheless be
something regrettable about this kind of self-knowledge sincd there may
be costs associated with instability in one’s credences.
We have introduced this latter interpretation of Bayesian conditionali-
sation to allow for at least two ways to think about what a “norm” of belief
change for growing awareness amounts to. That is to say that one can read
the quest of this chapter in at least two ways. One option is that we seek
a genuinely diachronic norm for belief change under growing awareness.
That was the presumption in our introductory remarks. We asked: how
should an agent change her credences in response to a given growth in
awareness? Another option, for those sceptical of genuinely diachronic
norms (and who moreover doubt the prospects for the relevant “planning”
norm), is that we seek a mere description of, or criteria for, what it means
for credences to be stable through time, having experienced awareness
growth. We will proceed using language that is more fitting to the former
interpretation, but everything we say can rather be read along the lines of
the latter.
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4.3 Reverse Bayesianism
The “standard” response to the question of how one should change one’s
credences in response to awareness growth, is, as mentioned, known as
Reverse Bayesianism. We note upfront a fixed point in our discussion of
Reverse Bayesianism and potential rivals. We take probabilism to be non-
negotiable: we are assuming that a rational agent’s credences in any given
awareness context must satisfy the probability axioms. Recall from chap-
ter 3.3 that an awareness context is defined by the set of basic propositions of
which the agent is aware, from which a Boolean algebra can be generated.7
A brief comment is in order here: The tautology, which has probability
one according to the probability axioms, must be interpreted such that
it depends on the awareness context: it is associated with the set of all
(epistemic) possibilities in that context, which corresponds, for instance, to
A ∨ ¬A, for any A in the context.
The question is whether and how an agent’s subjective probability func-
tion for one awareness context constrains or relates to her subjective prob-
ability function once she has experienced a growth in awareness. Let’s
consider a variant of the rent-or-buy example from the last chapter. This
new example involves a slightly more complicated set of contingencies. In
your least aware epistemic situation, represented by table 4.1, you perceive
the outcome of your decision as to whether to continue to rent or instead
buy an apartment to depend not just on how the rental price will change,
but also on whether the new neighbours would turn out to be noisy or quiet.
Note that in order to make these two sorts of properties of the world vivid,
table 4.1 suppresses the possible actions of “Rent” and “Buy”; the table is
rather a two-dimensional representation of the state space.
Now suppose that having found yourself in the least aware epistemic
situation, you become aware that your rental apartment might be sold, as
per table 4.2. How should you revise your credences in the various other
propositions in light of this expansion? Or, instead, suppose that in the
situation represented by Table 4.2, you realise that changes to the interest
rate affects the outcome of buying an apartment, as per table 4.3. How
should this refinement affect your credences in other propositions?
7In chapter 3.3 we specified that we understand basic propositions to be primitive proposi-
tions (representing simple facts about the world) that do not involve any logical connectives.
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Traditional Bayesianism is silent on these two questions. As we have
seen, this is not a type of learning experience that the traditional Bayesian
framework incorporates. But recently, Karni and Vierø have defended a
unified answer to these two questions (at least for the particular kind of
decision problem and awareness growth that they represent) in the form of
a principle that they call “Reverse Bayesianism”.
Let us state Reverse Bayesianism as if it were a general principle tran-
scending the particular type of decision model formulated by Karni and
Vierø (more on which below). We use P and P+ respectively to represent
the probabilistic degrees of belief of the agent before and after awareness
grows. As per the notation in chapter 3.3, X (X+) is the set of basic proposi-
tions of which the agent is aware before (after) awareness grows. Reverse
Bayesianism holds that the ratio between the probabilities of any two incon-
sistent8 basic propositions in the old epistemic state (that each had positive
probability) should not change when awareness grows. More formally:
Reverse Bayesianism. For any A,B ∈ X (where P(A&B) = 0, P(A) > 0 and






Versions of this principle have more recently been endorsed by Wenmackers
and Romeijn (2016) and Bradley (2017).
Consider what Reverse Bayesianism requires in the rent-or-buy variant
presented above. Suppose you find “Neighbours noisy” to be twice as
likely as “Neighbours quiet” before realising that the apartment could be
8The reader might wonder why the propositions are required to be inconsistent. (We
thank a referee for encouraging us to clarify this.) The reason is that otherwise Reverse
Bayesianism, stated in a proposition framework like that adopted in this book, will not
hold for awareness growth by expansion unless the agent in question only recognises one
way of partitioning her algebra (which of course few agents ever do). For instance, note
that in the awareness context represented by table 4.1, the agent recognises two partitions;
one in terms of whether the new neighbour is noisy or not, another in terms of how the
landlord might affect the result of not buying a new apartment. Now, in the shift from
table 4.1 to table 4.2, the agent becomes aware of a possibility that is not accounted for in
the latter partition; so, if the newly discovered possibility gets a positive probability, the
probabilities of the possibilities already accounted for in that partition (“Available at higher
rent” and “Available at same or lower rent”) must shrink. In contrast, the probabilities of the
possibilities in the first partition (“Neighbour noisy” vs. “Neighbour quite”) are unaffected.
So, without the restriction to inconsistent propositions, Reverse Bayesianism would fail in
this case; and, more generally, in any case of expansion where the agent recognises more
than one partition.
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sold. Then after this realisation, you should still find “Neighbours noisy”
to be twice as likely as “Neighbours quiet”. Similarly, after you realise
that the central bank might change the interest rate, you should still find
“Neighbours noisy” to be twice as likely as “Neighbours quiet”. On the face
of it, these implications of Reverse Bayesianism might seem intuitive. For
why should the prospect of the the apartment being sold, say, change one’s
relative credence in whether the new neighbours will be noisy vs. quiet?
One might surmise that Reverse Bayesianism is compelling because it
precisely captures conservative belief change for the learning experience
in question—awareness growth. Indeed, its defenders take it to be the
consequence of something akin to the Rigidity condition for this kind of
learning experience. Bradley, for instance, says as much:
Within the Bayesian framework, conservation of the agent’s rela-
tional beliefs is ensured by the rigidity of her conditional prob-
abilities. So we can conclude that conservative belief change
[when faced with growing awareness] requires [that] the agent’s
new conditional probabilities, given the old domain, for any
members of the old domain should equal her old unconditional
probabilities for these members. (2017: 258)
Wenmackers and Romeijn similarly suggest that the conservation of “prob-
ability ratios among the old hypotheses” follows from the relevant condi-
tional probabilities remaining constant:
In analogy with Bayes’ rule, one natural conservativity con-
straint is that the new [i.e., more aware] probability distribution
must respect the old [i.e., less aware] distribution on the pre-
existing parts of the algebra [i.e., on the distributions’ shared
domain]. (2016: 1235)
Karni and Vierø also appeal to the constancy of conditional attitudes by way
of defending Reverse Bayesianism. In the behaviourist economics tradition,
they appeal to constraints on preferences, and only indirectly on beliefs:
. . . as the decision-maker’s awareness of consequences grows
and his state space expands, his preference relation conditional
on the prior state space remains unchanged. (2013: 2801)
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The above defences of Reverse Bayesianism are arguably sound given
the models of awareness growth to which they pertain. As mentioned
earlier, however, these models place limitations on the kinds of awareness
growth and/or the beliefs that are subject to the Reverse Bayesianism rule.
Karni and Vierø, for instance, employ an Anscombe and Aumann (1963)
framework, which, (like Savage’s 1954 framework, on which it is based),
consists of acts, maximally specific consequences, and states amounting to
act-consequence pairs. For Karni and Vierø, in cases of awareness growth
by expansion, the agent ultimately comes to be aware of states that are by
their very nature inconsistent with the states that define her old awareness
context.
Philosophers tend to prefer a more general Jeffrey (1965)-inspired propo-
sitional framework, but nonetheless introduce similar restrictions to Karni
and Vierø in their discussions of belief change under growing awareness.
Wenmackers and Romeijn (2016) focus on changes to sets of scientific the-
ories that are assumed to be mutually inconsistent. Bradley’s interests are
more general, but he too, in his endorsement of Reverse Bayesianism for
awareness growth by expansion, at least, focuses on propositions that are
inconsistent with those the agent comes to be aware of:
. . . the key to conservative attitude change in cases where we
become aware of prospects that are inconsistent with those that
we previously took into consideration is that we should extend our
relational attitudes to the new set in such a way as to conserve
all prior relational beliefs . . . (2017: 257, emphasis added)
Moreover, we hold that Bradley implicitly assumes only “vanilla” kinds of
awareness growth by refinement, as our discussion in the next section will
reveal.
We allow that Reverse Bayesianism may be defensible in the limited
setting that the above authors consider. But the question remains as to
whether this learning rule is defensible in a more general setting (as Bradley,
at least, suggests). In the next section, we show that the answer to this
question is negative: we offer some informal counterexamples to Reverse
Bayesianism.
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4.4 Counterexamples to Reverse Bayesianism
It is not hard to see that Reverse Bayesianism cannot generally be true
once we move beyond the constrained models of its defenders. That is,
one can devise examples where Reverse Bayesianism is violated without
irrationality on behalf of the agent in question. All we need are examples
where awareness grows since an agent becomes aware of a proposition that
she takes to be evidentially relevant, intuitively speaking, to the comparison
of propositions of which she was already aware. For in that case, the
ratio between probabilities of propositions of which the agent was already
aware will not stay the same; one proposition will become more probable
compared to the other, just like in ordinary cases where one learns evidence
relevant to the comparison of hypotheses.
In fact, the history of science is full of examples that undermine Reverse
Bayesianism, for the above reason. Here is a particularly prominent such
example:
Example 1. Nineteenth century physicists were unaware of the Special Theory of
Relativity (STR). That is, not only did they not take the theory to be true; they had
not even entertained the theory. We can suppose, however, that they had entertained
various propositions for which the theory was regarded evidentially relevant, once
Einstein brought the theory to their attention. In particular, they did (rightly)
take the theory to be evidentially relevant to various propositions about the speed
of light, such as whether the speed of light would always be measured at 300,000
km/s independently of how fast the investigator is moving or whether the measured
speed would differ, depending on how fast the investigator is moving. But then the
awareness and subsequent acceptance of the STR changed their relative confidence
in such propositions.
Not all examples where Reverse Bayesianism fails come from the history
of science. Here is a more mundane, or everyday, example:
Example 2. Suppose you happen to see your partner enter your best friend’s house
on an evening when your partner had told you she would have to work late. At
that point, you become convinced that your partner and best friend are having an
affair, as opposed to their being warm friends or mere acquaintances. You discuss
your suspicion with another friend of yours, who points out that perhaps they were
meeting to plan a surprise party to celebrate your upcoming birthday—a possibility
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that you had not even entertained. Becoming aware of this possible explanation for
your partner’s behaviour makes you doubt that she is having an affair with your
friend, relative, for instance, to their being warm friends.
There is an important difference between the two examples. In the first
example, the awareness growth consists in the recognition of a completely
new idea that the scientists had never heard or thought about before. In the
second example, by contrast, the agent has, we can assume, heard of sur-
prise parties before; it is just that in the situation and the moment in which
he/she finds him/herself, the possibility is not part of his/her awareness. As
we however pointed out in the introductory chapter, our interest is the role
that an agent’s epistemic state plays in her deliberation about how to act.
And since “unawareness” due to never having heard about an idea gen-
erally plays the same role in deliberation as “unawareness” merely in the
moment of deliberation, we treat these two types of epistemic limitations
in the same way.
A defender of Reverse Bayesianism might argue that the above two
examples do not undermine their thesis, since, for instance, the proposition
picked out by the sentence “the speed of light will always be measured
at 300,000 km/s independently of how fast the investigator is moving” is
different before and after the speaker becomes aware of the Special Theory
of Relativity. (Similarly, the proposition picked out by the sentence “my
partner and best friend are having an affair” is different before and after
the speaker realises that their partner and best friend might be organising
a surprise party.) That is, it is not just that the propositions in question
are understood differently, given a change in the underlying possibility space
(as per our own approach, detailed in chapter 3.3); rather what appear
to be the same propositions across awareness contexts are in fact entirely
different propositions. For instance, the physics case might be spelled
out as follows: despite appearances, the agent’s growth in awareness is
not simply an expansion of the “fundamental physical theory” partition
to include the STR; there is also an expansion of the “light hypothesis”
partition to include the STR versions of the (speed-of-) light hypotheses.
As a result, the addition of the STR has no bearing on the original (speed-
of-) light hypotheses, in conformity with Reverse Bayesianism. It might
be added that, if the new propositions of which the agent becomes aware
were apparently evidentially relevant to the basic propositions in the old
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awareness context, then we would not have a case of genuine awareness
growth, to which Reverse Bayesianism is limited.9
This way of saving Reverse Bayesianism however seriously weakens
the commonsense appeal and normative interest of the thesis, and seems
rather ad hoc, as the examples under consideration are surely as genuine
cases of awareness growth as any. Moreover, if the aim is to represent
the internal perspective of an agent, then it is surely more natural to take
the individuation of propositions at face value, such that, with respect to
our example above, the speed-of-light hypothesis corresponds to the same
proposition before and after recognition of the Special Theory of Relativity.
But that means that new propositions may well have a bearing on the
relative probabilities of old basic propositions. Better to modify the Reverse
Bayesian principle itself than to modify what counts as genuine awareness
growth.
So, we can conclude that we should not impose Reverse Bayesianism as a
general constraint on how a rational agent can revise her credences when her
awareness grows. The above counterexamples, however, both involve what
we called awareness growth by expansion. But as previously mentioned,
proponents also want to impose Reverse Bayesianism as a constraint on
how a rational agent can revise her credences when her awareness grows
due to refinement (see e.g. Karni and Vierø 2013: 2803). And one might
well hope that despite the above counterexamples, the principle could be
retained for belief revision due to refinement.
Unfortunately, counterexamples similar to those discussed above also
undermine Reverse Bayesianism understood in this latter way. Consider a
third example:
Example 3. Suppose you are deciding whether to see a movie at your local cinema.
You know that on the day in question, the cinema only shows “international”
(non-English) movies. You realise that both the movie’s language and genre will
affect your viewing experience. The possible languages you consider are French
and German and the genres you consider are thriller and comedy. But then you
realise that, due to your poor French and German skills, your enjoyment of the
movie will also depend on the level of difficulty of the language. Since you know the
owner of the cinema to be simple-minded, you are, after this realisation, much more
9The implication is that we would rather have a case of irrational and/or poorly repre-
sented belief change.
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confident that the language of the movie will be simple than that it will be difficult.
Moreover, since you associate simple language with thrillers, this makes you more
confident than you were before that the movie on offer is a thriller as opposed to a
comedy.
The important feature of the above example is that the original awareness
context is partitioned according to some property (the language level) that
is taken to be evidentially relevant to the comparison of some pair of in-
consistent basic propositions—that the movie is a thriller and that it is a
comedy—in the old awareness context.
There is one remaining potential objection to, in particular, examples 2
and 3 that we should address before proceeding. The objection is that, in
example 2, you realise that you did not to begin with have as much evidence
as you had thought for your partner having an affair, whereas in example
3, you realise that you had evidence all along that the movie would be a
thriller. So, in both cases, you realise that your previous epistemic state was
flawed.10
Now, we need not reject the above characterisation of these examples
for them to be counterexamples to Reverse Bayesianism. After all, the
reason you realise that your previous epistemic state was flawed, is that
you become aware of new contingencies that show that you either had
more or else less evidence than you thought. In the movie example you
become aware of a fact that connects what you already knew to the movie
being a thriller, whereas in the surprise party example you become aware of
a new possible explanation that convinces you that the evidence you took
yourself to have for your partner’s affair wasn’t strong. So, even though
you do realise that your previous epistemic state was flawed, you do so by
becoming more aware, and this growth in awareness need not align with
the requirements of Reverse Bayesianism to be rational. In addition, and
more generally, one might of course wonder why the kind of conservativity
that Reverse Bayesianism captures should be rationally required when one
has realised one’s previous epistemic state to be flawed.11
In sum, the above examples show that Reverse Bayesianism cannot hold
in full generality, neither as a constraint on belief revision due to expansion
nor as a constraint on belief revision due to refinement. Before closing,
10Thanks to Teru Thomas for suggesting this interpretation.
11Thanks to Alan Hájek for this last point.
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however, we note a different potential criticism of our analysis. It might be
argued that our examples are not illustrative of a simple learning event (a
simple growth in awareness); rather, our examples illustrate and should be
expressed formally as complex learning experiences, where first there is a
growth in awareness, and then there is a further learning event that may
be represented, say, as a Jeffrey-style or Adams-style (recall fn. 5) learning
event.12 In this way, one could argue that the awareness-growth aspect of
the learning event always satisfies Reverse Bayesianism (the new proposi-
tions are in the first instance evidentially irrelevant to the comparison of the
old basic propositions). Subsequently, however, there may be a revision of
probabilities over some partition of the possibility space, resulting in more
dramatic changes to the ratios of probabilities for the old basic propositions.
The reason we reject this way of conceiving of the learning events described
by our examples is that the two-part structure is ultimately unmotivated.
The second learning stage is an odd, spontaneous learning event that would
be hard to rationalise. Hence, this would again seem to us to be an artificial
and ad hoc way to save Reverse Bayesianism.
4.5 Concluding remarks on chapter 4
In this chapter we set out to determine the norms for belief revision under
growing awareness that are the suitable parallel to or extension of the tra-
ditional Bayesian norms for belief revision. We have seen that the arguably
most-worked-out proposal to this effect, namely, Reverse Bayesianism, does
not hold in general. That is, there are examples where an agent’s aware-
ness grows in a way that conflicts with Reverse Bayesianism, without any
apparent irrationality or undue lack of conservatism on behalf of the agent.
The further question, to be pursued in the next chapter, is whether there
is some alternative norm of belief change for growing awareness. More
generally, what are the features, if any, of conservative belief change when
one becomes aware of new contingencies?




In the last chapter we argued that Reverse Bayesianism fails with respect to
propositions A and B if the awareness growth favours one of these propo-
sitions over the other. What happens in these cases is that the “new”
propositions that the agent comes to be aware of change the relationships
between the “old” propositions. Figure 5.1 provides a stylised (not to scale!)
pictorial illustration of this phenomenon with respect to the Special The-
ory of Relativity example of awareness growth by expansion. The figure
makes clear that the propositions concerning whether or not the speed of
light is relative to the observer, denoted “Relative Light” and “Non-relative
Light” respectively, are associated with different sets of possibilities when
awareness about fundamental scientific theories grows to include the Spe-
cial Theory of Relativity, “STR”.
Figure 5.1: Expansion to include STR
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Figure 5.1 moreover suggests a retreat from Reverse Bayesianism to
the kind of rigidity principle defenders of Reverse Bayesianism apparently
take as fundamental. (Recall the quotes from chapter 4.3 which reveal
that defenders of Reverse Bayesianism take this principle to be the con-
sequence of appropriate conditional attitudes remaining constant or rigid
under growing awareness.) Informally, the idea is that the probabilities of
the old propositions, conditional on, roughly speaking, “how things were
before” (in our example, the proposition “Newton’s Theory”), should be
rigid or unaffected by the awareness growth (in our example, the expan-
sion of the fundamental theory space to include “STR”). Such a rigidity
principle looks to be the appropriate basis for conservative belief change in
the awareness-growth setting.1 It is just that the condition does not entail
Reverse Bayesianism when stated in general terms, namely, for all pairs of
basic propositions. Or so the argument might go.
Even if this position were roughly right, the relevant rigidity condition
would need to be properly spelled out. For instance, what precisely is meant
by “how things were before”, which should be conditioned on according
to this view? In section 5.2, we appeal to the model we introduced in
chapter 3.3 in order to meet this challenge. We give a precise definition
of the intended rigidity principle, which we dub Awareness Rigidity. In
section 5.3, we go on to argue against Awareness Rigidity. The prospects
for a general principle for belief change under growing awareness are thus
dim. Nonetheless, we proceed, in section 5.4, to formulate what we call
Restricted Reverse Bayesianism (RRB). Even if RRB is not a substantive norm
for belief revision under growing awareness, it may yet serve as a guide for
detecting cases where we can expect the type of conservatism enshrined in
Bayesianism to hold.
5.2 Awareness Rigidity defined
Let us start then by spelling out the rigidity condition that plausibly con-
strains belief change under growing awareness. The hope would be that
1In fact, Karni and Vierø (2013) formulate the preference analogue of such a rigidity
principle, which they call Awareness consistency, and use it in their derivation of Reverse
Bayesianism. (Karni and Vierø 2015 however use a somewhat weaker axiom.) Moroever,
as we point out below, Bradley (2017) explicitly assumes what is essentially Awareness
Rigidity (although giving it a different name).
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this rigidity principle does not imply Reverse Bayesianism in the situations
in which we do not want the latter to hold, that is, in situations where the
awareness growth is intuitively evidentially relevant to the comparison of
some propositions.
Our suggestion for specifying a rigidity condition for awareness growth
is to identify the smallest set of possibilities in the new awareness context
that is associated with a proposition that used to be associated with all
possibilities (i.e., the tautology) in the old awareness context. (Recall the
terminology we introduced in section 3.3.2 to describe the possibilities as-
sociated with any given proposition in a particular awareness context.) For
the example described in figure 5.1, this proposition will indeed be “New-
ton’s theory”, as per our informal discussion above. With respect to our
rent-or-buy example, when awareness grows by expansion to incorporate
the new contingency “Apartment is sold”, as per the shift from table 4.1 to
table 4.2, the proposition associated with the smallest set of new possibilities
and which used to be the tautology in the old awareness context is the dis-
junction of all the old Landlord contingencies, i.e., “Available at higher rent
∨ Available at same or lower rent”. In special cases of awareness growth
by refinement where all possibilities are effectively refined (what we refer
to as complete refinement), the relevant proposition will be associated with
the entire set of possibilities constituting the new awareness context. So,
for instance, when awareness grows by refinement to incorporate the new
contingencies concerning the interest rates, as per the shift from table 4.2
to table 4.3, the proposition associated with the smallest set of new possi-
bilities and which used to be the tautology in the old awareness context is,
for instance, “Available at higher rent ∨ Available at same or lower rent ∨
Apartment is sold”. This proposition is the tautology—associated with all
possibilities—in the new awareness context too.
More formally: Let T∗X+ inFX+ be the proposition(s) found by the follow-
ing procedure. First, find all those propositions in FX+ that are associated
with the full set WX. (Recall from section 3.3.2 that the set of possibilities
associated with a proposition are just all those possibilities for which that
proposition is true.) This results in a set of propositions that we can denote
{T∗X+}. Next, find a proposition in {T
∗
X} that corresponds to the smallest sub-
set of WX+ . Any such proposition is denoted T∗X+ . This allows us to specify
a rigidity condition that one might take to be the appropriate extension of
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Bayesian (i.e., conservative) belief change to the case of growing awareness:
Awareness Rigidity. For any rational agent and for any A ∈ FX:
P+(A | T∗X+) = P(A)
This, we think, captures the rigidity condition that defenders of Reverse
Bayesianism take as more fundamental than Reverse Bayesianism itself.
In fact, setting aside subtle differences when it comes to the interpretation
of the background algebra (in particular, whether parts of it remain con-
stant during awareness change, which we deny), this is precisely the norm
that Bradley (2017: 258) endorses as the appropriate extension of Bayesian
conservatism to situations where awareness changes.2
Figure 5.1 makes vivid that Awareness Rigidity does not generally entail
Reverse Bayesianism, at least for cases of awareness growth by expansion.
Awareness Rigidity requires that the probabilities for old propositions—
“Relative Light” and “Non-relative Light”—conditional on “Newton’s theory”,
remain constant when awareness grows. One can see just by looking at the
figure that it does not follow that the ratio of the absolute probabilities for
“Relative Light” and “Non-relative Light” remain constant when awareness
grows. For this particular case of awareness growth, then, Awareness
Rigidity does seem to precisely capture what aspect of the agent’s credences
should stay constant as awareness grows.
Note that we might have otherwise defined Awareness Rigidity in a dif-
ferent but logically equivalent way, by concentrating on those propositions
that are associated with the agent’s atomic possibilities in the old awareness
context. Awareness Rigidity requires that the relative probabilities of these
propositions remain constant. For instance, with respect to the awareness
growth by expansion described in figure 5.1, the original possibilities are
associated with the propositions “Newton’s Theory & Relative Light” and
“Newton’s Theory & Non-relative Light”. It is the ratio of probabilities
for these propositions that must remain constant, according to Awareness
Rigidity, when the agent becomes aware of a further fundamental theory:
“STR”.
2Bradley however uses the term “rigid extension” rather than Awareness Rigidity. More
precisely, he calls one (more aware) probability function a rigid extension of another if the
two are related by what we call Awareness Rigidity.
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5.3 Against Awareness Rigidity
Unfortunately, Awareness Rigidity is not a compelling rationality require-
ment, especially for cases of refinement, which we turn to now. The problem
is that Awareness Rigidity entails Reverse Bayesianism in those special cases
where awareness grows by refinement of all possibilities, as per the shift
from table 4.2 to table 4.3 (since it effectively requires that the probabilities
for all propositions in the old awareness context remain unchanged). We
previously argued that Reverse Bayesianism is not plausible even in these
special cases of complete refinement. By modus tollens, Awareness Rigidity
is then not a plausible principle for belief change.
Is there any reason to retract this position? We think not. Figure 5.2 is a
pictorial representation of our third counterexample to Reverse Bayesianism—
the refinement-counterexample to Reverse Bayesianism concerning the in-
ternational movie that will be shown at the local cinema. Figure 5.2
makes vivid how awareness of an entirely new property or kind of con-
tingency may intuitively cause adjustment of the relative probabilities of
“old” propositions. Specifically, the relative probabilities of the thriller and
comedy genres changes when the agent becomes aware of the language-
level contingencies, denoted “High” and “Low”.
Figure 5.2: Refinement into high/low language
While we hesitate to read too much into a formal representation of
awareness growth, we suggest that our model introduced in chapter 3.3
offers some explanation for why Awareness Rigidity may be reasonably
violated. In short, the set of possibilities associated with any proposition
completely changes when awareness grows. Initially the set is constituted
by possibilities that are effectively truth functions over a given set of basic
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propositions; after awareness growth, the set is constituted by possibilities
that are truth functions over an enlarged set of basic propositions.
So, it is not surprising that the relationships between propositions, even
conditional on “how things were before”, may in some cases dramatically
change. This is what happens in the movie example depicted in figure 5.2:
when the set of possibilities associated with the movie genres “Thriller”
and “Comedy” change, so too do their relative probabilities conditional on
“how things were before”, which, in this case, equate to their unconditional
probabilities. Examples like this highlight that there is no clear delineation
between those propositions and corresponding credences that are and are
not affected by the awareness growth.
Mahtani (2020) presents an example that also serves as a striking coun-
terexample to Awareness Rigidity in the case of refinement.3 The example
goes as follows:
You know that I am holding a fair ten pence UK coin which I
am about to toss. You have a credence of 0.5 that it will land
HEADS, and a credence of 0.5 that it will land TAILS. You think
that the tails side always shows an engraving of a lion. So you
also naturally have a credence of 0.5 that (LION) it will land with
the lion engraving face-up: relative to your state of awareness,
TAILS and LION are equivalent. [...] Now let’s suppose that
you somehow become aware that occasionally ten pence coins
have something other than a lion engraving on the tails side. In
particular, you become aware that [STONE] there are some ten
pence coins that have an engraving of Stonehenge on the tails
side. Let’s assume that no other possibilities occur to you. [...]
The awareness growth in Mahtani’s example is one of refinement (albeit
partial refinement as opposed to complete refinement, since not all possi-
bilities are refined): you realise that TAILS can be further refined into
the disjunction LION ∨ STONE. To see that this is a counterexample to
Awareness Rigidity, note that the smallest set of possibilities in the new
awareness context that is associated with what used to be the tautology
3Mahtani proposed the example rather as a counterexample to a restricted version of
Reverse Bayesianism that we proposed in earlier draft work. We follow up on this in the
next section (in particular, see our reference to Mahtani in footnote 6).
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in the old awareness context is LION ∨ HEADS. So, according to Aware-
ness Rigidity, we should find that, say, P+(LION | LION ∨ HEADS) =
P(LION) = 0.5. But that is counterintuitive. By learning that some instances
of TAILS are not instances of LION, and nothing more, your credence in
LION should diminish. In other words, intutively, we should find that
P+(LION | LION∨HEADS) < P(LION), in violation of Awareness Rigidity.
So, we have another refinement-counterexample to Awareness Rigidity.
Awareness Rigidity might nevertheless be compelling for awareness
growth by expansion. After all, when awareness grows by expansion,
some old propositions are no longer equivalent to the tautology, and hence,
Awareness Rigidity does not entail Reverse Bayesianism in cases of expan-
sion. Perhaps Awareness Rigidity is plausible when restricted to expansion,
even if Reverse Bayesianism is not. The example involving an expansion of
fundamental theories depicted in figure 5.1 suggests as much.
Even in cases of expansion, however, it may be that the gained awareness
shakes things up sufficiently in one’s old awareness state that Awareness
Rigidity is violated. Again, our formal model underscores the fact that all
propositions are in some way affected by a growth in awareness, whether
it be awareness growth due to expansion or refinement. So it is certainly
not off the table that Awareness Rigidity may be violated in cases of aware-
ness growth by expansion. We leave as an open question whether that is
something that can rationally happen.
5.4 Restricted Reverse Beyesianism
Finally, we note that while Reverse Bayesianism must be abandoned as a
general principle of belief revision for growing awareness, it is arguably still
an interesting relation that may sometimes hold between pairs of propositions
in the transition from one belief state to another. As we have seen with
the earlier rent-or-buy examples, there are circumstances where Reverse
Bayesianism does intuitively hold. We suggest that these are cases in which
what is learnt is evidentially irrelevant to the pairs of propositions at issue. In
other words, Reverse Bayesianism is a useful relationship for characterising
cases of awareness growth that is evidentially irrelevant for the pair of
propositions at issue.
One might say that a restricted version of Reverse Bayesiaism holds.
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The relevant principle can be stated as follows:
Restricted Reverse Bayesianism (RBB). For any A,B ∈ X (where P(A) > 0
and P(B) > 0), if
• the awareness growth from X to X+ is evidentially irrelevant for A vs. B,
• and Awareness Rigidity holds “locally” with respect to A and B,4






Restricted Reverse Bayesianism is not intended to be a substantive norma-
tive principle, since the antecedent conditions—stipulating “local” Aware-
ness Rigidity and evidential irrelevance—secure the conclusion as a mat-
ter of logic (we illustrate this below after we formally define evidential
irrelevance). RRB is nonetheless supposed to be illuminating in that it re-
veals sufficient conditions for Reverse Bayesianism to hold for some pair of
propositions under awareness growth.
Of course, whether or not it really is the case that Reverse Bayesianism
is entailed by the conditions stated in RRB depends on what it means for
awareness growth to be “evidentially irrelevant for A vs. B”. Intuitively,
an awareness growth experience is evidentially irrelevant for A vs. B if
the awareness growth neither favours A over B nor vice versa. Note that
awareness growth can thus be evidentially irrelevant for A vs. B even if it
is evidentially relevant for both A and B. For instance, an expansion that
lowers the probability of A and B by 10% each, say, favours neither over
the other, but is (negatively) evidentially relevant for both A and B. It is
also worth noting that an awareness growth that increases the probability
of A&B without increasing the probability of either A or B counts as growth
that is evidentially irrelevant for A vs. B.5 Since the purpose of the definition
is simply to build a sufficient condition where Reverse Bayesianism holds,
and since we think that Reverse Bayesianism should hold (for A and B)
4That is, the probability of both A and B conditional on “how things were before” (as
spelled out in the previous section) remains constant under the awareness growth from X
to X+.
5We thank Sven Ove Hansson for pressing us on this point.
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in these sorts of cases, we take the above to be a strength rather than a
weakness of our definition.
More formally, we propose the following account of evidential irrele-
vance, at least for special cases of awareness growth (more on this restriction
below):
Definition (Evidential irrelevance). For any A,B ∈ FX, we say that an agent’s
awareness growth, from awareness context X to X+, where Xj is the set of all basic
propositions X j ∈ X+ such that X j < X, is evidentially irrelevant for A vs. B
whenever:
either (i) P+(A |
∨
Xi∈Xj














We said that this definition only works for special cases of awareness
growth. The special cases are those of pure expansion or pure refinement.
In these cases, the “new” propositions of which the agent is aware (those in
Xj) are mutually inconsistent, and we suggest our definition of evidential
irrelevance only for such cases. For mixed cases of awareness growth, RRB
simply will not be illuminating in the intended way, since evidential irrele-
vance must itself be defined in terms of whether or not Reverse Bayesianism
holds for the propositions in question.6
Let us now briefly illustrate how, given the above definition of evidential
irrelevance (and assuming “pure” awareness growth as per above), Reverse
Bayesianism logically follows from the two conditions in RRB (i.e., from
local Awareness Rigidity plus evidential irrelevance). Note first the new
(more aware) space of possibilities, WX+ , can be partitioned into two sets,
on the one hand the possibilities associated with “how things were before”,
T∗, and on the other hand the possibilities associated with (the disjunction
of propositions in) the set of newly discovered basic propositions, Xj. (Note
that in the case of refinement this second set will simply be empty since the
6 We are indebted to the work of Anna Mahtani (2020) for inspiring this presentation
of RRB as a statement of sufficient conditions for Reverse Bayesianism, rather than a sub-
stantive norm. Mahtani’s counterexamples to a version of RRB we proposed in previous
draft work prompted us to refine the principle. The previous version did not make all the
requisite antecedent conditions explicit in the statement of RRB.
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possibilities associated with “how things were before” amount to the full
set of possibilities WX+ .)
Suppose now that in the shift from WX to WX+ , Awareness Rigidity is







For evidential irrelevance, as defined above, there are two cases to consider,
(i) and (ii). Let’s first suppose that in addition to the assumed local Aware-
ness Rigidity, (i) holds in the awareness growth from WX to WX+ . That
means it is a case of expansion where neither A nor B is consistent with







Now suppose instead that in addition to the assumed local Awareness
Rigidity, (ii) holds in the awareness growth from WX to WX+ . If it is a
case of expansion, that means that the ratio of the probability of A to the
probability of B conditional on the possibilities associated with Xj (i.e. all
those possibilities not associated with T∗) is the same as the ratio of A
and B in the old awareness context. (In the case of refinement, evidential
irrelevance due to ii) is entailed by local Awareness Rigidity; moreover,
there are no remaining possibilities to consider that are not associated with






In sum, the two conditions in the statement of Restricted Reverse Bayesianism—
that is, local Awareness Rigidity and evidential irrelevance—logically im-
ply the conclusion in the principle—that is, Reverse Bayesianism. Hence,
Restricted Reverse Bayesianism cannot, as we previously noted, be a sub-
stantive normative principle. However, it is, we think, illuminating in that
it states sufficient conditions for Reverse Bayesianism (for “pure” expan-
sion/refinement cases).
Note that evidential irrelevance does not hold in the counterexamples
to Reverse Bayesianism discussed in chapter 4.4 (these being cases of pure
expansion/refinement as required). For instance, the probability ratio (in
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terms of probability function P+) of your partner having an affair with
your friend to their being warm friends, conditional on your partner and
your friend meeting to organise a surprise party, is lower than the “old”
probability ratio (in terms of probability function P) of your partner having
an affair with your friend to their being warm friends. Similarly, in the
example involving refinement, the probability ratio (in terms of P+) of the
movie being a thriller to its being a comedy, conditional on the disjunction
of low- and high-level language, differs from the “old” probability ratio (in
terms of P) of the movie being a thriller to its being a comedy. In sum,
both in the counterexamples to Reverse Bayesianism involving expansion
and in the counterexamples involving refinement, evidential irrelevance is
violated.
On the other hand, the more standard examples of awareness growth,
such as the rent-or-buy examples, are plausibly cases of evidential irrele-
vance (at least with respect to some pairs of “old” basic propositions), by
the above definition. In the expansion case, you become aware that the
apartment could be sold. This is irrelevant, for instance, to your relative
confidence in the neighbours being noisy vs. quiet, since your new prob-
ability ratio (in terms of P+) of the neighbours being noisy to their being
quiet, conditional on the rental apartment being sold, is intuitively the same
as your old probability ratio (in terms of P) of the neighbours being noisy
to their being quiet. Likewise for the refinement case: the realisation that
interest rates could go up or else go down or stay the same is irrelevant, for
instance, to your relative confidence in the neighbours being noisy vs. quiet,
since your new probability ratio (in terms of P+) of the neighbours being
noisy to their being quiet, both conditional on interest rates either going up
or else going down or staying the same, matches your old probability ratio
(in terms of P) of the neighbours being noisy to their being quiet.
5.5 Concluding remarks on chapter 5
We take our findings to suggest that there is no general, conservative norm
of belief revision for awareness growth. (Alternatively—recall our discus-
sion in chapter 4.2.2—one can translate our conclusion as follows: There
is no general account of what it means for credences to be stable before
and after awareness growth.) Reverse Bayesianism simply characterises
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those cases in which belief revision under awareness growth happens to be
conservative in the familiar way, since the relevant beliefs are not affected
by the awareness growth. Restricted Reverse Bayesian describes sufficient
conditions for when that is the case.
Now, we have, admittedly, only considered two conservative norms
of belief revision for awareness growth: Reverse Bayesianism in the last
chapter and Awareness Rigidity in this chapter. To understand why we
are skeptical of there being any fully general, conservative norm of belief
revision for awareness growth, recall that being conservative when revising
one’s beliefs means that one holds certain aspects of one’s credences fixed
throughout the revision. We take our discussion so far to have established
that when awareness grows, there is no clear boundary between those
credences that are directly affected by the learning experience and those
that are not. This makes the prospects of finding a general conservative
norm of belief revision for awareness growth very bleak.
The spirit of our discussion has been simply to assess whether a rational
agent would endorse specific principles for belief revision in response to
learning. Diaconis and Zabell (1982: 827) refer to this as a “subjective”
mode of justification. They have this mode of justification in mind when
stating (e.g., ibid.: 822) that standard conditionalisation and its Jeffrey vari-
ant are applicable just in case one judges that Rigidity would hold in the given
circumstances. We have effectively claimed that a rational agent may reason-
ably judge that neither Reverse Bayesianism nor Awareness Rigidity would
hold in various cases of awareness growth.
Of course, there are also “stricter” justifications of conditionalisation,
at least when it is interpreted as a planning norm,7 including the so-called
“diachronic Dutch book argument”. On this argument, planning to revise
one’s beliefs contrary to conditionalisation in the appropriate learning cir-
cumstances has bad pragmatic consequences that should be avoided; specif-
ically, it makes one vulnerable to sure loss. One might wonder whether,
notwithstanding our counterexamples, there is an argument of this sort for
Reverse Bayesianism, or perhaps for Awareness Rigidity.
The answer is clearly “no”, we say, if the aim is to justify a very general
and widely applicably norm for belief revision under growing awareness.
7Again, recall our discussion in chapter 4.2.2 of the different interpretations of norms of
belief revision.
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As discussed in chapter 4.2.2, in the context of growing awareness, in par-
ticular, planning norms have limited viability. An agent cannot always
anticipate that she might experience awareness growth, let alone all the
details of this awareness growth. So it would seem that she cannot, at least
not always, specify a plan for belief revision under growing awareness.
We are yet to fully investigate circumstances in which awareness growth
is anticipated, however. In these special circumstances, there may be a sense
in which an agent can specify a plan for belief revision. One might wonder
whether some sort of Dutch book argument could be made in favour of
a norm for belief revision when it comes to these special circumstances.
That is the question to which we turn in chapter 7, after having introduced
anticipated awareness growth in the next chapter.





In previous chapters, we introduced the general idea of limited awareness
and changes in awareness, and explained why these are both common and
practically important. We have moreover proposed a general model of
limited awareness and awareness growth. Finally, we have argued, against
most of the previous literature on limited awareness, that there are no
general norms of belief revision for growing awareness; indeed, the notion
of conservative belief change is not well defined when it comes to awareness
growth.
For the purposes of decision-making, however, what is of interest is nei-
ther limited awareness nor awareness growth in general, but rather, the
recognition of one’s limited awareness and how it may change over time.
If you are completely “unaware of your unawareness” in some choice sit-
uation, that is, if you do not even realise that you could be unaware of
something that might turn out to be important for the outcome of your de-
cision, then this lack of awareness will not play any role in your deliberation.
In contrast, if you find yourself in a situation of “conscious unawareness”
(Walker and Dietz 2011), that is, you suspect that you lack awareness and
may potentially experience awareness growth, then this suspicion could,
and arguably often should, play a role in your deliberation.
Situations where one is aware that one has limited awareness that is
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relevant to one’s choices are not uncommon. These will often be, and
are usefully conceived as, situations where one anticipates experiencing
awareness growth sometime in the future. (Recall that “planned awareness
growth” was one kind of feedback from the world captured in table 2.2.) Of
course, there will be situations where one does not anticipate such growth
but rather predicts that one’s limited awareness will persist over time. Even
then, however, we suggest that being consciously unaware means that one
is at least open to later experiences of awareness growth.
Intuitively, it would be reasonable to anticipate or at least be open to the
possibility of awareness growth in novel situations—those in which one’s
own action is unprecedented, or else one may otherwise experience the
world in a new way. Moreover, one’s past experiences can serve as a guide
to novelty. One may come to recognise situations that are in some important
respects similar1 to situations in which one has previously proven to have
limited awareness, presumably brought to light by a later experience of
awareness growth.
It would also seem reasonable to be open to the possibility of awareness
growth in decision-situations that exceed some specified level of complexity.
Again, one’s past experience can serve as a guide: If you have proven to
have limited awareness in the past—due to later experiencing awareness
growth—in choice situations that exceed some level of complexity, then it
would seem reasonable to at least be open to the possibility of awareness
growth whenever you find yourself in a choice situation that exceeds that
level of complexity.2
Radical technological change would seem to be a prime example of a
novel (and complex) situation where we should be open to the possibility of
awareness growth. For instance, when scientists in the late 1960s managed
to send information between computers the size of small houses, most peo-
ple could not foresee that this would ultimately result in people walking
around with pocket-sized computers with access to the near totality of hu-
manity’s knowledge. To take another example: with the benefit of hindsight
1Although the notion of similarity to past decision situations might seem elusive, and
perhaps ill-defined, a formal and sophisticated decision theory based on this notion has
been developed: Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2001).
2This point is made by Grant and Quiggin (2013b), who consider more precise measures
of complexity and develop a game theoretic model with unawareness and (what we call)
the anticipation of awareness growth.
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we see that early industrialists were unaware of the possibility that their
employment of new manufacturing and transportation techniques would
eventually change the climate. Other similar scenarios lead us to think that
deployment of a new technology is prone to limited awareness that may
later be “filled in” and moreover turn out to be relevant to the choice at
hand. But there will be more ordinary sorts of situations, too, where one
may reasonably anticipate or be open to awareness growth. For instance,
one might anticipate becoming aware of new artists or genres when one
visits an arts festival—an example to which we shall later return.
In this chapter we however foreground the more dramatic or extreme
cases of “conscious unawareness” and associated anticipation or openness
to awareness growth, such as the prospect of geoengineering that we in-
troduce in section 6.2. We go on to propose, in section 6.3, how to model
an agent who is open to the possibility of awareness growth, such that this
may play a role in her decision-making. Finally, in section 6.4, we reflect on
how our model of openness to awareness growth reveals this phenomenon
to be in some ways very ordinary, more or less akin to ordinary reasoning
about less-than-fully-specified contingencies as described in any standard
decision model.
6.2 Example: Solar Radiation Management
Solar radiation management (SRM), also known as solar geoengineering,
has been discussed as a most likely very efficient and effective way of com-
bating (and potentially even reversing) climate change. One such technique
would consist in injecting reflective aerosol particles into the stratosphere.
These particles would then reflect a small amount of inbound sunlight back
out into space, thus making the planet cooler than it would otherwise be.
Although the idea behind SRM is partly inspired by the eruption of
large volcanoes that naturally blast reflective sulphate particles into the
stratosphere, nothing like the scale of SRM that would be needed to combat
climate change has ever been tried. Thus, as for instance the Solar Radia-
tion Management Governance Initiative frankly admits, the potential “side
effects” of SRM are not well understood and are in fact mostly unknown.3
SRM would thus seem to be an example where we do, and should,
3See http://www.srmgi.org/what-is-srm/.
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anticipate awareness growth, if (or when) it is seriously tried. There may
be various possible “side effects” which we cannot yet articulate, but we
think one of these side effects is bound to occur if we do try SRM on the
scale needed to combat climate change. So none of the possible outcomes
of SRM can currently be described in perfect detail. That is to say, we may
anticipate that trying out SRM on a global scale leads to awareness growth
by refinement.
In addition (or alternatively), we may suspect there is some unknown
contingency that is inconsistent with any contingency of which we are
aware, and that could make solar radiation management either much more
positive, or much more negative, than the possible outcomes of which we
are currently aware. That is to say, we may anticipate or at least be open to
awareness growth by expansion, if we try SRM on a global scale.
Despite SRM being an example where we anticipate awareness growth
(should we try it on a global scale), we may nonetheless have some rough
estimate of the desirability of SRM. For instance, although we recognise that
things could go wrong in ways we have not yet considered, we might think
that the expected utility is positive (when SRM is compared to not employ-
ing SRM). That is, we may prefer employing SRM to not employing it by
an amount that can be quantified relative to our other preferences, despite
recognising our limited awareness and the potential for later awareness
growth. More generally, the fact that we anticipate or are open to aware-
ness growth that affects the desirability of an action need not entail that we
cannot evaluate the action—and compare it to its alternatives—in terms of
(at least rough, or imprecise) expected utility.
It might seem puzzling that we can evaluate an option, by estimating
its expected utility, even when we take the option to be associated with
potential awareness growth. We have more to say about this in the following
sections, but let us here offer some preliminary remarks. To begin with, it
helps to see the more dramatic cases of awareness growth at one end of a
spectrum that also includes, at the other end, the less dramatic, ordinary
cases of awareness growth.
Part of the appeal of going to a music or film festival, for instance, is the
prospect of finding out about new artists or genres, that is, the possibility of
becoming aware of artists or genres the existence of which one had previously
been unaware. So, we may hope for some abstract outcome, or experience,
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the content of which we cannot quite articulate yet. Still, it seems evident
that we can and do compare the option of going to a film festival, say, with
the option of staying home, despite there being important aspects of the film
festival of which we realise we are currently unaware.4 The same arguably
applies to the evaluation of SRM, despite it being a more extreme case of
anticipated awareness growth.
Nevertheless, it might seem reckless, especially in extreme cases of an-
ticipated awareness growth, to base one’s choices entirely on considerations
of expected utility. For instance, even if, conditional on the contingencies of
which we are currently aware, SRM has positive expected utility, one might
wonder whether that suffices to justify a choice to try SRM on, say, a global
scale. After all, since we anticipate awareness growth, we are open to the
possibility that SRM will go wrong in ways that we haven’t yet considered.
In particular, it might seem that agents who are averse to risk and uncer-
tainty should take such possibilities to be reasons against basing decisions
purely on considerations of expected utility maximization.5
However, it is unclear whether we should take such caution to be in-
consistent with expected utility maximisation. In fact, the model we shall
soon introduce makes such caution consistent with expected utility max-
imisation. In particular, the model allows for maximising expected utility
all-things-considered while turning down an option that has positive expected
utility given the contingencies of which one is aware.
4Since discovering a new film genre might be “transformative”, for instance in the
(epistemic) sense that one cannot know what experiencing films of that genre is like before
having had the experience, our claim that one can compare the option of going to a film
festival with the option of staying home is in contrast with Paul’s (2014) influential work
on “transformative experience”. This is not the place to discuss Paul’s argument in detail,
but in a nutshell, our response is that even if one cannot fully know what it is like to, say,
experience some art genre before having experienced it, that does not rule out the possibility
of evaluating the choice-worthiness of options involving that experience by, for instance,
reasoning in accordance with a decision-model like that discussed below. (For a similar
response to Paul’s argument, see Bykvist and Stefánsson 2017).
5Similarly, one might speculate that uncertainty averse agents—who are, to put it roughly,
particularly worried about the unknown—might place a higher value on increasing their
awareness than those who are less risk averse. In fact, Quiggin (2016) proves that within
his framework, the expected value (to an agent) of gaining awareness is greater the more
risk averse is the agent.
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6.3 Modelling anticipated awareness growth
Previously we argued that when modelling an agent’s limited state of
awareness, from her own perspective, it is not always apt to use a “catch-
all” to represent that which she is unaware of. In particular, if the agent is
“unaware of her unawareness”, and thus does not anticipate any growth in
awareness, then in so far as we are trying to model the agent’s deliberation,
we should resist that modelling choice. The upshot is that the experience
of awareness growth cannot always be modelled as the refinement of a
catch-all or some other proposition(s).
But that is not to say that it never makes sense to appeal to a catch-all
proposition to describe an agent’s reasoning. If we are trying to model
an agent who is aware of their unawareness, and, in particular one who
anticipates awareness growth (by expansion), then it does seem natural to
use some sort of catch-all to model that which the agent takes herself to be
currently unaware of. However, as the reader may recall from chapter 3, by
“catch-all” we (unlike some philosophers whose work we discussed) do not
here mean strictly speaking all possibilities of which the agent is unaware.
That is not something that can sensibly feature in an agent’s reasoning, or
so we argued. Rather, we take the catch-all in question to be some abstract
proposition standing in for a broad class of contingencies that the agent
thinks she may later be in a position to concretize. For clarity, we will refer
to the kind of proposition we have in mind as a “subjective catch-all”.
It may be useful to start with a standard decision-model (in which there
is no room for awareness growth), against which we contrast a model of
an agent who is aware of their potential lack of awareness and how it may
grow. The matrix in table 6.1 is such a model. The agent assumes there
are n states of the world (from s1 to sn), that determine the outcome of the
available acts, i.e., the objects of choice, f and g. Finally, f (si) is the outcome
that obtains when f is chosen (or performed) and si is the actual (or true)
state of the world.
s1 ... sn
f f (s1) ... f (sn)
g g(s1) ... g(sn)
Table 6.1: Decision model with no room for awareness growth
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Since both the states of the world and the outcomes in this model are
thought to be maximally specific in all ways that might be relevant to the
decision—as is usually assumed—and since the states s1 to sn are thought to
exhaust the set of possible contingencies—as is also usually assumed—the
model makes no room for awareness growth. For instance, if each outcome
f (si) is thought to contain no uncertainty whatsoever—which in turn means
that each state si is taken to be a maximally specific description of ways in
which the world might be (prior to the choice between f and g)—and if
the agent is in addition certain that one of outcomes f (s1) to f (sn) will be
realised by the choice of f , then an agent who is appropriately modelled
with a matrix like the one in table 6.1 takes herself to be fully aware (in this
decision situation).
E1 ... En ??
f f (E1) ... f (En) f (??)
g g(E1) ... g(En) g(??)
Table 6.2: Decision model with room for awareness growth
Consider now the matrix in table 6.2. We focus initially on the open-
ness to awareness growth by refinement that is represented here. Suppose
that E1 to En is the finest and most exhaustive “partition” of the space of
contingencies that the agent of interest can come up with. (We see below
that it is not really a partition, according to the agent.) Each Ei is not taken
to be a (fully specified) state of the world, but rather an event that may
not fully determine the outcome of the two available acts. So, for instance,
f (Ei) leaves open what precisely are the concrete outcomes that may arise.
The agent recognises this, let us assume, but does not know how to further
partition the Ei into elements that leave no room for unawareness. In other
words, the agent realises that she is (or, at least, she takes herself to be)
unaware of some contingencies that are consistent with each Ei but which,
if they materialise, deliver different outcomes for the two acts.
Now we turn to the openness to awareness growth by expansion that
is represented in table 6.2. We see from the “??” column in the table
that the agent does not regard E1 to En to be an exhaustive set of mutually
exclusive events. In other words, the agent is aware of the fact that there
might be contingencies that are inconsistent with all of E1 to En and which
would, if they materialise, determine the outcome of the two available
92 6. ANTICIPATING AWARENESS GROWTH
acts. These further contingencies, that the agent cannot properly articulate,
are represented in the table by “??”, which stands for a subjective catch-all.
Note that, while we call this openness to awareness growth by “expansion”,
formally speaking, the agent here is open to the possibility that she will refine
her catch-all. There is a sense in which she cannot truly be open to, let alone
anticipate, awareness growth by expansion.6
One reason it is important to model openness to (and anticipation of)
awareness growth in the way just discussed is psychological realism. That
has been our focus so far in this discussion. If the agent anticipates (or
at least is open to the possibility of) awareness growth, then a decision
model in which her “states” are somewhat crude, and/or in which there is
a variable or catch-all representing contingencies she is not fully aware of,
is consistent with how she herself sees her epistemic predicament. (The
same is not true when an agent is completely unaware, that is, when she
is not even aware of her own potential limitations as far as awareness is
concerned.) But it is important then that any such catch-all is a subjective
one. No psychological realism is gained by adding propositions to the
model that go beyond the abstract contingencies that the agent herself has
gotten the whiff of.
Another reason for pursuing our model of openness to awareness growth
is that it will often be necessary for describing (and rationalising) an agent’s
reasoning about what to do. Consider again the solar radiation management
example and suppose that a policy-maker’s epistemic situation, including
where she thinks there is room for awareness growth, when she deliberates
about whether to try SRM, is represented by a table like 6.2. We can read
the options f and g as doing and refraining from SRM respectively.
First, let us focus on openness to awareness growth by expansion, rep-
resented by the subjective catch-all, “??”, which in some sense is easier for
a modeller to get a handle on. Suppose that the policy-maker reasons that
if any of the events E1 to En obtain, then she would prefer implementing
SRM rather than abstaining. Still, because the policy-maker anticipates, or
is at least open to the possibility of, awareness growth by expansion if SRM
is implemented (as represented by the subjective catch-all), she finds SRM
6Recall that in chapter 3.4 we mentioned various models in the literature that treat all
cases of awareness growth as awareness growth that was anticipated. As per our discussion
here, these models appeal to either a “catch-all” or else to otherwise coarse events that the
agent expects will be later refined or made more concrete.
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to be so risky that she prefers to abstain all things considered. This is to
say that the utility and probability of the subjective catch-all, according to
the policy maker, makes the overall expected utility of SRM lower than the
alternative, according to her.
To make the above claim more precise, suppose that the policy-maker’s
preference relation conditional on events E1 to En7 satisfies the appropriate
coherence constraints, such that this conditional preference relation can be
represented as maximising expected utility (recall our discussion in chapter
1.2.2 of representation theorems, and our later mention in chapter 1.3.2 of
Karni and Vierø’s (2017) representation theorem for anticipated awareness
growth). Then we can, in this case, infer from her preferences that the ex-
pected utility of implementing SRM, given the catch-all, ??, is sufficiently
negative, compared to the expected utility of not implementing SRM given
??, such that SRM is not worth the risk all-things-considered. In contrast,
had the decision-maker preferred to implement SRM, then, given that she
prefers SRM over its alternative conditional on events E1 to En, we would
instead have inferred that the expected utility of implementing SRM given
?? is not sufficiently negative compared to the expected utility of not imple-
menting SRM given ??. More generally, when we use a model that includes
a subjective catch-all, the assumptions of standard decision theory for full
awareness (supposing the contingencies of which she is aware) allow us to
say at least something about the policy-maker’s attitudes to that which she
suspects she currently has limited awareness.
A method like this cannot, however, be used to estimate the policy-
maker’s attitudes to contingencies that she anticipates or is open to discov-
ering due to what we called a complete (as opposed to partial) refinement.
Recall that we assumed that the events E1 to En are the most fine-grained
contingencies that the policy-maker can come up with; however, she sus-
pects that these contingencies can all be refined according to some property
of which she is currently unaware. Hence, there is no possibility of consid-
ering the policy-maker’s preferences conditional on what she takes to be
fully specified contingencies to determine her attitude to that of which she
is yet to become aware.
7Piermont (2017) calls such conditional preferences “contingency plans”, and uses them
to formally characterize anticipated awareness growth (or “introspective unawareness”, to
use his term).
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In contrast, if the policy-maker is open to the possibility of a par-
tial refinement—which we have so far mostly set aside for reasons of
simplicity—then a method very similar to that discussed above to elicit
the attitude to potential expansion could be used for potential refinement.
Let us focus on some given event Ei that the agent anticipates will (or may)
be later refined. For our SRM example, this event may be “SRM causes
severe smog”. Now it may be that the policy-maker is unsure of all of the
maximally specific ways in which this event may be true. But she may com-
prehend some of the ways it may be true. For instance, she may regard one
of the maximally specific states constituting Ei to be “SRM causes severe
smog but otherwise status quo (with respect to natural systems function-
ing)” (call this Ei1). Assume that she thinks there is some other way that Ei
might be true that she cannot quite articulate; it may be described as “SRM
causes severe smog and otherwise not the status quo” (call this Ei2). This
latter instantiation of Ei is like a local catch-all; that is, it acts as a catch-all
within the partition of outcomes that comprise Ei. Then the comparison of
the policy-maker’s preference between f and g conditional on Ei with her
preference between f and g conditional on Ei1—and similarly the compar-
ison of the policy-maker’s preference between f and g conditional on Ei
with her preference between f and g conditional on Ei2—will reveal how
her optimism or pessimism about the specific outcomes associated with Ei,
which she currently cannot articulate, affects her comparison of the two
acts, f and g. Moreover, if the policy-maker’s preferences satisfy the appro-
priate constraints (recall again our discussion of representation theorems),
then we can even find precisely how (un)favourable she expects to be the
outcomes associated with the local catch-all event Ei2.
6.4 Not such extraordinary reasoning?
The reader might wonder whether our model of openness to awareness
growth reveals that it is not in fact a hitherto neglected aspect of reasoning.
The thought might be that our model described above is no different from
a standard model of reasoning. So either openness to awareness growth
is unremarkable or else it is something that has been accommodated in
decision models all along. While we are, to a great extent, sympathetic
to this line, we see the similarities between openness to awareness growth
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and “ordinary” reasoning—to be discussed in what follows—as helpful for
better understanding the former, rather than reason to dismiss it.
First, let us consider the extent of similarity. Given our favoured (sub-
jective) interpretation of catch-alls, they are, in many ways, just like any
ordinary proposition that we use to model agents’ practical reasoning. In
general, the propositions that are thought to feature in an agent’s reasoning
are quite abstract and lacking in details. In deciding whether to ride my
bike or else drive to work, for instance, I may not anticipate or be open to
any awareness growth and yet nonetheless appeal to rather abstract propo-
sitions, like “some unusual road incident occurs”. That is, I do not dwell on
the specific ways in which an unusual road incident may occur (whether it
be, for instance, a collision between cars or a flock of swooping magpie birds
harassing cyclists). I can form a preference for driving rather than riding
given merely the abstractly-described circumstance, and I can also assign
some probability to said circumstance occurring. Indeed, upon reflecting
on any ordinary case of reasoning, one might surmise that, when it comes
to abstraction, the difference between a “catch-all” and other propositions
that ordinarily feature in decision models is one of degree rather than kind.
Similarly, there seems to be much in common between, on the one hand,
the coarse-grained events we introduced to model agents who anticipate
(and more generally are open to the possibility of) awareness growth by re-
finement, and, on the other hand, the maximally specific states of the world
in traditional decision models. After all, the states in traditional decision
models are themselves abstract to varying degrees; they are only specific
enough to account for everything that matters to the agent in comparing
the options available to her. Coming back to my decision about whether
to drive or ride to work: I do not consider, for instance, whether or not
my neighbour has her breakfast before 9am, or whether or not the school
children will be in the mood to wave to me. That is because these finer
details about how the world might be do not matter to my decision, given
my goals and values.
That said, there is a difference worth acknowledging: the reasons for ab-
straction differ when it comes to modelling openness to awareness growth
compared to modelling “ordinary” reasoning, i.e., reasoning that does not
involve recognition of potential awareness growth. In the former case, the
agent suspects that she omits contingencies in the course of her reasoning
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that she may later recognise to be relevant to her decision but which, re-
grettably, she is currently unaware of. In the latter case, while the agent
may recognise that she omits contingencies in the course of her reasoning,
she does not consider this regrettable since she does not regard these con-
tingencies to be relevant to her decision (and if she later comes to think
that these contingencies are relevant, then she can simply re-evaluate her
decision in light of them). Nor does she expect to become aware of any
other contingencies that turn out to be relevant to her decision.
The question is what hangs on this interpretative difference. Apparently
not so much, since it seems that any given decision model, like that in table
6.2, could be read either way. While we have described table 6.2 as a model
of openness to awareness growth, it may otherwise serve as a model of an
agent’s reasoning who is not open to the possibility of awareness growth. It
often makes sense for a model to include a highly abstract proposition that
is similar to a subjective “catch-all”, or to include a coarse-grained partition
of events, even though the agent neither anticipates awareness growth by
refinement nor by expansion. And this is true even when modelling the
reasoning, or “internal perspective”, of an agent, which is the perspective
on which we have focused.
One can see this by reflecting on our earlier example of deciding whether
to drive or ride to work. Other examples are in this regard even more vivid.
For instance, when deciding how to invest one’s pension, one need not take
detailed account of extreme events—such as a meteorite striking the earth
and killing all of humanity—that would affect each investment in the same
way. One way to model this reasoning would be to include an abstract and
unspecified proposition which in this case would be interpreted as the set of
contingencies that yield the same outcome for all the pension alternatives.
As far as abstractness is concerned, there may not be much of a difference
between such a proposition and a subjective catch-all. Continuing with this
example, one also need not, when making this investment choice, consider
all possible percentage points by which interest rates might change; instead,
one would presumably just consider coarse-grained events such as “low”,
“moderate”, and “high” interest rates.
Intuitively, one does not want to say in this case that the decision-maker
realises she is currently unaware of relevant contingencies that she may later
come to be aware of. Quite the contrary. It is her considered judgement that
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the further details of the contingencies in question are not worth dwelling
on since they will not affect her choice. However, if she were to come
to believe that, say, a meteorite strike could affect the various investments
differently, then she could (and should) include this in her reasoning, unlike
someone who is truly unaware of this possibility.8
We can also use table 6.2 to model an agent who suspects that something
that she deliberately excluded from her deliberation should in fact be in-
cluded, while not being able to specify further what she wrongly excluded.
In that case, the agent’s predicament will be much like someone’s who an-
ticipates or is at least open to awareness growth. In fact, there is an intuitive
sense in which this agent does anticipate awareness growth: she anticipates
becoming aware of the fact that something that she took to be irrelevant to
her deliberation in fact is relevant.9
Finally, we said above that the similarities between openness to aware-
ness growth and ordinary reasoning may be instructive. For starters, the
similarities provide further grounds for the proposal of the last section that
agents who are open to awareness growth can maximise expected utility
just like ordinary reasoners. Furthermore, we have grounds to think that
the credences and utilities underlying these expected utility evaluations are
largely based on the same sorts of considerations, whether the case involves
anticipated awareness growth or not. With respect to the SRM example, for
instance, that the policy maker anticipates later becoming more aware of the
contingencies represented by the catch-all does not mean that she cannot
evaluate the probability and utility of the catch-all based on what she is
currently aware of, sketchy as that may be. For instance, the policy maker
may judge the utility of the catch-all to be negative, based on the fact that in
the past the unforeseen outcomes of major technological change have been
bad sorts of disruptions to existing natural and social systems. This was
the sort of reasoning we described in the introduction to this chapter.
By way of contrast, note that some take the evaluation of utilities and
probabilities in cases of anticipated awareness growth to be somewhat prob-
lematic or else highly idiosyncratic. Laurie Paul (2014), for instance, is
8Similarly, if the agent were to come to think that, say, the difference between a 0.02
and 0.021 interest rate is of importance to her decision, then she could factor this into her
reasoning, unlike someone who is truly unaware of this possible refinement.
9Karni and Vierø (2017: 317) make a similar observation about their model of anticipated
awareness growth.
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sceptical about an agent’s ability to evaluate contingencies that she herself
takes herself to be unacquainted with (recall footnote 4), and says that to
the extent the agent can do so, all she can go on is the value of some general
experience of discovery (the “revelatory value”, as she calls it). While not
similarly sceptical about the evaluation of yet-to-be-articulated contingen-
cies, Karni and Vierø (2017) seem to agree on the last point, suggesting that
the agent’s evaluation of a catch-all is to be interpreted as how much she
generally likes being surprised.10
We resist such exceptional treatment of anticipated awareness growth.
To be sure, when an agent anticipates awareness growth, this has some
bearing on the bases for her belief and desire judgments. For instance,
her general attitude towards surprise plausibly plays a greater role than
usual (as we suggested with our earlier arts festival example). Moreover,
the agent will have different sorts of projections about her attitudes in the
future. Precisely how these projections of her more aware future self can
and should bear on her present attitudes is the topic of the next chapter. For
now we emphasise that the reasoning of an agent who anticipates awareness
growth—and, more generally, the reasoning of an agent who is open to the
possibility of awareness growth—has much in common with what we have
called “ordinary” reasoning, for instance, the reasoning of an agent who is
not even aware of their lack of awareness.
6.5 Concluding remarks on chapter 6
We have now explained in informal terms what it means to be open to the
possibility of awareness growth, and even to anticipate awareness growth,
and illustrated why such openness is both common and important. We have
moreover suggested a formal way of accounting for this within a decision
model. We appealed to abstract propositions, whether a “subjective catch-
all” in the case of expansion, or else a coarse-grained “partition” of events in
the case of refinement. Moreover, we considered why openness to, and even
the anticipation of, awareness growth, thus understood, is in some ways
unremarkable. We have however not yet discussed in detail how such
10Moreover, Grant and Quiggin (2013a, 2013b) argue that, when it comes to openness to
awareness growth, probability estimates are necessarily based on induction and options are
evaluated by heuristics, which differ from the standard (deductive and calculative) methods
assumed for fully aware agents.
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anticipation, in particular, an agent’s projections of her more aware future
self, should (or should not) affect her current credences and preferences.
That is the topic to which we turn next.




In chapters 4 and 5 we considered the dynamics of awareness growth.
In particular, we considered what changes in credence are rational when
an agent with limited awareness experiences awareness growth (or more
minimally, what changes in credence are consistent with the agent hav-
ing“stable” credences). We argued that more or less anything goes. There
is no general requirement of rationality dictating how you should change
your beliefs upon becoming aware of new contingencies. (Likewise, there
is no straightforward way to detect whether your credences are stable upon
becoming aware of new contingencies.)
In the last chapter we however turned our attention to a special case of
limited awareness, namely, when one suspects that there is something of
which one is unaware and perhaps even anticipates growth in awareness.
As we saw, this special case of limited awareness is both common and
tremendously important from a practical point of view.
In this chapter we focus in particular on what is entailed when an
agent anticipates, or predicts (rightly or wrongly), that her awareness will
later grow. While not itself a dynamic phenomenon, anticipated awareness
growth is intimately related to the dynamics of belief. We ask whether
there is a norm of rationality that constrains an agent’s credences in these
special circumstances. To be clear, this would not be a diachronic norm,
governing change in credence, but rather a synchronic norm, governing an
agent’s credences at a given time. We consider both an informal and a formal
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argument for such a norm, which seems to be very constraining indeed:
When you anticipate awareness growth, your current credences should
match your expected1 future credences in the event that you experience
awareness growth. Moreover, there is arguably an equally constraining
norm on preference: When you anticipate awareness growth, your current
preferences should match your predicted2 future preferences in the event
that you experience awareness growth.3
7.2 Informal argument
We will focus on a very simple decision problem to try to get clear on what
(if anything) rationality requires of an agent who anticipates awareness
growth. Suppose, for instance, that you are trying to decide whether you
should go to the beach rather than stay at home and finish the latest Netflix
series that you have been binging on. The pleasantness of going to the
beach is highly sensitive to what the weather will be like, of which you are
uncertain. (Let us imagine that you do not have access to a trustworthy
weather forecast.) Staying at home is the risk-free option, since you take
yourself to know, for instance, that you will have a relaxing day on the
couch no matter what the weather will be like.
Now, suppose that the only weather conditions that you consider are
sunny and clouded. You suspect, however, that there is some weather condi-
tion that you have left out, which may affect the outcome of your decision
to go to the beach. (We, the modellers, may see that this weather condition
is misty.) Your decision problem is represented by table 7.1.4
sunny clouded ??
Beach Beach & sunny Beach & clouded Beach & ??
Home Home & sunny Home & clouded Home & ??
Table 7.1: Beach or Home
1As will become apparent, we are using “expected” here in the technical (mathematical)
sense. More precisely, the norm requires that the mathematical expectation of your more
aware credences, calculated relative to your own prediction about your future credences,
should be the same as your less aware credences.
2See fn. 12 for an explanation of the connection between an agent’s predicted preference
and her current expectation of expected utility.
3We thank Michael Nielsen for encouraging us to consider “reflection principles” in
relation to growing awareness, and thereby inspiring our investigations in this chapter.
4The example is inspired by Bradley (2017: 254).
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To make the example a little more concrete, suppose that your credence
that it will be sunny is 0.4, which is also your credence that it will be clouded.
Your credence in the (subjective) catch-all weather contingency, denoted ‘??’
in table 7.1, is 0.2. Now we can ask: Is this probability, 0.2, indicative of (or
constrained by) your predicted future credences? Conversely: Once you
manage to fill in the catch-all, how do you expect that this will change your
credences in all three weather contingencies? In other words, now when
you are unaware of the content of the catch-all, what probability do you
expect that you will assign it when you become aware of its content, and
what probabilities do you expect you will then assign sunny and clouded?
One natural answer would be that you should not expect the above
growth in awareness to yield any change, positive or negative, in your
credences. You may of course believe that this awareness growth could
affect your credences in some direction. For instance, you may think that
you could become more confident of the catch-all, but you should then
also believe that this awareness growth could affect your credences in the
“other direction”, such that you are less confident in the catch-all. More
precisely, the claim is that there should be no expected change of credence
after awareness growth, where the expectation is based entirely on your
own prediction about your future epistemic state.
What considerations support the above claim? Informally, one could
argue for the above claim by noting that if you did expect your credence
in, say, the catch-all, to change one way or another once you become aware
of its content, then you should now change your degrees of belief in that
same direction—assuming (as seems reasonable in this case) that you do
not predict that you would be any less rational, or less informed, if your
awareness were to grow. For instance, suppose that you expect that if you
were to become aware of what the catch-all consists in, you would become
more confident than you currently are that it it will neither be sunny nor
clouded. Then it would seem that you should revise upward your current
degree of belief that it will neither be sunny nor clouded. You should, as it
were, defer to your more aware self. For why would you not trust someone
who is exactly like you, epistemically speaking, except more aware than
you are?
Now,it could of course be that when it comes to some cases of anticipated
awareness growth, one does not, in the relevant sense, treat one’s more
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aware self as someone exactly like one’s current self except more aware;
and hence, one is not willing to defer to one’s more aware self. How
might such cases be distinguished? It cannot be on the basis of the agent’s
predicted credence change since we argued in chapters 4 and 5 that there is
no general way to discern what is a stable credence change upon growth in
awareness. Perhaps then it is on the basis of the agent’s deliberative process
and whether it is free from what one might call “epistemic interferences”.
Mind-altering drugs would presumably count as an epistemic interference
that makes one’s future self, more aware as it may be, unworthy of one’s
current deference. But so too might other strongly disruptive experiences.
Imagine for instance that one predicts the experience of going to an arts
festival to be so “epistemically transformative” (Paul 2014) that the belief
system that one will have after the experience differs from one’s current
system in some fundamental ways (that are neither for the better nor the
worse). In that case, rationality may not require that one defer to one’s
future self, and thereby match one’s credences to one’s expected future
credences.
Although we do not want to rule out the possibility of awareness growth
being transformative or otherwise accompanied by an epistemic interfer-
ence, we shall set such experiences aside for now, and instead focus on
what arguably are more typical examples of anticipated awareness growth.
In fact, the principles we discuss below explicitly stipulate the awareness
growth to which they apply to be free of epistemic interferences, since they
only apply to events where the only thing that happens is that you gain
more awareness. Hence, these principles do not apply to events where you
gain more awareness and are subject to an epistemic interference.
We can call the principle that the above considerations about the beach-
or-home example seem to support Awareness Reflection, after the traditional
Reflection principle (van Fraassen 1984).5
Awareness Reflection (Informal version). For any awareness context and any
proposition A (in that context), if you predict that between now and time t, the only
thing that happens is that you gain more awareness, then your current credence
in A should equal your currently expected credence in A for time t (if the latter is
5Note that even if Awareness Reflection is true, it need not, in any sense, be a fundamental
norm of epistemic rationality. Rather, it may simply be an instance of a more general norm
of deference to those who are experts relative to your current self. In fact, Brian Hedden
(2015) argues that this is true of epistemic reflection principles in general.
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well-defined). Conversely, your currently expected credence in A for time t should
(if well-defined) equal your current credence in A.
The qualification that the relevant values be well-defined is due to the
fact that the informal arguments above only seem to establish that there is
something strange with a person who currently has a credence for A that
differs from her currently well-defined expectation of credence at time t.
We get back to this qualification in section 7.3.2, when discussing a formal
argument for Awareness Reflection.
In addition to it seeming odd, from a purely epistemic perspective, to
violate Awareness Reflection, one might suspect that violating the principle
can be undesirable from a purely practical point of view. After all, if you
violate Awareness Reflection, then you expect that what you are now willing
to pay for some bet is more than what you will find the bet to be worth if
you gain more awareness. For instance, if you expect that, once you become
aware of the content of the catch-all weather contingency, you will be less
confident in it being sunny than you currently are, then what you are now
willing to bet on it being sunny is more than what you expect you will be
willing to bet when your awareness grows. One might suspect that a clever
bookie could exploit this discrepancy. That is indeed the case: A so-called
Dutch book strategy can be employed against you if you violate Awareness
Reflection, as we shall soon see.
7.3 Formal argument
We now consider a formal argument that supports the informal considera-
tions and conclusions of the last section. We start by formalising the norm,
Awareness Reflection, that we introduced above, and we then propose a
so-called “Dutch book argument” for this norm.
7.3.1 Awareness Reflection formalised
As usual, we will use P to denote your less aware credences. What matters in
the case of anticipated awareness growth is what you predict your credences
to be in the future, having experienced awareness growth. Let P+ denote the
proposition that your credences in your more aware state can be represented
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by P+.6 Assume for now that you do indeed make such a prediction—that
you entertain the proposition P+ in your current awareness context. In fact,
in line with our comments above, it is important for what follows that the
proposition in question, P+, is slightly more complex: it denotes that your
credences in your more aware state can be represented by P+ and you are
otherwise just as informed (and just as rational) as you are now when your
credences are represented by P. More generally, your deliberative process
is free of what we called “epistemic interferences”.
As a first attempt, we might try to formally present the principle we
have been discussing and will now investigate further as:
Awareness Reflection (Formal version). For any awareness context X and any
proposition A ∈ X, and for any rational P and P+:
P(A | P+) = P+(A)
Informally, the principle says that the degree to which you should now
believe A, given that you will in your more aware state believe A to some
particular degree, say r, is that degree, r. (In the next section we consider a
weakening of this principle.)
Note that the above (conditional) formulation of Awareness Reflection
is, under special conditions, logically equivalent to an expectational version
that might on the face of it seem to better capture our informal discussion
of responding to your expectation about your more aware degrees of belief.
Another virtue of the expectation version is that, unlike Awareness Reflec-
tion, it does not give the impression of lacking actual-credence guidance.
Faced with Awareness Reflection, one might wonder how one can use that
norm to guide one’s credence, given that one will never become certain that
one will have any particular credence function in a more aware state; hence,
one will never be in a position to conditionalise on a proposition like P+.
The special conditions mentioned above that are crucial for the logical
equivalence claim can be spelled out as follows: you are certain you will,
epistemically speaking, be the same agent after awareness growth, in that
6 The supposed domain of this probability function, P+, is simply your current algebra
of propositions, which we earlier denoted F . Your anticipated awareness growth (from F
to F +) amounts, formally, to a refinement of your current set of possibilities including the
subjective catch-all. As such, your credences over the propositions in the “coarse” algebra,
F , even once you become more aware, should satisfy the probability calculus.
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you will not be subject to epistemic interferences,7 and are uncertain only
about which of a number of candidate credence functions will represent
your more-aware credences. As such, there is some set of credence func-
tions, call them P+1 to P
+
n , that are the candidates for representing your
more-aware credences. As before, P+i denotes the proposition that (you are
not subject to epistemic interferences and) your more-aware credences can




n } is a partition of the set of all possi-
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P(P+i ) · P
+
i (A) (7.1)
Less formally, Awareness Reflection implies that your current credence
in A should equal your expected credence in A in your more aware state.
Moreover, the expectational formula implies Awareness Reflection. Updat-
ing 7.1 on P+j gives us:
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But if we then assume that one always is certain of one’s own credence, that
is, P+j (P
+
j ) = 1, which implies that P
+
j (A | P
+
j ) = P
+





j ) · P
+
i (A | P
+
j ) = P
+
j (A) (7.3)
7This is in line with Briggs (2009), who argues for a qualification of the traditional
Reflection principle which can be put as follows: for reflection principles to be generally
plausible, we need to assume that the agent, when their credence is represented by P, is
certain that they are the same agent as the one that will be represented by P+. (Cf. one of the
interpretations of Conditionalization that we suggested in chapter 4.2.2—that this pattern
of belief revision is constitutive of being the same agent upon revising one’s credences).
8If, contrary to our stipulated assumption, you think it possible that you will not be the
same epistemic agent after the growth in awareness due to an epistemic interference, then
{P+1 , ...,P
+
n } is not a partition of the possibility space, as these propositions are not exhaustive.
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Combining 7.2 and 7.3, we get Awareness Reflection:
P(A | P+j ) = P
+
j (A)
So, the conditional version of Awareness Reflection is logically equivalent
(under the conditions discussed) to an expectational version, where the
latter is more pertinent to one’s actual credences at a time, and is thus the
focus of our informal considerations in section 7.2.
7.3.2 A Dutch book argument for Awareness Reflection
Return now to the simple (conditional) Awareness Reflection principle. As
those familiar with the Dutch book argument for the traditional Reflection
principle (due to van Fraassen 1984) might immediately recognise, a Dutch
book strategy can be employed against you if you violate Awareness Re-
flection. A Dutch book strategy is a betting strategy that consists of bets
that you consider individually fair, or acceptable, but which nevertheless
together ensure that you lose. In other words, no bet in the strategy is un-
favourable, as judged by your own degrees of belief, but together the bets
ensure your loss. An important premise in so-called Dutch book arguments
is that being vulnerable to a sure loss is a sign of irrationality. Hence, if
Dutch book arguments are generally valid, Awareness Reflection may be a
requirement of rationality.9
Below we describe a Dutch book argument for Awareness Reflection.10
The bets have prices and prizes between 0 and 1. These numbers can, for
instance, be interpreted as dollars, or units of well-being, or anything else
that we can assume to be valued linearly (at least in the zero to one interval).
Suppose that you violate Awareness Reflection by being more confident
of A than you expect you will be when your awareness grows; in particular,
your current conditional degree of belief in A, given that you believe A to
degree r in your more aware state, is some degree greater than r. More
formally, P(A | P+j ) > r even though P
+
j (A) = r; in violation of Awareness
Reflection. First the bookie offers you the following three bets, each of which
you accept, assuming that you use your degrees of belief or credences to
9For a more detailed discussion of Dutch book arguments, see Richard Pettigrew’s ele-
ment in this series (Pettigrew 2020).
10Our formulation is similar to Vineberg’s (2011).
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evaluate bets by their expected value.
• Bet 1 costs you P(A&P+j ) and pays you 1 if A&P
+
j is true but pays 0
otherwise.
• Bet 2 costs you P(A | P+j ) · P(¬P
+
j ) and pays you P(A | P
+




• Bet 3 costs you (P(A | P+j ) − r) · P(P
+
j ) and pays you P(A | P
+
j ) − r if P
+
j
but pays 0 otherwise.
Now, if ¬P+j , then you win P(A | P
+
j ) from Bet 2, which is the sum of
what you paid for Bet 1 (which you have lost) and for Bet 2, and you have
also lost Bet 3, for which you paid (P(A | P+j ) − r) · P(P
+
j ) > 0; so, you are at
a net loss.
However, if P+j , then you have won Bet 3, thus gained P(A | P
+
j ) − r, for
which you paid (P(A | P+j )− r) ·P(P
+
j ); but you have lost Bet 2, for which you
paid P(A | P+j ) ·P(¬P
+
j ). So, from bet 2 and 3 you are at a loss: the combined
net outcome from these bets is rP(P+j ) − r, which, since both r and P(P
+
j ) are
between 0 and 1, is less than 0. But Bet 1 is not settled until the truth of A
is known. What the bookie now does, is to buy from you a Bet 4 that pays
him 1 if A but 0 otherwise, exploiting your new degrees of belief; that is, he
offers a price of r for Bet 4, which you accept (again assuming that you use
your degrees of belief to evaluate bets by their expected value). Then, if A
is true, you win Bet 1 but lose this final bet, and the reverse is true if A is
false; so, in either case, you end up with P(P+j )(r − P(A | P
+
j )). Thus, by the
assumption that P(A | P+j ) > r, you are again at a net loss.
An analogous strategy could be used to exploit you if you had instead
violated Awareness Reflection by P(A | P+j ) < r even though P
+
j (A) = r.
In other words, whatever happens, you are sure to lose, and the bookie
is sure to win, if you use your awareness-reflection-violating degrees of
belief to decide which bets to accept. So, in so far as being vulnerable to
sure loss, due to your degrees of belief, is a sign that your degrees of belief
are irrational, we can conclude that it is irrational to violate Awareness
Reflection.
We should note that the above Dutch book argument depends on the
assumption that P(A | P+j ) is defined, that is, that it takes some value. (Others
have noted the corresponding assumption in the Dutch book argument for
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the traditional Reflection principle, e.g. Briggs 2009.) It will however be
undefined if P+j has zero probability, according to the agent, and similarly
if at least one of P+j and A&P
+
j has no probability, according to the agent.
Throughout the book we have been assuming, for reasons of simplicity,
that an agent has precise probabilities in those propositions of which she is
aware; hence, if P+j or A&P
+
j has no probability, according to the agent, then
that means that she is not aware of the proposition(s) in question.
The assumption that P(A | P+j ) is well-defined is however far from being
self-evident. Hence, we can either take the assumption as being part of the
Dutch book argument, or we can weaken Awareness Reflection to:
Awareness Reflection (Formal, weaker version). For any awareness context
and any proposition A, and for any rational P and P+:
P(A | P+) ≯ P+(A)
So we see that an agent is only subject to the threat of a Dutch book
and thus the norm of Awareness Reflection (now assumed to refer to the
stronger version) in those circumstances where she both entertains the var-
ious candidates for her future more-aware credences and is also certain
she will be free of epistemic interferences upon becoming more aware. But
would these conditions ever plausibly hold? For one thing, in the context of
awareness change, anticipated as it may be, the agent cannot even articulate
the events that she may or may not come to learn, which differs from the tra-
ditional cases to which Dutch book arguments have been applied. Perhaps
this fact could be used to argue that even if Dutch book arguments are valid
when it comes to the ordinary Reflection principle and Conditonalization,
the argument is not ever applicable when it comes to Awareness Reflection.
By way of response, however, one might point out that the agent need not
be able to predict what she will become aware of in order to predict how this
awareness growth may affect her credences in propositions of which she is
already aware. The Dutch book argument above, and ultimately the norm
of Awareness Reflection, is concerned just with the latter kind of prediction.
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7.4 Awareness Reflection vs. Reverse Bayesianism
Although Awareness Reflection, when it applies, is in many ways a very
strong and very conservative requirement, it turns out that an agent can
satisfy the principle without satisfying, or predicting that she will satisfy,
the conservative rule we examined in chapter 4: Reverse Bayesianism.
Below we illustrate this fact by returning to the decision between staying at
home and going to the beach, represented in table 7.1. We go on to discuss
why this is further reason to doubt that Reverse Bayesianism is a general
norm for belief revision under growing awareness.
Recall that we assumed that in your less aware state, you believe to
degree 0.4 that it will be clouded and you also believe to degree 0.4 that
it will be sunny. Now suppose that, in line with Awareness Reflection,
you expect that, after awareness grows, you will believe each of these
possibilities to degree 0.4. However, you believe this to be the case because
you now (in your less aware state) believe that you will (in your more aware
state) either believe to degree 0.2 that it will be sunny and to degree 0.6 that
it will be clouded, or believe to degree 0.6 that it will be sunny and to degree
0.2 that it will be clouded, and you now (in your less aware state) find each
of these possible future epistemic states to be equally likely and together
exhaustive. More formally:
P(sunny) = P+1 (sunny) · P(P
+
1 ) + P
+
2 (sunny) · P(P
+
2 ) = (0.6)0.5 + (0.2)0.5 = 0.4
P(clouded) = P+1 (clouded) · P(P
+
1 ) + P
+
2 (clouded) · P(P
+
2 ) = (0.2)0.5 + (0.6)0.5 = 0.4
Note that in this case, while you satisfy Awareness Reflection, you
believe that when awareness grows, you will either be three times more
confident that it will be sunny than clouded, or three times more confident
that it will be clouded than sunny. And since we are assuming that these
are the only two future epistemic states that you consider possible, you are
in fact certain that you will be three times more confident in one of these
weather contingencies than the other. Before awareness grows, however,
you are equally confident in these two weather contingencies. So, you
are certain that you will violate Reverse Bayesianism, understood as a
diachronic norm. In fact, you do violate Reverse Bayesianism, if it is rather
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understood as a “planning” norm (recall our discussion in chapter 4.2.2),
since you predict or plan that your relative credence in clouded versus
sunny weather will change one way or the other upon awareness growth.
Note that Awareness Reflection is strictly logically weaker than (the
planning version of) Reverse Bayesianism. If one plans or predicts that
one’s credence change upon awareness growth will conform with Reverse
Bayesianism, then one will also satisfy Awareness Reflection. That is be-
cause awareness growth that is anticipated is, formally speaking at least,
awareness growth by refinement (we mention this in footnote 6 and also in
chapter 6.3). In cases of refinement, Reverse Bayesianism requires simply
that all credences in propositions of which you were already aware (in-
cluding here the subjective catch-all) stay constant. So if you satisfy (the
planning version of) Reverse Bayesianism, you trivially satisfy Awareness
Reflection.
While it is a logically weaker norm, in many cases the person who sat-
isfies Awareness Reflection while predicting a credence change in violation
of Reverse Bayesianism behaves like a person who predicts that they will
not change their beliefs at all when awareness grows, in accordance with
Reverse Bayesianism. For instance, suppose again that you satisfy Aware-
ness Reflection by splitting your confidence between two different future
epistemic states, as in the above example. Moreover, suppose that you
want to base your choice, partly at least, on what you expect yourself to
believe when you gain more awareness. Then if you are what we might call
uncertainty neutral11 with respect to your future beliefs—in the sense that, in
so far as you take your predictions about your future beliefs into account,
you only consider your expected future degrees of belief—then you will act
just like someone who predicts that their beliefs will not change at all when
awareness grows, in accordance with Reverse Bayesianism.
However, a person who is sensitive to their own uncertainty about their
future beliefs, will, even though they satisfy Awareness Reflection, often
act quite differently from someone whose predictions accord with Reverse
Bayesianism. For instance, if you are averse to uncertainty of this kind,
then you might not be willing to risk finding yourself in a situation where
awareness grows just as you are arriving at the beach in a way that results
in you becoming three times more confident that it will be clouded than
11Some may be more familiar with the term “ambiguity neutral”.
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that it will be sunny; and hence, you will now essentially act as though you
were more confident that it will be clouded than that it will be sunny, even
though you are actually now equally confident that it will be clouded as
that it will be sunny. In contrast, someone whose predictions about their
future beliefs accord with Reverse Bayesianism will not behave that way,
since they are not uncertain about their future beliefs in clouded versus
sunny.
So, Awareness Reflection is strictly logically weaker than (the planning
version of) Reverse Bayesianism, and the two norms can have different
behavioural implications. What should we conclude from this? We suggest
that this observation casts further doubt on Reverse Bayesianism being a
general norm of rational belief change for growing awareness (however
such a norm is interpreted). Awareness Reflection is highly constraining
with respect to how one’s predicted changes in credence upon awareness
growth should relate to one’s current credences. And yet this norm does
not require that one’s predicted changes in credence accord with Reverse
Bayesianism. So the latter norm apparently goes out on a limb. Moreover,
the traditional arguments do not seem to offer any support for this limb. For
instance, the Dutch book argument proposed in the last section only secures
(as far as its assumptions hold) the weaker norm, Awareness Reflection.
7.5 Preference Awareness Reflection
The intuition behind—and the informal argument in favour of—Awareness
Reflection can be applied more generally to your preferences: If you pre-
dict12 that as your awareness grows (but everything else remains fixed) you
will reverse a current preference, then that is arguably a reason to reverse
it now. For in this case too one could ask why you would not defer to
someone who is exactly like you in every respect except that they are more
aware than you are.
Consider again for instance the beach-or-home example. Suppose that
12We can think of this prediction of yours as corresponding to your expectation of expected
utility. For instance, that you now predict that you will later prefer not to go to the beach,
means that your current credences over your future credence and utility functions is such
that your current expectation for your future expected utility assignment to the option of
going to the beach is lower than your current expectation for your future expected utility
assignment to the option of not going to the beach.
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you predict now that when you are able to specify the catch-all weather
contingency, you will prefer not to go (or not to have gone) to the beach.
(And as before, let us suppose that you predict that you will be no less
rational, and no less informed, when your awareness has grown.) Then it
would seem that, intuitively, you should not prefer to go to the beach now,
in your less aware state. In other words, it would seem we should accept:
Preference Awareness Reflection. For any awareness context and any pair of
actions a and b, if you predict that between now and time t, the only thing that
happens is that you gain more awareness, then you should not now predict that
your preference ranking of a vs. b at time t differs from your current ranking of a
vs. b.
It might be illuminating to compare the above principle to a stronger
and more general version. Let’s use the term “Preference Reflection” for
the principle that you should not now predict that your preference ranking
of a vs. b at some later time t differs from your current ranking of a vs. b.13
Note that Preference Awareness Reflection is a special case of Preference
Reflection in that the former says that the latter holds in the special case
where the only thing that happens until time t is that the agent gains more
awareness. We do not claim that Preference Reflection is a general require-
ment of rationality. However, it would seem irrational to violate the general
principle just because you predict that you will gain more awareness.14
Since Preference Awareness Reflection only holds in cases where you
predict that “between now and time t, the only thing that happens is that you
gain more awareness”, the most obvious complaints one would have about
a more general principle like Preference Reflection seem not to apply to this
special case.15 Now, similarly to what we acknowledged in the belief case, it
13Preference Reflection is similar to what Arntzenius (2008) calls “Desire Reflection”,
which is stated in terms of a numerical representation of desire (i.e., utility or “desirability”)
rather than in terms of binary preference.
14Similarly, Arntzenius claims that Desire Reflection should not be violated merely be-
cause one conditionalises upon new evidence (2008: 279). He weakens Desire Reflection by
adding a condition stipulating that the only thing that happens in the relevant time interval
is that the agent conditionalises on new evidence, and calls the resulting principle “Weak
Desire Reflection”. It is this weaker principle that he ends up defending.
15For instance, Hedden (2015) argues that what we called Preference Reflection is under-
mined by the fact that what you prefer often depends on what you have chosen; hence,
Preference Reflection will often imply that what you now should prefer depends on what
you believe you will choose. However, if between now and time t you have made some
choice, then Preference Awareness Reflection will not hold, since in that case it is not true
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could be that you predict an experience by which your awareness grows to
be so “personally transformative” (Paul 2014) that your fundamental values
will change in such a way that you will (metaphorically speaking) not be the
same person. Experimenting with planetary-scale geoengineering or with
hallucinogenic drugs might be transformative in this way for the global
community and for a single person respectively. Again, we do not want to
rule out the possibility that, upon awareness growth, your values change
in such a way that you will not (metaphorically speaking) be “the same
person”, or, to put it less dramatically, that you are not stable throughout the
experience of awareness growth. But we nevertheless set such possibilities
aside for now. And note that the principle does not apply to such cases,
since in them it is not true that the only thing that happens is that you gain
more awareness.
So, let’s return our focus to the presumably more typical, non-transformative
cases of anticipated awareness growth. Can we make any positive argu-
ment in favour of Preference Awareness Reflection? Now, one might think
that we already have given an argument for Preference Awareness Reflec-
tion. After all, if one satisfies Awareness Reflection (which, we have argued,
one should satisfy), and moreover predicts that one’s preferences between
sure (i.e., risk-free) outcomes won’t be affected by the awareness growth,
then one will satisfy Preference Awareness Reflection.16 But that simply
raises the question of why or when one should predict one’s preferences
between sure outcomes to be unaffected by awareness growth. (In particu-
lar, even if one has not in fact had a transformative awareness growth, can
one’s preferences between sure outcomes nonetheless rationally change?)
Rather than taking for granted that such preferences should be unaffected
by (non-transformative) awareness growth, we will argue for Preference
Awareness Reflection directly, which has implications for when one’s pref-
erences between sure outcomes should be unaffected by awareness growth.
Unlike the Awareness Reflection principle for belief, a traditional (di-
achronic) Dutch book argument, like that discussed in the last section,
cannot be made against you if you violate Preference Awareness Reflection.
However, you are vulnerable to a more general “dynamic consistency” ar-
that “between now and time t, the only thing that happens is that you gain more awareness”.
Similarly with personal identity: if your identity changes between now and t, then it is not
true that you have only gained awareness between now and t. And so on.
16We thank Brian Hedden for pressing us on this point.
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gument. In particular, you will be willing to pay a price to limit your future
options and to bind yourself if your preferences violate Preference Aware-
ness Reflection; so, having preferences that violate this principle may be
costly.
For instance, suppose that while you now strictly prefer going to the
beach to staying home, you predict that you will prefer to stay home if you
become aware of the content of the catch-all weather contingency. Then
there is some price that you should be willing to pay to remove the option of
staying home if and when you have become aware of the catch-all. Similarly,
you should be willing to pay some cost to make a binding decision now to
go to the beach.17 And one might think that there is something irrational
about an attitudinal state that makes one vulnerable to such unfortunate,
and seemingly unnecessary, expenses.
However, one might wonder whether the above dynamic consistency
argument doesn’t prove much. One can often predict, at some stage of one’s
life, that one will have different preferences at later stages in one’s lives. For
instance, when the sleepless nights that are associated with raising toddlers
are fresh in one’s memory, one might undergo a vasectomy to prevent
oneself from acting on a future temptation to have another child. But it
would seem that paying to limit one’s options can in that case be perfectly
rational. Is the predicted preference change in the beach example, and the
associated willingness to bind oneself in that case, any different?
One potential difference, that might suggest that the dynamic consis-
tency argument does at least indicate some problem in the beach-or-home
example, is that in that example one expects to undergo a preference change
as a result of gaining more information or worldly wisdom. So, the person who
pays to bind herself from staying at home if she becomes more aware, is
binding herself from acting on more information than what she now has.
In other words, she is accepting a price for being able to act on less rather
than more information. And that does seem irrational—at least if one as-
sumes that the gain in information, that is, the awareness growth, is not
associated with some fundamental transformation (which seems plausible
to assume in the beach-or-home example).18 In contrast, in the vasectomy
17The same goes, of course, for outcomes: If you expect that your preference between two
outcomes will change when your awareness grows, then you might now be willing to pay
to bind yourself from swapping outcomes in the event that your awareness grows.
18Note that in this respect the dynamic argument for Preference Awareness Reflection is
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case, binding may seem rational because we assume that the person has
more information, or a more vivid memory of what it is like to have small
children, when he makes the decision compared to some later time. Alter-
natively, the person may predict that he will undergo radical transformation
as he gets older. In any case, paying a price to prevent oneself from acting
on a more aware epistemic state could be irrational in a way that many
instances of binding are not.
7.6 Concluding remarks on chapter 7
Let’s take stock of the main message of this chapter. We have consid-
ered very strict requirements on agents who anticipate awareness growth,
namely, requirements that such agents neither expect that their credences
be affected on balance by awareness growth, nor predict (in the sense of fn.
12) that awareness growth will reverse any of their preferences.
This finding provides an additional reason for including a “catch-all”
when modelling an agent who anticipates awareness growth. Suppose that
an agent is choosing between options f and g, abstractly represented in
table 6.2 above, and let’s assume that the agent reasons that conditional on
all the events that she is aware of, that is, events E1 to En, she would prefer
f to g; nevertheless, she unconditionally prefers g to f . Given the above
argument, we cannot rationalise this preference pattern by stipulating that
the agent’s expectation of expected utility for f and/or g upon awareness
growth diverges from her current expected utility for f and/or g. Such
divergence would be irrational. Instead, we can rationalise it by stipulating
that the probability weighted utility of the catch-all outcome for f is suffi-
ciently negative, compared to the catch-all outcome for g, that the overall
expected utility of g is greater than that of f . But then we need to include
a catch-all when modelling this agent’s epistemic state. And this catch-all
should of course be what we in the last chapter called “subjective”, that is,
standing in for possibilities that the agent herself thinks she is missing and
may later become aware of, rather than, say, standing in for the set of all
possibilities that she has actually left out.
like the much discussed dynamic arguments in favour of the Independence axiom and the
Sure Thing principle. For a discussion, see e.g. McClennen (1990). See too Steele (2010,
2018) for general discussions of dynamic arguments for principles of rationality.
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8
Conclusion
8.1 ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be
silent’
We noted at the outset of this book that there are surely limits to what can be
said about one’s own limited awareness at a time. In reasoning, one tries to
account for all the possible ways that the world might be that are relevant
to one’s practical purposes. But this reasoning is limited by one’s vantage
point. One may not be able to discern all the possible contingencies that an
onlooker or even one’s later self is able to discern. Those things of which
one is unaware are forcibly absent from one’s reasoning.1
The question is whether limited awareness, duly recognised as an ab-
sence in an agent’s reasoning, may nonetheless play a role in her reasoning.
This book has built on previous work by others in reckoning with this key
question. By way of analogy: even if a driver is not able to see potholes
in the road, she may react in better and worse ways when she encoun-
ters a pothole, and she may practice better and worse defensive driving to
avoid or guard against any fallout from such encounters. Similarly, even if
one is unaware of all relevant contingencies, perhaps one may adjust one’s
reasoning in better and worse ways when one encounters a contingency of
which one was previously unaware, and perhaps there are better and worse
ways to reason defensively in order to guard against any fallout from such
1Hence use of a well-known quote from Wittgenstein (1922, proposition 7) as the title
of this section. While apt (roughly speaking) for our purposes, the quote conveys, in




Standard decision theory does not deal in such reasoning “potholes”
and the normative issues they raise. It simply ignores them, assuming
that the contingencies of which an agent is aware at a time are just those
of which she is ever aware, at any time. The problem is that this does
not do justice to the experiences of many in reasoning. We do apparently
encounter our own limited awareness as we undergo awareness growth.
And this leads us to expect and be wary of encountering awareness growth
in similar kinds of scenarios. Standard decision theory thus seems to let us
down. We would ideally like to use decision theory to help us reason about
what to do about the world’s most pressing problems, such as say climate
change and species extinction. However, as the examples throughout this
book suggest, these are the types of decisions where we have particularly
strong reasons to think that our choices may result in outcomes, or depend
on contingencies, of which we are currently unaware. Similarly, we might,
in these important situations, suspect that there are options of which we are
currently unaware. Since the standard decision-models, such as those of
Savage (1954) and Jeffrey (1965), were developed for decision-making with
full awareness, they are apparently not well-suited to help us solve these
pressing problems.
Still, wish as we might for a way to deal with reasoning potholes, es-
pecially when the stakes are high, they may evade norms of rationality.
Trying to reason beyond uncertainty may be akin to searching for the holy
grail. While this book joins the search for norms of rationality for respond-
ing to as well as anticipating growing awareness, we do not presume that
there are any such norms to be found. Indeed, the conclusions that we
arrive at over the course of the book are somewhat ambiguous: we suggest
norms for responding to and anticipating growing awareness but we also
cast doubt on whether these norms are truly substantive or distinct. Even
when read in the most deflationary way, however, our analysis shows that
reckoning with limited awareness is important for finessing one’s reasoning
roadmap at any given time—for determining what, all things considered,
is one’s best assessment of the possible contingencies, given the various
learning experiences and further choices one may encounter later.
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8.2 Norms for limited awareness
Let us then recap the normative conclusions of the book, however substan-
tive or distinct one may regard them.
Note that an initial task, in order to even begin contemplating norms,
was to characterise limited awareness and subsequent awareness growth.
Hence in chapter 2 we described decision models that represent an agent’s
own fallible perspective. Such models may fail to account for all possible
contingencies, and when/if an agent recognises this, she undergoes aware-
ness growth. In chapter 3 we considered more carefully how to model a
transition from one state of awareness—what we dub an awareness context—
to another. We suggested that this modelling exercise is in itself enlightening
with respect to better understanding an agent’s reasoning at a time. Indeed,
we hope that our discussion in these early chapters contributes not only to
the awareness literature, but more generally highlights the limits of the
standard possible-world models of cognitive states.
With a general model of awareness growth in hand, we were in a position
to investigate potential norms of rationality for, respectively, responding to
and anticipating awareness growth. We approached these topics in turn,
the former in chapters 4 and 5 and the latter in chapters 6 and 7.
One might say that the most striking new norm(s) we identified re-
garding limited awareness were those canvassed at the end of the book:
awareness version(s) of the so-called Reflection Principle. The belief norm,
which we dubbed Awareness Reflection, applies in cases where an agent an-
ticipates her awareness growth in a rather precise way: she can specify all
her possible future credences (over those propositions in her current aware-
ness context) after her awareness has grown, whatever it is that she comes
to be aware of. If, in addition, the agent takes herself to be the “same epis-
temic agent” after the awareness growth in question, her current credences
should be the expectation of her future credences.
We take Awareness Reflection to be a substantive and distinct belief
norm. There are reasons why it might be downplayed. In particular,
while on first glance the norm appears to strongly constrain how an agent’s
credences at one time relate to her credences at another time, on closer in-
spection one sees that it is not actual future credences but rather predicted
future credences that play a role. Once this is appreciated, the norm can
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be understood as simply describing how a rational agent arrives at her cur-
rent credences: by thinking through what are her possible better-informed
credences and taking the expectation of these future credences. This is very
much in line with the familiar Reflection Principle, and indeed in chapters 6
and 7 we emphasised the continuity between “ordinary” reasoning and
reasoning that involves anticipated awareness growth. But that continuity
is the very reason we regard Awareness Reflection to be a surprising norm.
The fact that anticipated awareness growth is akin to anticipated learning
of a more ordinary kind is itself an important finding.
Our analysis of anticipated awareness growth brings further perspec-
tive to the earlier more negative findings of the book. Initially we set out
to explore simply whether there are better and worse ways to respond to
some particular awareness growth (or alternatively whether there are ways
to discern whether credences are “stable” upon awareness growth). In
other words, does rationality (or stability) impose any general constraints
on the relationship between one’s credences prior to and post some growth
in awareness? Against the popular position in the philosophy and eco-
nomics literature, we argued that there are no such general constraints.
This position can be seen to resonate with Awareness Reflection in that
this norm does not constrain the predictions that an agent makes about
her future credences after awareness growth. An agent may predict any
kind of credence change, including rather radical changes, so long as her
current credences are the expectation of her predicted future credences post
awareness growth.
Nevertheless some of our examples in chapters 4 and 5 suggest there will
be many occasions in which an agent’s credence change upon awareness
growth will be more minimal. These are interesting cases to characterise.
We do so in the form of our Restricted Reverse Bayesianism rule. We do
not take the rule to be a substantive norm; it simply describes cases in
which what the agent becomes aware of is evidentially irrelevant to the pair
of “old” propositions that is of interest. In such circumstances, it follows
that the relevant aspect of the agent’s belief change will be conservative
in the familiar way: the relative probabilities of the pair of propositions in
question will remain constant. We suggest that others who have proposed
more general norms for conservative belief change under awareness growth
either explicitly or implicitly focus only on cases in which the awareness
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growth is evidentially irrelevant to the pair of propositions at issue.
8.3 Two challenges revisited
All this speaks to at least one of the challenges that we raised in the intro-
ductory chapter with respect to whether studying limited awareness and
awareness growth is a worthwhile project. One of the worries was whether
there could be any normative upshots from better understanding limited
awareness, since compared to, say, failures of transitivity, a lack of aware-
ness is not something that an agent can change through reasoning alone.
We suggested that the proof would be in the pudding, and we hope that our
summary of the book’s findings in the last section makes for a convincing
case that our project is indeed interesting from a normative perspective. At
the very least, the process of modelling limited awareness and awareness
growth is important for a more sophisticated view of reasoning at a time.
The other challenge raised in the introductory chapter concerns whether
a study of limited awareness could be scientifically respectable. That is, the
worry was that by introducing lack of awareness into a model of an agent,
we would inevitably have to start making assumptions about the agent that
cannot even in principle be empirically verified.
One partial response to this challenge, which we briefly discussed in
chapters 6 and 7, was that as long as an agent has a consistent conditional
preference relation, given all the events of which she is aware, we can in-
fer a great deal about her attitudes to that which she takes herself to be
unaware of from her all-things-considered preference (and, ideally, choice)
between options for which she is open to, and may even anticipate, aware-
ness growth. Moreover, as we mentioned in the introduction, decision
theories have already been developed that allow for a representation of
agents’ attitudes to that of which they are unaware.
However, for the readers not convinced by the above responses, we
can offer a partner-in-crime response. As we discussed in the introduction,
we see the extension to limited awareness as a natural next step in decision
theory’s historical trajectory, from the objective expected utility theory of von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), where the only subjective element is
the extent to which agents desire outcomes, to the subjective expected utility
theories of Savage (1954) and Jeffrey (1965), where the extent to which agents
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believe that various events will occur is also subjective. As we pointed out,
the latter two theories however do not allow for any subjectivity when it
comes to what is possible or available—that is, they do not allow for limited
awareness.
Now, a well-known problem—or feature, depending on one’s philo-
sophical views—of introducing the additional subjective variable to rep-
resent agents’ beliefs, is that it invariably introduces some (additional) as-
sumptions about the subject that cannot even in principle be empirically ver-
ified. For instance, Savage assumes that agents have preferences between
any functions from his set of states of the world to his set of consequences.
But, as has been much discussed, some of these functions will correspond
to options that are not only physically (perhaps even metaphysically) im-
possible, but also impossible according to the agent whose attitudes are
being represented (see e.g. Joyce 1999: chapter 3). And evidently we cannot
devise a choice scenario that reveals an agent’s preference between options
that she thinks are impossible.
Jeffrey on the other hand does not make as strong non-empirical as-
sumptions as Savage. But an implication of this is that Jeffrey’s framework
results in inconsistent representations of agents’ attitudes. In particular,
for any agent who satisfies all assumptions of Jeffrey’s framework, and
for most2 contingent but logically independent propositions A and B, the
agent will both be representable as believing A more strongly than B and
B more strongly than A.3 However, since people who satisfy all of Jef-
frey’s assumptions have to be very rational indeed, it is assumed that this
seeming inconsistency is a problem with the representation, not with the
agents themselves. But this assumption cannot, within Jeffrey’s system,
be empirically justified—what can at best be observed, namely, an agent’s
preferences as revealed by her choices, is consistent with her both believing
A more strongly than B and B more strongly than A.
In sum, the move from objective to subjective expected utility theory,
which was celebrated as a great achievement, brought with it assumptions
about agents that are even in principle empirically unverifiable. So, while
2In particular, for all propositions that are not of “neutral” desirability, or very close to
neutral desirability, that is, for all propositions that are not close to the desirability of the
tautology.
3This assumes that the agent’s preferences are not unbounded. For a discussion of this
assumption, see Joyce (1999: chapter 4.)
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the hard-lined empiricist may still not be comforted by this, at least we
take comfort in the fact that we are in good company in accepting the
introduction of empirically unverifiable assumptions about agents as a cost
of making decision theory more subjective.
8.4 Connection to applied work
Alongside theoretical developments in modelling and understanding un-
awareness and growing awareness, there has and continues to be progress
of a more practical kind. This is in the form of decision support tools for
relatively novel and/or complex decisions that assist in identifying what
are the relevant possible contingencies and one’s attitudes towards them.
We regard this work as complementary to the more general and abstract
treatment of growing awareness that is the focus of this book. Ideally the
two would inform each other.
For instance, one popular family of decision-support approaches is
known as scenario-based planning (Schwartz 1996). The aim is to assist
in mapping out the range and boundaries of the possibility space for a
given decision—to determine just how disparate are the scenarios or fully
detailed ways that the world might be that are pertinent to the choice at
hand. A simple qualitative approach to this effect involves identifying the
key factors or “axes” that discriminate the outcomes of different options.
For instance, two such key factors with respect to future global emissions
scenarios (that are pertinent to mitigation decisions) are purportedly de-
mographic (population) change and the rate and direction of technological
change (Nakicenovic et al. 2000). A telling range of emissions scenarios
can thus be constructed from combinations of extreme values on these and
the other key axes. In other cases, the key axes and associated spread of
scenarios may be less easy to discern with the naked eye, so to speak. If
it so happens that there is nonetheless a rich predictive model available,
computer-assisted scenario discovery approaches (e.g., Groves and Lem-
pert 2007, Bryant and Lempert 2010) may be useful. One such approach
involves automated identification and clustering of what may be hundreds
to millions of potentially important scenarios generated by a complex pre-
dictive model with large ranges for the parameter values. The idea is that
once scenarios are clustered they are cognitively accessible and thus more
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meaningfully evaluated.
We suggest that scenario-based planning and other decision-support
approaches associated with “horizon scanning” are, among other things,
implicitly techniques for regimenting limited awareness and anticipated
awareness growth, in that they aim for coverage of the possibility space
even if all the “interior” possibilities cannot be specified in full detail. That
is, these decision support approaches may be usefully conceived as tech-
niques for overcoming limited awareness, such that any anticipated future
awareness growth is by refinement, and moreover refinement that is evi-
dentially irrelevant to the comparison of propositions already known, such
that Reverse Bayesianism holds and credences remain unchanged. Better
still if the value of the coarse outcomes will also be unaffected by any future
awareness growth, such that the evaluation of the options is not distorted
by limited awareness.
As such, these methods may effectively flesh out what reckoning with
limited and growing awareness looks like in the context of real and signifi-
cant decision problems. This more practical task has not been our preoccu-
pation in this book. But we hope that our work here may provide food for
thought and helpful markers in the sand, so to speak, for those working at
this important practical end of the spectrum. Reverse Bayesianism is not a
requirement of rationality, as we have argued. But a decision-maker may
nonetheless aspire to overcome their limited awareness to the point where
any potential awareness growth is predicted to be a refinement that more
or less satisfies Reverse Bayesianism, leaving all or most relative credences
unchanged. Indeed, a decision-maker would presumably further hope that
the values of outcomes and ultimately which of the available options is
deemed optimal is more or less unaffected by their limited awareness.
Even if that is not the explicit aim of the scenario-planning and related de-
cision support methods—presumably the stated aim is simply to recognise
all available options and evaluate them as well as possible4—we suggest
that the above is a useful interpretation of the methods. It makes clear the
ways in which the methods may reasonably fail in any given application.
Namely, the methods may fail to overcome limited awareness such that
4In fact, some of these methods eschew probabilistic and expected utility reasoning
altogether, opting for less informationally-demanding ways of evaluating options in light
of their possible outcomes.
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any further anticipated awareness growth has only minor impact on the
evaluation of the options. It may turn out, for instance, that the anticipated
awareness growth has more dramatic effects on the relative expected utili-
ties of options than predicted, or else that awareness turns out to grow in
altogether unanticipated ways.
8.5 Further research
When we introduced the topic of our inquiry in this book—limited aware-
ness and how it changes over time—we appealed to an agent’s plight in
making decisions about what to do in the world. We made clear that our
very understanding of an agent’s epistemic state, in addition to her pref-
erences, relates to the decision problem she faces at a given time. Hence
we position our project within a larger decision-theory narrative. And yet,
throughout the book, many of our examples (particularly those in chapters
4 and 5) focus just on one aspect of an agent’s decision problem—the ways
the world might be that affect the outcomes of her options, or the state space.
Our paradigm for awareness growth is thus expansion or refinement of the
state space. We acknowledged in various places that limited awareness and
subsequent awareness growth may also affect other aspects of an agent’s
decision problem. In particular, the agent may have limited awareness with
respect to the set of options available to her, and/or she might have limited
awareness with respect to the outcomes that will result from particular
options in particular states of the world.
Our presumption has been that that limited awareness and awareness
growth with respect to the option and outcome aspects of an agent’s deci-
sion problem may be treated just as per the state space. After all, options and
outcomes are propositions in our (Jeffrey-inspired) model of the agent’s rea-
soning, just like states are. So in all cases it is simply a matter of the agent’s
underlying proposition space changing, whether by expanstion or refine-
ment. Moreover, it is important to note that by studying (un)awareness of
states we have at least implicitly studied (un)awareness of consequences
too. A discovery of a new state often introduces a new consequence, such
as in the rent-or-buy example, from chapter 3, where the discovery of the
possibility that the landlord sells the apartment (i.e., the discovery of a state)
introduces the possibility of becoming homeless (i.e., an outcome) which
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wasn’t part of the original decision problem.
The idea that all propositions in a decision model (states, outcomes,
and options) can be given the same treatment, as far as (un)awareness is
concerned, is, we suggest, a suitable starting position. Nevertheless, it
deserves further examination. In particular, consider limited awareness
about the option space. On the one hand, options are simply propositions,
and just as an agent may revise her state space, she may later become aware
that she has (or had) more options at a given time than she had realised, or
that the options at hand are (or were) more refined than she had realised.
And yet, on the other hand, perhaps there are further interesting questions
in connection with the option space. These are not just any old propositions;
they are propositions that describe, by the agent’s own lights, things she
can will to happen in the world. Should we expect that special puzzles arise
in connection with awareness growth for propositions of this sort? That is
an important question for future work.
Another avenue for further research concerns the potentially idealised
nature of our basic model for studying limited awareness and awareness
growth. As noted at the outset, our methodology in studying limited
awareness was to consider this phenomenon in isolation. We thus set aside
various other challenges to orthodox expected utility theory. For instance,
we did not entertain generalisations of expected utility theory that accom-
modate alternative representations of an agent’s uncertainty such as impre-
cise probabilities (or sets of probability functions). Nor did we entertain
generalisations of expected utility theory that accommodate, on the pref-
erence side, more complex kinds of risk aversion. For those sympathetic
to theories of either kind, our analysis can be understood as making cer-
tain idealising assumptions, for instance, that in the cases we examine the
agent’s credences are precise probabilities and she is moreover risk-neutral
in whatever is the relevant sense of that term.
But idealising in this way may not be apt if in fact the phenomenon
of awareness growth is not independent (in a normative sense) of the rep-
resentation of uncertainty and/or risk aversion. Let us focus just on the
former issue. One might think that an appropriate response to awareness
growth requires “going imprecise”: roughly, the “new” propositions of
which one has become aware are assigned maximally imprecise credence
(perhaps conditional on some relevant “old” proposition). Moreover, one
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might think that when an agent anticipates awareness growth, her uncer-
tainty is often so severe that it is best represented by imprecise probabilities.
As such, one might argue that allowing credences to be imprecise is crucial
for modelling awareness growth and the anticipation of it in a compelling
way, and for expressing the relevant norms.
While we have some sympathy for this line, we think it would be very
surprising indeed if imprecise credence were rationally mandated for grow-
ing awareness and/or its anticipation. And, as noted above, we do not think
the mere permissibility of imprecise credence in contexts of growing aware-
ness undercuts our analysis. Those who subscribe to imprecise credence
being rationally permissible can view our method as one of idealisation:
we assume that in all cases under investigation the agent happens to have
precise credences. Ditto for non-standard kinds of risk aversion. It would
be extremely surprising if growing awareness mandated some particular
risk-averse attitude. And if non-standard kinds of risk aversion are merely
permissible, then this does not compromise our approach to studying grow-
ing awareness.
All that said, it remains an interesting project to relax any idealisations
or scope restrictions that are inherent in our analysis. We welcome further
investigation of how growing awareness interacts with non-standard rep-
resentations of uncertainty and risk aversion. Note that some inroads have
already been made on this project, at least with respect to imprecise atti-
tudes. For instance, Bradley (2017: ch. 12) permits imprecise attitudes in his
exposition of growing awareness. Economists Dominiak and Tserenjigmid
(2018) explore in a working paper the transition from precise to imprecise
probabilities upon growing awareness and suggest constraints on such a
transition. Our findings in this book provide a base from which to ex-
amine these models/proposals that relate growing awareness to imprecise
attitudes.
There is a further idealisation in our study of growing awareness that is
tangential to the treatment of uncertainty and risk aversion. Our account
makes the standard assumption that agents progress in their reasoning and
view on the world. In particular, no forgetting or becoming less aware is
allowed. The assumption of exclusive progress may be relatively harm-
less for most normative enquiries. However, when it comes to awareness
growth, there may be progressive reasons to eradicate old concepts in one’s
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proposition space, since it may not always be a matter of forgetting. Rather,
it may be a matter of conceptual learning, where old and outdated concepts
are replaced by new ones.
We make this suggestion with caution, because we suspect that this way
of thinking of an agent’s concepts—they they may be replaced by more
explanatory or in some other sense more apt concepts—would represent a
radical departure from the notion of reasoning and learning that decision
theory has been designed to capture. It would involve seeing learning not
as a linear accumulation of knowledge but rather a jerky process that admits
of conceptual revolutions à la Kuhn (1962). So this may be very far from
incremental future research. And it may ultimately be regarded beyond the
scope of decision theory. But all the more reason, we say, to make some
preliminary investigations to see how different reasoning would look were
we to allow for progressive “loss of awareness”.
8.6 Closing remarks
As the above (incomplete) list of issues left out from this book illustrate,
there is still a lot of work to be done on the connection between ratio-
nality and limited awareness. That is, there remain important theoretical
questions quite apart from the many further practical ones associated with
making good decisions under limited awareness. But we believe that we
have nevertheless clarified and moved the frontier of research on limited
awareness. Our main hope for this book, however, is simply that it will
bring further attention to the importance of studying limited and growing
awareness, this being a fundamental aspect of our predicament in the world
as reasoning agents.
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